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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters that empirically investigate questions of in-
creasing relevance in the banking risk and financial economics literature. The first chapter
studies bank risk in the context of its joint determination with bank liquidity and capital
in the Eurozone. The second chapter examines the banks’ appetite for risk using the
comprehensive credit register of the Czech National Bank. Finally, the last chapter refers
to model risk and analyzes the ability of the selected term structure models to value the
interest rate swaps in the Polish market.
The first chapter analyzes the coordination of bank risk, liquidity and capital in the
presence of securitization. Its outcome contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of
the banking regulations. My findings with regard to the simultaneity of capital and risk
decisions are consistent with previous empirical studies. Incorporation of bank liquidity
permits me to establish the presence of the coordination of risk and liquidity decisions.
At the same time, I find no evidence of the direct joint determination of capital and liq-
uidity. Finally, the first chapter partially confirms the theoretical implications of Repullo
(2005).
The second chapter, coauthored with Adam Geršl, Petr Jakubík, Steven Ongena and
José-Luis Peydró, addresses the question of banks’ appetite for risk. In particular, we
examine the impact of monetary conditions on the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the
Czech Republic. Our duration analysis indicates that expansionary monetary conditions
promote risk-taking among banks. At the same time, a lower interest rate during the life
of a loan reduces its riskiness.
The third chapter refers to model risk and analyzes the performance of the selected
term structure models when valuing interest rate swaps in the Polish market. The Nelson-
Siegel, cubic interpolation and CIR models generate adequate fit and transaction values
similar to the realized contract values. The ample performance of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
model suggests the rate-reliant nature of the interest rate volatility. The underperfor-
mance of Vasicek’s emphasizes the role of the cross section of interest rates, and thus the
importance of a no-arbitrage argument. Finally, the ex-post accuracy of the Nelson-Siegel
and the cubic spline models indicates that a current cross-section of the yield curve is




Tato dizertace obsahuje tři kapitoly, ve kterých jsou empiricky zkoumány klasické otázky
bankovní rizika a finanční ekonomie. V první kapitole zkoumám jestli bankovní likvidita,
kapitál a riziko jsou společně určeny v bankovním sektoru eurozóny. Ve druhé kapitole,
spolu s Adamom Geršlem, Petrem Jakubíkem, Stevnem Ongena a José-Luis Peydró,
zkoumáme roli měnových podmínek pro bankovní rizika v sektoru v ČR. Používǎme
komplexní úvěrověho registru České národní banky. Třetí kapitola se vztahuje na mod-
eloveho rizika a analyzuje výkonnost vybraného modelu vynosove krivky při oceňování
úrokové swapy na polském trhu. Cox-Ingersoll-Ross navrhuje ze volatilita souvisi z ve-
likosti úrokových sazeb. Ex-post Nelson-Siegel model ukazuje, že prurez výnosove křivky
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This dissertation consists of three chapters which empirically examine questions of in-
creasing relevance in the banking risk and financial economics literature. The first chapter
studies bank risk in the context of its joint determination with bank liquidity and capital
in the Eurozone banking sector. The second chapter examines the banks’ appetite for
risk using the comprehensive credit register of the Czech National Bank. Finally, the
last chapter refers to model risk and analyzes the ability of the selected term structure
models to value interest rate swaps in the Polish market.
The recent financial turmoil and developments leading to its emergence have altered
the key sources of banks’ risks. Financial innovations, deregulation and competition from
non-bank financial intermediaries encouraged banks to seek higher returns and securitize
their loans. The new banking model and banks’ greater reliance on wholesale credi-
tors have emphasized the importance of bank liquidity buffers. At the same time, the
"originate-to-distribute" model and securitization might have resulted in an increased in-
terdependence of bank capital, liquidity and risk. This process has revitalized a need for a
proper recognition of risk, on balance and off-balance sheet, and led to revisions of bank-
ing regulations. This dissertation contributes to the discussion on banking regulations by
drawing conclusions from the analysis of risk, liquidity and capital coordination in the
Eurozone banking sector. The crisis has also fueled the discussion about the complexity
of valuation of contemporary financial instruments. Following the crisis, practitioners
and regulators have raised concerns regarding opaque financial products and their pric-
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ing. This dissertation poses a more basic question, namely it discusses the usefulness
of advanced term structure models in valuation of plain vanilla interest rate sensitive
derivatives. Finally, the relaxed monetary policy of major central banks has been listed
among the causes of the recent financial turbulence. Existing theoretical work shows how
changes in short-term interest rates may affect risk-taking by financial institutions, and
empirical investigations that followed, largely confirmed the theoretical concepts. This
dissertation complements the existing empirical studies with an analysis of the impact
of monetary conditions on the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the Czech Republic, a
small open economy with independent monetary policy and a banking sector dominated
by the foreign ownership.
The first chapter investigates bank risk in the context of its joint determination with
bank liquidity and capital. The study analyzes the coordination of bank liquidity, capital
and risk in the presence of securitization. Its outcome contributes to the debate on the
effectiveness of the banking regulations. The empirical strategy relies on the system of
simultaneous equations and the partial adjustment approach, introduced by Shrieves and
Dahl (1992) and advanced by Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003). The estimation results for
the securitization show that higher risk in the previous period implies greater securiti-
zation in the next period. My findings with regard to the simultaneity of capital and
risk decisions are consistent with the previous empirical studies. Incorporation of bank
liquidity permits me to establish a presence of the coordination of risk and liquidity de-
cisions. At the same time, I find no evidence of the direct joint determination of capital
and liquidity. Finally, the first chapter partially confirms the theoretical implications of
Repullo (2005).
The second chapter, coauthored with Adam Geršl, Petr Jakubík, Steven Ongena and
José-Luis Peydró, addresses the question of banks’ appetite for risk. In particular, we
examine the impact of monetary conditions on the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the
Czech Republic. Our duration analysis indicates that expansionary monetary conditions
promote risk-taking among banks. At the same time, a lower interest rate during the life
of a loan reduces its riskiness. While seeking to assess the association between banks’
appetite for risk and the short-term interest rate we answer a set of questions related to
the difference between higher liquidity versus credit risk and the effect of a policy rate
2
conditioned on bank and borrower characteristics.
The third chapter refers to model risk and analyzes five term structure models in order
to compare their ability to capture the interest rate dynamics and value the interest rate
swaps in the Polish market. Although model risk is typically associated with complex
derivatives, the choice of a plain interest rate derivative allows for examination of model
risk in the case of a dynamically growing OTC market, such as the Polish one, and a
wider selection of interest rate models, which includes the frameworks of Nelson and Siegel
(1987), Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), Heath et al. (1992) and the cu-
bic spline curves. The performance and predictive accuracy of the term structure models
are assessed based on the realized contract values. The Nelson-Siegel, cubic interpola-
tion and CIR models generate adequate fit and transaction values similar to the realized
contract values. The Vasicek’s approach gives contract values statistically different from
the amounts actually swapped. The ample performance of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model
suggests the rate-reliant nature of the interest rate volatility. The underperformance of
Vasicek’s emphasizes the role of the cross section of interest rates, and thus the impor-
tance of a no-arbitrage argument. Finally, the ex-post accuracy of the Nelson-Siegel and
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This chapter investigates the capital, risk and liquidity decisions of the European
banks in the period from 2001 to 2007. We examine the coordination of bank liquidity,
capital and risk in the presence of securitization. The empirical strategy relies on the
system of simultaneous equations and the partial adjustment approach, introduced by
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and advanced by Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003). The esti-
mation results for the securitization show that higher risk in the previous period implies
greater securitization in the next period. Our findings with regard to the simultaneity of
capital and risk decisions are consistent with the previous empirical studies. Incorpora-
tion of bank liquidity enables us to establish the presence of the coordination of risk and
liquidity decisions. At the same time, we find no evidence of the direct joint determina-
tion of capital and liquidity. This outcome contributes to the debate on the effectiveness
of the banking regulations. Finally, this study partially confirms the theoretical implica-
tions of Repullo (2005).
JEL Classification: G21, G28
Key Words: bank regulation, risk taking, bank capital, bank liquidity
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1.1 Introduction
Financial supervision authorities impose regulations on banks to ensure the safety and
soundness of the banking system. Unregulated banks are believed to maintain too lit-
tle capital and liquidity to absorb losses. Furthermore, it has been established that the
resilient banking sector facilitates proper financial intermediation and enhances capital
allocation in the economy. The key role of financial intermediation to the performance of
the real sector has been empirically established, for instance by Rousseau and Rousseau
and Wachtel (1998) or Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008). Therefore, achieving
and maintaining financial stability has been one of the main concerns of policy makers
and has gained attention from researchers, as has the ongoing reform process of the bank-
ing industry launched in response to the recent financial crisis. Until recently, it had been
believed that a bank’s access to funding liquidity vitally depends on its assets’ quality.
Due to this commonly shared belief liquidity regulations were absent. The capital re-
quirements were to assert the proper quality of bank assets and, in addition, the bank’s
sufficient liquidity. The recent crisis revealed the collective over-confidence in this respect.
The recent financial turmoil and developments leading to its emergence have altered
the traditional roles performed by banking firms and the key sources of their risks. Finan-
cial innovations, deregulation and competition from the non-bank financial intermediaries
encouraged banks to seek higher returns and securitize their loans. The new "originate
and distribute" banking model, and banks’ greater reliance on wholesale creditors, em-
phasized the importance of liquidity requirements. At the same time, the "originate-to-
distribute" model and securitization might have resulted in an increased interdependence
of bank capital, liquidity and risk. This process has revitalized a need for a proper
recognition of risk, on balance and off-balance sheet, and led to revisions of banking
regulations. One of the previously neglected determinants of bank risk is securitization
activity. Furthermore, should the joint reshuffling of the two financial buffers and risk
be confirmed by the banks’ behavior, the design of banking regulations would need to
account for this coordination effect. Any pairwise analysis overlooking the interplay be-
tween the two buffers and the asset quality may lead to inadequate regulatory liquidity
and capital provisions.
Charles University, and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
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This paper tests whether banks coordinate their decisions on credit risk, capital and
liquidity. In a sense, the main idea of this study was formulated years ago in banks’
annual reports, where one may find descriptions of integrated approaches to managing
capital, liquidity and balance sheet risk exposure, and the role of securitization in releas-
ing capital and liquidity designed to fuel the banks’ business growth1. Finding evidence
for joint allocation of capital, liquidity and risk and for the role of securitization could
shed some light on the way banks have relaxed the constraints of existing regulations
and may have important implications for a potential revision of the banking regulations.
While investigating the European banks’ coordination of the quality of assets, capital
and liquidity we - to some extent - test the predictions of Repullo (2005). Although
Repullo (2005) focuses on the implications of the presence of the lender of last resort
for bank liquidity, it also establishes that higher capital and liquidity induces lower risk.
Our empirical investigation tests the latter theoretical relationship for the EMU banks.
Repullo’s conclusions regarding the reverse relations are more ambiguous. Nevertheless
Repullo (2005), unlike many previous theoretical studies, does not ignore banks’ liquidity
buffers. Notably, it is the first theoretical paper to jointly model banks liquidity, capital
and risk decisions. Therefore, we refer to its findings when discussing our empirical results.
This chapter is organized as follows: the following section discusses the theoretical and
empirical literature, Section 3 outlines the methodology and model specification, while
Section 4 describes the dataset. The estimation results are presented in Section 5 and
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
1.2 Literature Overview
Financial intermediation enhances capital allocation in the economy. Among essential
functions performed by banks, banking theory identifies asset transformation, which in
turn involves risk associated with financing illiquid loans with short-term deposits. This
mismatch causes banks’ vulnerability to depositors’ confidence. Sufficient bank solvency
1For instance, Deutsche Bank states already in its report for the year 2000 that it carried out secu-
ritization transactions, which allowed for "growth by substantially reducing tied capital". And then it
describes the success of its Global ALCO that managed "all strategic decisions on financial resources,
including the allocation of capital, liquidity and balance sheet to the Group Divisions. This integrated
approach enabled the Bank to release [. . .] regulatory capital through asset securitizations."
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and liquidity are tools to maintain confidence in banking sectors. The academic litera-
ture on bank capital and capital regulations in the banking system has by now grown
plentiful. Liquidity, on the contrary, is a more complex concept and has only recently
emerged in banking firm theory. Baltensperger (1980) is the first to draw attention to a
bank liquidity buffer. He analyzes the liquidity buffer from a perspective of the inventory
theory. Baltensperger (1980) argues that, on one hand, it is costly for banks to keep a
stock of liquid assets. However, it is at the same time beneficiary, since liquidity buffers
reduce the probability of being ’out of stock’ in case of deposit withdrawals. His study
predicts that the size of liquidity buffer should reflect the cost of forgone return from
holding liquid assets rather than loans, and the cost of raising funds at a short notice.
Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka (1986) introduce liquidity risk into Monti-Klein model and
show that the expected cost of liquidity shortage augments the cost of bank’s resources.
Until Repullo (2005), little if any attention has been paid to modeling liquidity buffers.
His paper investigates a strategic interaction between a bank and the lender of last re-
sort, and concludes that the introduction of the latter reduces the size of bank’s liquidity
buffer. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge it is the first theoretical study that
addresses the question of banks’ decisions about their level of capital, risk as well as
liquidity. Repullo (2005) studies optimal liquidity, capital and risk choice with and with-
out capital requirement, penalty rates and collateral lending. Crucial to our analysis is
the result obtained under the capital requirement where the bank is obliged to maintain
the amount of equity no lower than regulatory κ portion of its investment in the risky
asset (1−λ). Appendix A.2 features derivations of Repullo (2005) equilibrium under the
capital requirement. In this equilibrium, the first-order condition (A.2.20) characterizing
the bank’s choice of risk suggests that higher capital and liquidity buffers imply lower
risk. This outcome is obtained regardless of the type of the distribution function of the
liquidity shock.
The conclusions of Repullo (2005) regarding the reverse relations are less straightfor-
ward. The bank’s optimal level of capital is derived for a particular density function of
liquidity shocks. Specifically, Repullo employs a simple case of a beta distribution, which
ensures that larger liquidity shocks are less likely than small ones. For this choice, the
9
equilibrum level of capital becomes the corner solution: k∗ = κ(1− λ∗). In this case, the
optimal level of capital depends depends inversely on the optimal level of liquidity. The
results for the optimal level of liquidity are obtained solely numerically. In our investiga-
tion we focus on the general outcome, that is the derivations describing the bank’s choice
of optimal risk.
An insightful overview of theoretical approaches to bank capital is presented in Van-
Hoose (2007), who discusses the efficiency of deposit insurance and solvency ratio as
disciplining tools in the frameworks ranging from pure portfolio choice to moral hazard
and incentive models. The stream of literature regarding banks as portfolio managers
indicates that the imposition of a solvency ratio is likely to yield efficient and less risky
asset allocation, providing that the risk weights are market based. On the other hand,
the strand of literature viewing banks mostly as monitors for moral hazard argues that
capital requirements may increase banks’ risk appetites. The underlying rationale is that
banks would seek to compensate for the costs of maintaining a capital cushion by in-
curring higher risk and increasing expected returns. Under the portfolio approach, first
presented by Kahane (1977) and later advanced by Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim
and Santomero (1988), a binding capital constraint changes the optimal composition of
the bank’s portfolio. The way in which the asset allocation is altered depends critically
on the risk weights used in the solvency ratio. Koehn and Santomero (1980) employ a
fixed capital-to-asset ratio and find that more stringent restriction on leveraging induces
banks to augment their holdings of risky assets, which from the supervisory point of view
is definitely an unintended outcome.
With mounting discussions on deficiencies of the Basel Capital Accord (1998), includ-
ing the flat rate, the idea of uniform solvency ratio has been superseded by a risk-based
approach. In their seminal paper, Kim and Santomero (1988) formally contrast the two
approaches and establish that stricter uniform capital ratio regulation eliminates some
leveraged parts of the bank’s opportunity set. However, the optimal reduction in the
insolvency risk is obtained under the risk-based plan. The most comprehensive study of
economic theory implications for solvency restrictions and deposit insurance in various
analytical banking models is due to Rochet (1992). Rochet shows that in the complete
markets setup capital requirements prove to be a very inapt tool for limiting the risk
taken by banks. In this case an increase in solvency ratio triggers portfolio reallocation
10
leading to specialization in risky assets. Most importantly, Rochet proves that capital
requirements attain the desired outcome in the portfolio model if and only if the risk
weights are proportional to the market betas of respective assets. Other-than-market-
based risk weights cause excessive investment in riskier assets, which corroborates with
Kim and Santomero (1988) result. When Rochet extends his model to account for the
limited liability of banks even market-based capital ratio does not prevent undercapi-
talized banks from specializing in riskier assets. This plethora of theoretical conflicting
recommendations has motivated researchers to empirically examine the bank capital and
capital regulations issues.
One of the most recognized empirical studies of capital buffers is due to Shrieves
and Dahl (1992), who investigate changes in banks’ capital and risk levels in order to de-
termine which of the theoretical arguments are supported by the US data. They identify
one theoretical rationale for a negative risk and capital dependence and four arguments
predicting a positive relation between risk and leverage. In their opinion, a negative
link is likely to characterize banks seeking to exploit deposit insurance subsidy, while
those under regulatory pressure, facing high bankruptcy or regulatory costs, as well as
banks exhibiting managerial risk aversion tend to adjust risk and leverage levels likewise.
Shrieves and Dahl test the capital-risk relation using a simultaneous equations model
with partial adjustment framework and find support for the effectiveness of regulatory
policies on banks’ capital and risk decisions. Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003) build on
Shrieves and Dahl’s framework and examine German banks’ risk-capital decisions. In
addition to pooled regressions, Heid, Porath, and Stolz employ dynamic panel data tech-
niques, subsample and rolling window approach. They test whether banks approaching
the regulatory minimum adjust their leverage, risk or both and verify the impact of min-
imal capital ratio on well-capitalized banks. Their study indicates that banks adjust
leverage faster than risk. However the speed does not depend on the level of capital
buffers. Moreover, Heid, Porath, and Stolz establish that low capitalized banks tend to
rebuild their capital cushions, while banks with substantial buffers tend to maintain their
leverage levels and alter solely their allocation of risky assets.
The first broad investigation of determinants of banks’ liquidity buffers is due to As-
pachs, Nier, and Tiesset (2005), who build on theoretical implications of Repullo (2005).
Aspachs, Nier and Tiesset study the liquidity policy of the UK banks and find that the
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higher the bank’s expectations of receiving assistance from the lender of last resort the
lower the liquidity buffers maintained. Their study also suggests that liquidity buffers
are counter-cyclical as a result of the financial constraints on the banks’ lending policy.
Aspachs, Nier, and Tiesset (2005), however, focuse mainly on the liquidity moral haz-
ard in the UK banking system and the interaction between the macroeconomic situation
and the banks’ liquidity buffers. In contrast, we employ the comprehensive theoretical
framework of Repullo (2005) to investigate its implications for the banks’ coordination of
liquidity, capital and risk decisions. The first study to investigate the relation between
banks’ capital, credit risk and securitization was by Dionne and Harchaoui (2008). They
find that securitization activity negatively affects banks’ capital ratios and positively af-
fects their credit risk. In other words, banks that are involved in securitization tend to
be more risky. Moreover, banks constrained by the solvency ratio increase their securi-
tization activity. In their opinion, a high risk level prevailing together with high total
capital adequacy ratios suggests that BIS weights may inadequately capture the riskiness
of banking activities.
1.3 Methodology and Model Specification
1.3.1 Determinants of Securitization
This paper tests whether banks coordinate their decisions on credit risk, capital and
liquidity. We first focus on securitization as this activity is likely to provide an additional
link for the interplay of risk, capital and liquidity. The immediate effect of securitization
is a reduction in the risk-weighted assets and untying of regulatory capital due to a re-
moval of the securitized loans from the bank’s balance sheet. Whether or not it decreases
the overall risk exposure depends on the bank’s lending and investment strategies and
the competitiveness of the financial sector. Financing new assets with the released liq-
uidity should result in an increased diversification and should lower the bank risk. While
Instefjord (2005) recognizes the benefits of risk sharing, he additionally shows that se-
curitization encourages more risk-taking. Increased competition in the financial markets
strengthens the impact of the latter effect (Instefjord (2005)). Moreover, Greenbaum and
Thakor (1987) argue that banks tend to withhold poorer quality assets. Given the benign
macroeconomic conditions and the search for yield observed in the analyzed period, we
expect a positive dependancy between the asset quality, measured by credit risk, and
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the securitization activity. The predictions about the interaction between the liquidity
and securitization and bank capital and securitization are even less evident. Therefore,
we simply expect to obtain a significant relation. The research hypotheses regarding the
securitization can be summarized as:
(HA 1.1) Higher risk in the previous period implies greater securitization in the next
period.
(HA 1.2) There is a significant impact of the liquidity and capital on the securitization
in the next period.
To verify the validity of these predictions we estimate the equation for the securitization
activity given by:
∆SECi,t = ξCAPi,t−1 + ψRISKi,t−1 + ζLIQi,t−1 + CONTROLS + ωi,t (1.1)
where CAPi,t−1 , RISKi,t−1 and LIQi,t−1 are the previous period levels of bank capital,
risk and liquidity defined as in the next section. Following Altunbas, Gambacorta, and
Marques-Ibanez (2009), SECi,t relates the flow of the securitized lending in the current
year to the total assets in the previous year. Using equation (1.1) we test whether ψ
is positive and ψ, ξ and ζ are significant. All variable definitions are also provided in
Table A1.1. The bank controls are bank-level variables affecting the decision to sell
loans. Due to the economies of scale, the bank size is a good candidate for a control
variable. Additionally, the alternative cost of funding new assets is likely to impact the
securitization activity. Banks able to attract "cheap" deposits (low interest on deposits) or
with a lot of "cheap" capital (low return on capital) should be less prone to finance new
assets with securitization (for a detailed discussion refer to Han, Park, and Pennacchi
(2010)). In our case, the size effect proved to significantly influence the securitization
activity.
1.3.2 Coordination of Risk, Capital and Liquidity
As already mentioned, the main goal of this paper is to test whether banks coordinate
their decisions on credit risk, capital and liquidity. By doing so, to some extent we verify
the predictions of Repullo (2005). Repullo (2005) studies the implications of the presence
of the lender of last resort for the bank liquidity. However Repullo also derives optimal
liquidity, capital and risk choice with and without capital requirement, penalty rates and
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collateral lending. The outcome obtained under the capital requirement, where the bank
is obliged to maintain the amount of equity no lower than regulatory κ portion of its
investment in the risky asset (1 - λ), is vital to our analysis. A simplified exposition
of the banking model of Repullo (2005) is provided in Appendix A.2. In short, Repullo
argues that higher capital and liquidity induces lower risk. Conclusions regarding the
reverse relations are more ambiguous. The bank’s optimal level of capital is derived for
a simple case of a beta distribution of liquidity shocks. Such a density function ensures
that larger liquidity shocks are less likely than small ones. For this choice, the equilibrum
level of capital becomes the corner solution: k∗ = κ(1 − λ∗). In this case, the optimal
level of capital depends inversely on the optimal level of liquidity. The results for the
optimal level of liquidity are obtained solely numerically. In our investigation we focus
on the general outcome, that is the derivations describing the bank’s choice of optimal
risk.
While testing the implications of economic theory for the relationship between cap-
ital, risk and liquidity we employ a simultaneous equations estimation with partial ad-
justments. An important aspect of this approach is that it recognizes the simultaneity of
leverage and risk decision-making, which is suggested by the theory and emphasized in
the work of Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003), among others.
The observed changes in banks’ leverage, risk and liquidity levels are caused not solely
by banks’ discretionary behavior, but also as a result of unanticipated shocks. This argu-
ment has been emphasized by Hart and Jaffee (1974) and incorporated in most previous
empirical studies. Accordingly, we model observed changes in capital, liquidity and risk
as the sum of a discretionary component and a random shock. The fact that we obtain
solely the estimates for the discretionary part of the observed changes is one of the jus-
tifications for the use of a partial adjustment framework. An even stronger rationale for
using partial adjustment stems from rigidities and adjustment costs assumed in a number
of theoretical banking models. This framework presumes that banks aim at establishing
optimal capital, risk and liquidity and, when driven away from those targets by exogenous
shocks, adjust their actual levels gradually. Full adjustments might be simply too costly
or unfeasible. The partial adjustment can be generally expressed as:
∆CAPit = α∆CAP
D
it + ϵit (1.2)
∆RISKit = β∆RISK
D




it + ηit (1.4)
where ∆CAPit, ∆RISKit and ∆LIQit are the observed changes, while ∆CAPDit , ∆RISKDit
and ∆LIQDit are the endogenously determined changes in bank’s capital, risk and liquid-
ity respectively. The coefficients α, β and γ capture the speed of adjustment for capital,
risk and liquidity. Following the conventional approach in the field, we estimate equa-
tions for the changes and not the absolute values of capital, risk and liquidity. In fact, in
the absence of the theory on optimal leverage, modeling deviations from banks’ internal
targets within the partial adjustment framework becomes a very convenient strategy for
conducting empirical studies. As a result, we obtain the following equations:
∆CAPit = α(CAP
∗
i,t − CAPi,t−1) + ϵit (1.5)
∆RISKit = β(RISK
∗
i,t −RISKi,t−1) + νit (1.6)
∆LIQit = γ(LIQ
∗
i,t − LIQi,t−1) + ηit (1.7)
The unobservable internal targets are usually captured by proxies, which are sug-
gested by banking theory, such as bank’s size or return on assets. First, however, we
discuss the measures of capital, risk and liquidity and only afterwards do we turn to their
unobservable targets. The simultaneity of capital, risk and liquidity decisions implies
that the system of equations (1.5 -1.7) becomes:
∆CAPit = α(CAP
∗
i,t − CAPi,t−1) + ϕ1∆RISKi,t + φ1∆LIQi,t + ϵit (1.8)
∆RISKit = β(RISK
∗
i,t −RISKi,t−1) + τ1∆CAPi,t + φ2∆LIQi,t + νit (1.9)
∆LIQit = γ(LIQ
∗
i,t − LIQi,t−1) + ϕ2∆RISKi,t + τ2∆CAPi,t + ηit (1.10)
Finally, we can formulate our research hypotheses regarding the coordination effect and
the test of Repullo’s predictions as follows:
(HA 2) There is a significant impact of the risk, capital and liquidity on each other.
(HA 3) Higher capital and liquidity imply lower risk.
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1.3.3 Empirical Model and Variable Measures
Empirical studies commonly use one of the following measures of capital, either the
leverage ratio or the risk-based capital ratio. The leverage ratio is defined as total capital
over total assets and the risk-based capital ratio is total capital to risk-weighted assets.
The latter measure has become more popular after the introduction of risk-based regu-
lation (see for example Jacques and Nigro (1997), Ediz, Michael, and Perraudin (1998),
Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) and Rime (2001)). Given our definition of RISK, we
measure capital as the leverage ratio2 (CAP ). The definition of risk causes even more
problems. The empirical investigations mostly rely on the ratio of risk-weighted assets
to total assets (RWATA ) as the risk measure. Such a choice stems from the belief that,
by reflecting the allocation of bank’s assets among risk categories, RWATA is the true
determinant of a bank’s risk. However, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) argue that RWATA ne-
glects the impact of loans quality and add a third equation, with nonperforming loans as
an additional measure of risk. Contrary to them, Jacques and Nigro (1997), Rime (2001)
and Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003) claim that RWATA captures both the allocation and
quality of portfolio risk and rely solely on this risk measure. We also employ the ratio
of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RISK), since together with our capital measure
they constitute the BIS capital adequacy ratio imposed on the EU banks to monitor their
soundness. Finally, liquidity (LIQ) is measured by the relation of liquid assets to total
assets (see for instance Aspachs, Nier, and Tiesset (2005)). The liquid assets comprise
cash, reverse repos, bills and commercial papers. All variable definitions are summarized
in Table A1.1.
The partial adjustment models account for the unobservable targets with the help of
variables describing the nature of the bank’s business and its current financial stance. For
the sake of comparability we rely on variables typically chosen in the related empirical
literature. As a rule, the bank size (SIZE) is considered to affect the target leverage,
liquidity and risk. SIZE is measured as the logarithm of a bank’s total assets. Among
others, the size effect matters for relative access to capital and liquidity, for the investment
possibilities and diversification of bank activities. Additionally, due to the economies of
scale in screening and monitoring, bigger banks might have less risky loan portfolios. Still,
the sign of the size effect on the risk, capital and liquidity is undetermined. Loan losses
2The same measure is used for instance in Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Heid, Porath, and Stolz
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lower the amount of risk-weighted assets and thus may affect the risk target. Additionally
to the size effect, we proxy the capital target by the ratio of net income to total assets
(ROA). We expect a positive coefficient on the return on assets. Earnings, if retained,
increase the capital. The bank size and loan losses are assumed to influence the target level
of risk. We approximate loan losses (LLOSS) with the ratio of new loan loss provisions
over the sum of banks’ loans net loan loss reserves. LLOSS is included in the risk
equation with an expected negative sign. Among the idiosyncratic factors influencing the
liquidity target we include the bank size and the loan growth rate (↑ LOAN). The loan
growth rate is defined as new lending volume over the loan portfolio in the previous year.
Finally, we include the year dummies. Thus, the system of equations to be estimated
takes the following form:
∆CAPit = α0 + α1SIZEi,t + α2ROAi,t − α3CAPi,t−1 + α4∆RISKi,t
+α5∆LIQi,t + α6∆SECi,t +DUMMIESY EAR + ϵit (1.11)
∆RISKit = β0 + β1SIZEi,t + β2LLOSSi,t − β3RISKi,t−1 + β4∆CAPi,t
+β5∆LIQi,t + β6∆SECi,t +DUMMIESY EAR + νit (1.12)
∆LIQit = γ0 + γ1SIZEi,t + γ2 ↑ LOANi,t − γ3LIQi,t−1 + γ4∆CAPi,t
+γ5∆RISKi,t + γ6∆SECi,t +DUMMIESY EAR + ηit (1.13)
1.3.4 Estimation Strategy
Given the simultaneous nature of the model, the estimation strategy has to account for
the endogeneity of ∆CAPit, ∆LIQit and ∆LIQit. The two-stage least squares and three-
stage least squares (3SLS) take into account the endogeneity of the regressors and yield
consistent estimates. As we wish to recognize the contemporaneous correlation between
the error terms in the three equations, we use 3SLS procedure. In such cases 3SLS
produces asymptotically more efficient estimates3. Typically, the empirical studies in the
(2003).
3For a description of the procedure refer to econometric textbooks, e.g. (Baltagi 2008), pp. 131-132.
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field rely on the pooled 3SLS methodology. Therefore, for the sake of comparability and
as a robustness check, we estimate and report the results for the three-stage least squares.
In the absence of the unobserved heterogeneity, the 3SLS procedure produces unbiased
estimates. However, when the "left-aside" bank-specific effects are not negligible, the
3SLS outcome is biased. To control for bank-specific heterogeneity we employ dynamic
panel data technique of Blundell and Bond (1999). The two-step Blundell-Bond system
GMM estimator uses lagged variables as instruments in the first difference equations and
lagged first differences in the levels equations. In both estimation techniques we use
dummy variables for the years studied. In addition to the system of the capital, risk and
liquidity equations, we model the bank securitization activity as a function of the three
key variables and the bank size. The securitization is also estimated with the help of the
two-step Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. The fitted values serve as instruments
for the securitization in the system of equations (1.11) - (1.13).
1.4 Data Description
This study uses annual bank financial data gathered from Bankscope, Bloomberg and
AMC Dealogic (former Bondware). Bankscope is a commercial database maintained by
International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd. and Bureau van Dijk, which contains financial
results for banks together with such additional metrics as Fitch ratings. Dealogic is
an independent data distributor, which provides information on various over-the-counter
structural finance transactions and syndicated loans. We use the extended dataset of
ABS securities and cash flow CDOs from Dealogic employed in Altunbas, Gambacorta,
and Marques-Ibanez (2009). When it comes to the financial statements data, if both
consolidated and unconsolidated figures are available, the consolidated ones are utilized.
We analyze annual data since this frequency accounts for more discretionary behavior by
capturing long-term trends. The dataset covers the period 2000 to 2007. However, due
to the use of first differences and lagged values, the reported results refer to 2002-2007.
The number of analyzed banks differs across years from 201 to 443 (see Table A1.4).
We consider solely the banks operating in the Eurozone. The number of bank records
is limited by the data availability. Table 1.1 displays main descriptive statistics for the
obtained data, while Table A1.2 and Table A1.3 present the bivariate dependencies in our
sample. The rationale for the variable selection is discussed in the sections: Empirical
Model and Variable Measures and Determinants of Securitization. All variable definitions
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are summarized in Table A1.1.
Table 1.1: Data Descriptive Statistics
Variable Type Freq. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
RISK # year 2, 477 0.605 0.313 0.011 2.693
CAP # year 2, 477 0.090 0.061 0.002 0.632
LIQ # year 2, 458 0.148 0.165 0 0.988
SEC # year 2, 477 3.969 26.37 0 532
SIZE # year 2, 477 15.21 2.44 9.47 21.67
ROA % year 2, 477 0.895 0.976 −11.13 20.25
LLOSS # year 2, 366 0.004 0.026 −0.733 0.407
↑ LOAN % year 2, 097 15.63 29.28 −96 256
1.5 Estimation Results
The estimation results for Equation (1.1) are presented in Table 1.2. We estimate the
securitization activity using the dynamic panel data procedure discussed in the section
Estimation Strategy. This approach allows us to account for the possible bank-specific
effects. To capture the two-way relation of risk, capital, liquidity and securitization, we
use GMM-type instruments for CAPi,t−1, RISKi,t−1 and LIQi,t−1. The Hansen test indi-
cates the validity of the instruments. The condition for the GMM estimator consistency is
also met. The test reports serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals and the lack
of the serial correlation for the second-order differences. The results show that the size
effect play a significant role in the determination of the level of securitization (0.488∗∗).
More importantly, the estimate for RISKi,t−1 is significant and amounts to 4.695∗∗.
Therefore, we find evidence to support our hypothesis (HA 1.1). Higher risk in the
previous period implies greater securitization in the next period. The outcome suggests
no significant influence of liquidity and capital on securitization (H0 1.2). The fitted val-
ues obtained for securitization serve as instruments in the estimation of the coordination
of the risk, capital and liquidity bank decisions.
With respect to the coordination of capital, risk and liquidity adjustments, the pooled
3SLS and the dynamic panel estimations agree on the simultaneity of the risk and cap-
ital decisions as well as the impact of the risk adjustment on the liquidity correction.
None of the methodology finds evidence of the simultaneity between capital and liquid-
ity. Therefore, our hypothesis (HA 2) is solely partially supported. In each equation, the
effect of the fitted securitization proves to be insignificant. Its effect is likely to be already
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captured by the levels of endogenous variables themselves. As each equation includes cor-
responding lagged variables, CAPi,t−1, RISKi,t−1 and LIQi,t−1, each of them is identified.
The validity of the overidentifying restrictions is confirmed by the Hansen test (see the
estimation output in Tables 1.3 - 1.5). To capture the simultaneity of risk, capital and liq-
uidity in the dynamic approach, we use GMM-type instruments for CAPi,t−1, RISKi,t−1
and LIQi,t−1. The Hansen test indicates the validity of the instruments. The condition
for the GMM estimator consistency is also met. The test reports serial correlation in
the first-differenced residuals and the lack of the serial correlation for the second-order
differences (for details refer to Tables 1.3 -1.5). The outcome for the capital equation
are provided in Table 1.3. The 3SLS and Blundell-Bond GMM estimates indicate a pos-
itive coordination of capital and risk. The estimated coefficients for the risk are 0.165∗∗∗
and 0.078∗∗∗ respectively. In addition, both procedures find the significant impact of the
return on assets on the capital adjustment. The sign is as expected and corroborates
with the empirical evidence (e.g. Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003)). The size effect and
the coefficient on CAPt−1 become significant under the dynamic panel treatment. Since
this approach accounts for any possible unaccounted bank-specific effects, the dynamic
panel estimators are regarded as more reliable in this context. The negative adjustment
coefficient (−0.145∗∗∗) supports the validity of the partial adjustment framework. The
size effect indicates the inverse relation between the bank size and the capital adjustment
(−0.001∗∗∗).
Table 1.4 summarizes the results for the risk equation. The 3SLS and Blundell-Bond
GMM estimates indicate a positive coordination of capital and risk. The estimated coef-
ficients for the capital are 3.829∗∗∗ and 2.629∗∗ respectively. Moreover, both procedures
find a significant impact of RISKt−1, which corroborates with the partial adjustment
framework. The GMM estimates for the coordination of the liquidity and risk adjust-
ments is highly significant and amounts to −0.268∗∗∗. Due to the possible unaccounted
bank-specific effects, the dynamic panel estimators are regarded as more reliable. Yet,
the insignificant pooled 3SLS estimate signals the result is not robust. The size effect
becomes marginally significant under the dynamic treatment (−0.006∗). As in the case
of the capital equation, the size effect indicates the inverse relation between the bank size
and the risk adjustment. The impact of the loan losses on the risk adjustment proves to
be insignificant.
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Table 1.2: Determinants of Securitization, 2003-2007
Dep. variable Coefficient























Notes: The dependent variable, SEC, is defined as securitization activity (deal values) in the current year over total
assets at the end of the previous year. SECt−1 and SECt−2 are one- and two-period lags respectively. The fitted values
of securitization are used in subsequent estimations. CAPi,t is total capital over total assets, RISKi,t are risk-weighted
assets over total assets and LIQi,t are liquid assets over total assets. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets.
Significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% in a two-tailed t-test are shown as ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively. Estimation with the
Blundell-Bond Two-Step GMM procedure. To account for simultaneity of risk, capital, liquidity and securitization
adjustments I use GMM-type instruments for CAPi,t−1, RISKi,t−1 and LIQi,t−1. The Hansen test reports a p-value for
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) tests report p-values for the test of no first-order and
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differences residuals.
21
Table 1.3: Simultaneous Estimation for the Capital Equation, 2002-2007
Dep. variable (I) Coefficient (II) Coefficient



















Hansen test 0.127 0.131
AR(1) test - 0.002
AR(2) test - 0.861
Notes: The dependent variable, ∆CAPi,t, is defined as a change in total capital over total assets. ∆RISKi,t is a change
in risk-weighted assets over total assets and ∆LIQi,t is a change in liquid assets over total assets. SEC is a fitted value of
securitization activity (see Table 1.2). ∆ indicates the first difference. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets.
ROA is return on assets. Significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% in a two-tailed t-test are shown as ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗
respectively. (I) The capital equation, the risk equation and the liquidity equation are estimated simultaneously using the
three-stage least squares procedure. The Hansen test reports a p-value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions. (II) Estimation with the Blundell-Bond Two-Step GMM procedure. To account for simultaneity of risk,
capital and liquidity adjustments I use GMM-type instruments for ∆RISKi,t and ∆LIQi,t. The Hansen test reports a
p-value for the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) tests report p-values for the test of no
first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differences residuals.
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Table 1.4: Simultaneous Estimation for the Risk Equation, 2002-2007
Dep. variable (I) Coefficient (II) Coefficient



















Hansen test 0.127 0.299
AR(1) test - 0.001
AR(2) test - 0.100
Notes: The dependent variable ∆RISKi,t is defined as a change in risk-weighted assets over total assets ∆LIQi,t is a
change in liquid assets over total assets and ∆CAPi,t is a change in total capital over total assets. SÊC is a fitted value
of securitization activity (see Table 2). ∆ indicates the first difference. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets.
LLOAN are loan loss provisions over the sum of banks loans net loan loss reserves. Significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% in
a two-tailed t-test are shown as ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively. (I) The capital equation, the risk equation and the liquidity
equation are estimated simultaneously using the three-stage least squares procedure. The Hansen test reports a p-value
for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. (II) Estimation with the Blundell-Bond Two-Step GMM
procedure. To account for simultaneity of risk, capital and liquidity adjustments I use GMM-type instruments for
∆CAPi,t and ∆LIQi,t. The Hansen test reports a p-value for the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(1) and
AR(2) tests report p-values for the test of no first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differences residuals.
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Table 1.5: Simultaneous Estimation for the Liquidity Equation, 2002-2007
Dep. variable (I) Coefficient (II) Coefficient



















Hansen test 0.127 0.148
AR(1) test - 0.000
AR(2) test - 0.268
Notes: The dependent variable is ∆LIQi,t defined as a change in liquid assets over total assets. ∆RISKi,t is a change
in risk-weighted assets over total assets and ∆CAPi,t is a change in total capital over total assets. SÊC is a fitted value
of securitization activity (see Table 2). ∆ indicates the first difference. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets.
↑ LOAN is a loan portfolio growth defined as new volume to previous period loan amount. Significance levels at 10%,
5%, 1% in a two-tailed t-test are shown as ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively. (I) The capital equation, the risk equation and the
liquidity equation are estimated simultaneously using the three-stage least squares procedure. The Hansen test reports a
p-value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. (II) Estimation with the Blundell-Bond Two-Step
GMM procedure. To account for simultaneity of risk, capital and liquidity adjustments I use GMM-type instruments for
∆RISKi,t and ∆CAPi,t. The Hansen test reports a p-value for the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(1) and
AR(2) tests report p-values for the test of no first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differences residuals.
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Table 1.5 presents the estimation outcome for the liquidity equation. The 3SLS and
Blundell-Bond GMM estimates indicate a significant impact of the risk adjustment on
the liquidity adjustment. Yet, the procedures do not agree on the direction of this inter-
action. Given the concerns about the unaccounted bank-specific effects, we rely on the
GMM dynamic estimation and conclude that there is coordination of the risk and liquid-
ity adjustments. As the estimate for the impact of the liquidity adjustment in the risk
equation, the corresponding coefficient for the risk adjustment in the liquidity equation
is negative (−0.101∗∗∗). Both procedures find a significant impact of LIQt−1, which pro-
vides support the partial adjustment framework (−0.168∗∗∗ and −0.366∗∗∗ for the pooled
3SLS and dynamic GMM respectively). In addition, the effect of the loan growth on the
liquidity adjustment proves to be negative and highly significant under both methodolo-
gies (0.0001∗∗∗). The size is significant and negative under the two estimation procedures,
however only marginally significant in the GMM estimation (−0.003∗∗∗ and −0.003∗).
Finally, all estimation results indicate the presence of the coordination of capital and
risk. In addition, the dynamic approach suggests the coordination of liquidity and risk
decisions. Therefore, our hypothesis (HA 2) is partially supported. In particular, we find
no evidence for the coordination of the capital and liquidity decisions. Still, the reshuffling
between the risk and liquidity as well as risk and capital calls for further investigation,
especially in the context of the efficiency of the new capital and liquidity banking reg-
ulations. Furthermore, the estimation results only partially confirm the predictions of
Repullo (2005). The corresponding hypothesis (HA 3) states that higher capital and
liquidity imply lower risk. Our findings suggest that higher capital induces higher risk,
while higher liquidity indeed yields to lower risk. Moreover, we confirm that the partial
adjustment approach to modeling deviations from the internal target levels of risk, capital
and liquidity is the appropriate one. The coefficients on the three lagged variables are
significant, and of the expected size in each equation respectively. By expected sign we
mean the range between −1 and 0, which suggest that after a shock occurs our model
returns to the target equilibrium.
1.6 Conclusion
This study examines the capital, risk and liquidity decisions of the European banks
in the period leading to the recent crisis. In particular, we investigate to what extent
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banks coordinate capital, risk and liquidity adjustments in the presence of securitization.
We employ the partial adjustment approach, introduced by Shrieves and Dahl (1992)
and advanced by Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003). To account for the coordination effect,
we estimate the system of simultaneous equations. The empirical strategy relies on the
dynamic panel estimation and, additionally, includes the pooled 3SLS procedure. Our
research contributes to the debate on the global banking reform process.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to jointly examine capital, risk and
liquidity decisions of the European banks. In line with the previous empirical evidence,
we find support for the simultaneity of capital and risk decisions. In addition, our results
suggest a coordination of risk and liquidity decisions. At the same time, we find no evi-
dence of the direct coordination of capital and liquidity.
Since securitization is one of the previously neglected determinants of the bank risk
and a possible strengthening link for the capital, risk and liquidity coordination, we in-
clude the securitization in our investigations. The estimation results for the securitization
show that higher risk in the previous period implies greater securitization in the next pe-
riod. This study only partially confirms the theoretical implications of Repullo (2005).
Our findings regarding the joint allocation of liquidity and risk suggest how banks could
have relaxed the constraints resulting from the banking regulations. The issue of how the
existing capital requirements proved ineffective is of critical importance to the reform of
the banking regulatory framework.
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Chapter 2
Monetary Conditions and Banks’ Behaviour in
the Czech Republic
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This chapter examines the impact of monetary conditions on the risk-taking behaviour
of banks in the Czech Republic by analysing the comprehensive credit register of the Czech
National Bank. Our duration analysis indicates that expansionary monetary conditions
promote risk-taking among banks. At the same time, a lower interest rate during the life
of a loan reduces its riskiness. While seeking to assess the association between banks’
appetite for risk and the short-term interest rate, we answer a set of questions related to
the difference between higher liquidity versus credit risk and the effect of the policy rate
conditioned on bank and borrower characteristics.
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2.1 Introduction
One of the factors often mentioned as a cause of the recent financial turbulence has been
the relaxed monetary policy of major central banks, which might have increased finan-
cial institutions’ appetite for risk. Monetary policy influences bank behaviour and the
supply of loans via several channels (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). Because of imperfect
information, incomplete contracts and imperfect bank competition, monetary policy may
affect loan supply. In particular, expansive monetary policy may increase bank loan sup-
ply either directly (the bank lending channel) or indirectly by improving borrower net
worth and, hence, by reducing the agency costs of lending (the balance sheet channel). In
the “balance sheet channel”, higher interest rates, by reducing borrower net worth, may
induce a flight to quality from financiers (Bernanke and Gilchrist 1996) or more lending
to borrowers with more pledgeable assets (Matsuyama 2007). On the other hand, when
there is a reduction of overnight rates, financiers start lending more to borrowers that
previously had a too-low net worth (hence, too-high agency costs of lending), because
thanks to the lower rates their net worth rises enough to make lending possible. However,
in this case, the potential softening of credit standards is not regarded as greater bank
appetite for risk induced by low rates.
Recent theoretical work shows how changes in short-term interest rates may affect
risk-taking by financial institutions. This effect has been labelled the “risk-taking chan-
nel” of monetary policy following Borio and Zhu (2012) and can be considered a part
of the credit channel (Diamond and Rajan 2006), and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003).
Borio and Zhu (2012) advocate that the policy rate may affect the risk tolerance of
banks due to increased wealth or the presence of “sticky” targets for rates of return. The
latter transmission mechanism is quite self-explanatory. Banks targeting rigid rates of
returns would reach out to riskier borrowers to recoup their drop in profits at times of
monetary expansion. The former argument rests upon the conjecture that, in general,
the risk tolerance of any economic agent increases with wealth. Such an effect can be
found, for instance, in the mean-variance portfolio framework, where investors become
less risk-averse during economic expansions because their consumption increases relative
to its normal level (Campbell and Cochrane 1999). If risk aversion decreases with wealth,
lower interest rates may in turn induce more risk-taking among banks by augmenting as-
set and collateral values.
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Furthermore, lower interest rates may reduce the threat of deposit withdrawals (Dia-
mond and Rajan 2006), reduce adverse selection problems in credit markets (Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez 2006), improve bank net worth (Stiglitz and Greenwald 2003), or lead to
a search for yield (Rajan 2006), allowing banks to relax their credit standards. This
softening happens not only for riskier loans, which have an adjusted net present value
(NPV) close to zero, but also for average loans. On the other hand, higher interest rates
increase the opportunity cost of holding cash for banks, thus making risky alternatives
more attractive (Smith 2002). Higher interest rates could also reduce bank net worth
down to a point where a “gambling for resurrection” strategy becomes attractive (Kane
1989), and Hellman and Stiglitz (2000). Given the conflicting theoretical implications,
the impact of short-term interest rates on risk-taking is ultimately a critical empirical
question.
Theoretical advancements in the field of monetary policy and bank risk interac-
tion, together with recent economic developments, have invigorated the related empirical
work. Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2009) re-examine the monetary pol-
icy transmission mechanism in the euro area and, contrary to previous studies, accounts
for the role of bank risk. However, Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2009)
concentrate on the influence of bank risk on the credit supply and not risk tolerance as
such. In contrast, Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2014) examine banks’
risk responses to changes in the monetary policy indicator. The study concludes that
low interest rates increase bank risk, but employs solely bank-level and macroeconomic
data. The renewed interest has also fuelled research of bank lending standards. Lown and
Morgan (2006) estimate a VAR model for credit standards, lending volumes and output
fluctuations in order to examine the role of lending frictions on the two latter quantities.
The authors find that fluctuations in commercial credit standards significantly explain
changes in bank loan supply and real GDP. Maddaloni and Scope (2009), on the other
hand, assess the impact of monetary policy on bank lending standards and establish that
lower interest rates lead to softening of bank credit standards.
To the best of our knowledge, the first empirical investigations of the impact of mone-
tary policy on bank risk-taking behaviour were by Ioannidou and Peydró-Alcalde (2007)
and Jiménez and Saurina (2008). The latter tests the effect of interest rates on banks’
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appetite for credit risk on Spanish data, while the former explores this question using the
credit register from Bolivia. Both papers find that in the short run a lower short-term
interest rate augments banks’ appetite for risk, while the medium-term effect is a decrease
in credit risk for existing bank portfolios. In the longer term, both effects yield a net
increase in the risk incurred. The analysis of Bolivian banks’ appetite for risk is further
advanced in Ioannidou and Peydró-Alcalde (2009), where the authors additionally explore
the pricing of credit risk. We draw upon the methodology of Jiménez and Saurina (2008)
and answer many of their questions in the Czech context. The Czech banking sector
has undergone tremendous changes with respect to regulatory policy and banks’ attitude
towards corporate lending and credit risk assessment. The Czech Republic is an example
of an economy that has paved a way from central planning to a small open economy
with a banking sector dominated by foreign ownership. Meanwhile, and in addition to
the transition experience, EU accession and Basel II implementation have taken place.
Clearly, the Czech banking sector is an appealing one to investigate.
Estimating the impact of short-term interest rates on banks’ attitude to liquidity and
credit risk should enhance the understanding of the link between monetary policy and
financial stability in the Czech Republic. This link has been explored using macroeco-
nomic modelling, VAR methodology and bank-by-bank stress testing (e.g. Babouček and
Jančar (2005), Čihák and Heřmánek (2005), and Jakubík and Schmieder (2008)) as well
as validation of credit risk (rating) models on a simulated corporate loan portfolio of the
Czech banking sector Kadlčáková and Keplinger (2004). However, our study is the first
to apply panel data analysis on macroeconomic, bank, loan and borrower data to study
the Czech monetary conditions and financial stability relation from the perspective of
banks’ attitude to risk and its sensitivity to the short-term interest rate. In contrast
to other studies, which investigate the link between asset quality and macroeconomic
indicators for a panel of countries (e.g. Nkusu (2011), or Glen and Mondragón-Vélez
(2011)) we employ a unique microlevel dataset obtained from the Czech Credit Registry.
Moreover, most studies focus on the advanced economies, while we explore these linkages
for a transition economy.
This chapter is organized as follows. The following section outlines the methodology
and model specification, Section 3 describes the dataset, while Section 4 presents the
estimation results and provides robustness checks. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
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2.2 Methodology and Model Specification
This study poses two main and distinct research questions that relate monetary policy
stance and bank risk-taking. First, we examine whether lower interest rates promote more
lending to borrowers with a riskier past (H1.1). Such an effect is likely to be attributed to
higher current net worth of borrowers. Next, we investigate whether lower interest rates
encourage banks to incur more risk by accepting borrowers with a higher probability of
default (H1.2). Default is defined as failure to pay a loan instalment and/or interest 90
or more days past the due date. Risky past stands for other overdue loans prior to the
origination of a new loan. In addition to these main questions, we test whether all types
of banks are equally affected by the monetary policy stance. In this vein, we also study
the impact of the interest rate conditioned on bank liquidity (H2.1), capital (H2.2) and
lending strategy diversification (H2.3).
Most studies exploring the theoretical mechanisms that could be directly or indirectly
linked to the “risk-taking channel” suggest that banks should be more reluctant to grant
risky loans at times of monetary contraction. Thus, we state hypothesesH1.1 andH1.2 in
the spirit of opposite movements: lower interest rates imply more credit risk-taking. Nat-
urally, in the econometric analysis we expect a negative sign on the estimated coefficient
on the interest rate prior to loan origination. This negative relation can be attributed to
weaker incentives to screen borrowers when interest rates that determine banks’ financing
costs are low (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006). Lower interest rates decrease financing
costs, thus banks’ motivation to screen borrowers declines, which in turn may result in
them accepting riskier applicants. Another reason could be a reduced threat of deposit
withdrawals at times of excess liquidity, as in Diamond and Rajan (2006). Lower interest
rates generate more liquidity in the banking sector, which provides less of an incentive
for depositors to withdraw and more of an incentive for banks to finance risky projects.
It is reasonable to assume that a bank’s risk tolerance might vary with its economic
profile. Typically, the theoretical banking literature links a bank’s riskiness with its level
of capital and, as in Keeley (1990), predicts a negative relation between the two. Note,
however, that the theory concentrates on bank capital and default risk, not risk tolerance.
Moreover, in a banking sector shared between few banks, a highly capitalized bank might
easily become “too big to fail”. Due to this moral hazard problem, banks rich in capital
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may engage in riskier lending at times of monetary expansion. On the other hand, the
Czech banking sector is not only concentrated, but also dominated by foreign capital, and
foreign capital usually induces more monitoring effort. In short, the effect of bank capital
is not easily foreseeable and we expect any outcome, albeit an insignificant one (H2.1).
Bank liquidity is another characteristic likely to differentiate a bank’s attitude to risk in
low and high interest rate regimes. Diamond and Rajan (2006) develop a model of the
“liquidity channel”, as a modification of the “lending channel”, and obtain that banks accu-
mulating liquid assets tend to grant less risky loans. In our hypothesis H2.2 we test their
implications. Finally, economic theory provides us with contradicting suggestions about
the optimal strategy and, thus, loan portfolio composition. The literature on intermedi-
ation following Diamond (1984) promotes diversification as a way of minimizing the risk
of failure. In doing so, such authors use the argument of uncorrelated returns in line with
Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio theory. On the other hand, the corporate finance literature
argues that specializing may lead to improvement in a bank’s monitoring effectiveness
and incentives, and thus is likely to reduce credit risk Stomper (2006). Nevertheless, we
formulate hypothesis H2.3 based on studies on financial intermediation, and expect less
risk-taking among more diversified banks. Therefore, our main research hypotheses can
be summarized as follows:
H 1 The monetary policy stance affects credit risk, in particular:
H 1.1 Lower interest rates lead to more lending to borrowers with a riskier past.
H 1.2 Lower interest rates encourage banks to incur more risk by accepting not only
borrowers who are riskier ex ante, but also those with a higher probability of default per
time period.
H 2 Not all types of banks are equally affected by the monetary policy stance; in partic-
ular:
H 2.1 Banks with a poorer liquidity profile tend to take more risk in lower-interest-rate
periods.
H 2.2 Banks’ capital significantly influences and differentiates their risk-taking behaviour
in response to monetary and macroeconomic changes.
H 2.3 A lending strategy based on diversification, ceteris paribus, limits banks’ risk ap-
petite.
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This study considers two different measures of credit risk-taking. First, we estimate
the likelihood that a borrower with observable past non-performance obtains a new loan.
We treat all firms with overdue loans six months prior to new loan origination as borrowers
with a bad credit history and, thus, ex-ante riskier. The dependant variable in our
probit model1, Bad history, equals one for the ex-ante riskier borrowers. We explain the
probability that a borrower with a “bad history” receives a loan, conditioning on selected
bank, loan, firm and macroeconomic variables. Among those explanatory variables, the
interest rate prior to loan origination is of primary interest to us. Consequently, within
the probit framework we explore whether lower interest rates lead to more lending to
borrowers with a riskier past (H1.1) and estimate the following model:
P (Bad history = 1|X) = Φ(Xβ + e) (2.1)
where:
Bad history = 1 if a borrower had overdue loans 6 months prior to new
loan initiation
Φ( ) – the standard normal cumulative distribution function
X – a set of macroeconomic, bank, borrower and loan-related regressors
The other measure of credit risk-taking employed in this paper is the time-specific
likelihood of loan default. Default is defined as failure to pay a loan instalment and/or
interest 90 or more days past the due date. By time-specific likelihood we mean the prob-
ability that loan default occurs within a specific time-span. Such a treatment emphasizes
that there is a dynamic element to loan performance and that defaults differ at different
points of the loan “life”. After all, the loan survival time, i.e. the time for which the
borrower has managed to pay regularly, affects the risk of default in the following pe-
riod. By incorporating duration dependence we do not ignore the data on regular loans
that eventually become nonperforming. On the contrary, all the available information
helps us to determine the credit default risk at each point in the loan “life” (see Kiefer
(1988)). Our methodology follows Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Duffie
and Wang (2007), who strongly advocate the importance of duration in bankruptcy pre-
1A situation of a binary choice – a borrower with or without a bad history – calls for a discrete choice
model such as probit.
34
dictions. Moreover, including duration dependence enables us to differentiate between
the effects of monetary policy on new and outstanding loans. Finally, Matsuyama (2007)
and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) show that monetary policy influences risk-taking
and also lending standards and, thus, maturity. Ideally, to disentangle credit risk from
liquidity risk, or the maturity effect, one should employ a measure of default probabil-
ity normalized per period of time. The duration model offers such a dynamic measure
of risk, namely the hazard rate. The same treatment of time-specific credit risk-taking
is employed in Jiménez and Saurina (2007) and Ioannidou and Peydró-Alcalde (2009),
making the results of all three studies comparable.
The hazard function is the limiting probability of default in a given interval con-
ditional on the loan having survived until this period, divided by the width of the period.
Duration, i.e. the length of time a loan is performing, is also referred to as spell length
(t). In general, the hazard function depends on the survival probability and the den-
sity function associated with the distribution of the spells, f(t). When estimating hazard
functions, it is convenient to assume a proportional hazard specification with the baseline
hazard λ0(t) a function of t alone. This paper follows the Cox semi-parametric approach,
which specifies no shape for the baseline hazard function Cox (1972). Therefore, we
model the time to loan default, T , using a set of macroeconomic, bank, borrower and
loan-related regressors (X) within the following framework:
λ(t) = λ0(t)exp (f (X,X(τ); β, β
τ )) (2.2)
where:
X – characteristics constant over time
X(τ) – time-varying covariates
β and βτ – parameters (including time-varying variables)
T – duration of a spell
t – loan spell
τ – calendar time
The regressors are described in the data section. As we use flow sampling and con-
sider only new loans, our data does not suffer from left censoring. The right censoring
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problem is alleviated in a standard way, that is by expressing the log-likelihood func-
tion as a weighted average of the sample density of completed duration spells and the
survivor function of uncompleted spells. We estimate four duration models and con-
trast their outcomes. The survival models differ in line with the shifting focus of our
analysis. Each formulation contains the core covariates, namely a set of macroeconomic
variables to control for major economic developments in the Czech Republic. First of all,
we explore how risk-taking varies with bank characteristics. The role of banks’ balance
sheets (Matsuyama 2007) and moral hazard problems (Rajan 2006) in determining the
sensitivity of bank risk-taking to monetary policy is well-established in the theory. Ini-
tially, we account for banks’ heterogeneity2 by applying shared frailty duration analysis
(Model I). The shared frailty effect is estimated along with the other model parameters,
and the random effects are common among groups of loan spells of the same bank. A
comprehensive introduction to frailty and shared frailty duration analysis is provided in
Gutierrez (2002). In the next formulation (Model II), we incorporate bank characteris-
tics and thus capture the variety across banks in their risk-taking reactions to changing
monetary conditions. Naturally, banks tend to differ in their lending strategies and thus
their loan portfolio diversification may impact on their risk behaviour in different interest
rate regimes. Therefore, the specification for Model IV incorporates additionally the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (hereof: HHI) as a measure of bank loan portfolio diversi-
fication.
By introducing firm and loan characteristics in Model III we control for changes in
the loan and borrower pools throughout the time span of our study. More importantly,
we hope to separate credit supply and demand effects. As we examine bank risk-taking,
we need to identify whether the observed increases in riskier loans are supply-driven. On
the other hand, bad borrowers seeking more credit when rates are low could also cause
higher loan hazard rates. The difference is that with a demand-driven increase in haz-
ardous loans the risk premiums should also rise, while the supply effect should cause a
drop in the risk premiums. Ideally, we would test how risk “pricing” reacts to changes
in monetary conditions in the Czech banking sector and identify either the supply or
demand effect. However, that requires data on loan pricing, specifically each loan con-
tract interest rate, and the Central Credit Register maintained by the Czech National
2Generally, when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity we follow the flexible approach of Heckmann
and Singer (1984).
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Bank does not record such data. The second-best empirical strategy is to control for the
quality of borrowers throughout the time span and for those loan characteristics which
are regarded by financial intermediation theory as screening devices. The role of loan size
and collateral as intermediary screening devices is grounded in the theory. Loan maturity
also plays some role in disentangling supply and demand effects, as banks taking more
risk will not mind engaging in long-term financing. This is no longer true for a demand-
driven rise in loan riskiness.
Finally, we note that this study examines two distinct research questions relating
bank risk-taking to the monetary policy stance, uses two different measures of risk-taking
(the likelihood of financing an ex-ante riskier borrower and the time-specific loan default
risk) and subsequently estimates two different models – a probit model and a duration
model. Obviously, the outcomes of the two examinations are not comparable. Still, one
would expect to see low interest rates promoting either more risk-taking in both cases
or less risk-taking in both cases. However, this is not what our results for the Czech




The dataset used in this study contains 207 356 loan-period observations (N ; loan spells
in the duration analysis). The data on loans is combined with information from bank
financial reports and, where available, from the financial statements of borrowers. We
consider solely corporate loans for non-financial firms. In addition, we complete the
dataset with macroeconomic variables describing the performance of the Czech and euro
area economies. Prior to any analyses our dataset was anonymized.
The loan data comes from the Czech National Bank’s Central Credit Register (CCR).
Out of all the borrowers issued with loans between October 2002 and January 2010 we
select a random sample amounting to 3% of all companies granted new loans in this
period.3 The CCR was launched in October 2002, so this is the first available month for
3We consider solely loans and overdrafts granted by the bank, and exclude unauthorized debits and
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the loan data. The information on borrowers is obtained from two sources: the CCR and
the Magnus database maintained by CEKIA. The time span for the firms’ financials is
also limited by data availability and covers the period from January 2000 to December
2009. We discuss the two data sources in greater detail below. The bank covariates
originate from the Czech National Bank’s (CNB) internal database. Clearly, the scope
of the central bank’s knowledge about the economic situation of each “supervised” bank
is quite broad. In our analysis we limit ourselves to the key bank performance variables
and the bank ownership type, foreign or local. Finally, the macroeconomic variables are
collected from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the European Central Bank (SDW), the
Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) and the CNB’s public database ARAD. ARAD contains
time series of monetary indicators, aggregated financial markets data, balance of pay-
ments statistics and fiscal statistics. ARAD data is processed directly by the CNB, but
also comes from external sources such as the CZSO. The macrofinancial variables include
overnight money market rates (CZEONIA and EONIA), GDP growth rates and consumer
price indices (CPI) for the Czech and euro area economies as well as the exchange rate
between the Czech koruna and the euro.
The Central Credit Register of the Czech National Bank contains monthly infor-
mation on clients’ loans, overdrafts, current account debit balances, guarantees, undrawn
lending arrangements and standby credits. Our study focuses solely on the first three
categories. The CCR data includes the loan identification number, NACE code4, type,
purpose, currency and classification. In accordance with CNB amending Regulation No.
193/1998, Czech banks classify loans according to a five-tier scheme and assign each loan
a “standard”, “watch”, “substandard”, “doubtful” or “loss” grade. In the case of nonper-
forming loans, the dataset provides information on the loan’s principal, interest, fees and
days overdue. Moreover, the CCR records the loan amounts granted and remaining as
well as the dates of loan origination, maturity and, if applicable, write-off.
The firm-related covariates are obtained from two sources: the CCR and the Magnus
database maintained by CEKIA. The Magnus data is mostly available at a yearly fre-
quency. CEKIA supplies business information about Czech companies and their financial
loans bought from other banks.
4NACE is the European industry standard classification system (Statistical Classification of Economic
Activities in the European Community).
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statements, namely balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. The corporate charac-
teristics cover the firm’s identification number, NACE code5, legal form, ownership type,
amount of registered capital, number of employees, turnover and state of operation. The
Magnus dataset also carries information on the dates when the company was launched
and, where applicable, ceased to operate. Additionally, it contains the firm’s position
among the top 100 Czech companies and its rating, if provided by the Czech Rating
Agency. The accounting variables are numerous and include, among others, the value
of assets (total, fixed, current and other), equity, liabilities (total, other), sales, costs,
operating income and net and pre-tax profits.
2.3.2 Data Description and Construction of Variables
In the paper, we use several money market rates to represent the monetary conditions in
which Czech banks operate. Given that in the Czech Republic most traditional banking
business is done in local currency (Czech koruna), the koruna money market rates (such as
the PRIBOR reference rates or the overnight CZEONIA index) are the relevant variables
to which banks react. The central bank of the Czech Republic, the Czech National Bank
(CNB), pursues an independent monetary policy within its inflation targeting regime and
a floating exchange rate.
The Czech banking market is not euroized – the share of foreign currency loans in
total loans to households is virtually zero. This contrasts with the situation in many
other Central and Eastern European countries, where FX loans to households are much
more common. The main reason for the total dominance of local currency loans is the
very low and sometimes even negative spread between koruna and FX interest rates, so
that households have not had any incentive to demand FX loans in order to benefit from
better interest rate conditions. In the non-financial corporations segment, FX loans exist,
but only on a relatively minor scale (roughly 20% of loans to non-financial corporations
are denominated in foreign currencies, mainly euro). This instrument is used mainly by
export-oriented companies and commercial real estate developers for hedging purposes,
as these two types of corporations have large revenues in euro.
5The same classification system as in the case of loans (the European industry standard classification
system), although this time the code applies to the company’s industry.
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Nevertheless, given the deep economic integration of the Czech Republic into the
rest of the EU via foreign trade, the Czech business cycle is to a large extent synchro-
nized with that of the Eurozone and especially Germany. Therefore, Czech monetary
policy rates – and thus also money market rates, which follow monetary policy rates
quite closely – co-move with ECB monetary policy rates. The relationship works via two
channels – directly, i.e. via the exchange rate transmission channel (a decrease in ECB
rates and thus euro area money market rates leads to appreciation of the Czech koruna
vis-a-vis the euro, contributing to lower inflation pressures and thus lower CNB rates),
and indirectly, via common movement of the Eurozone and Czech economies in the cycle.
A natural candidate for capturing the monetary conditions in the Czech Republic
is CZEONIA. CZEONIA is a weighted average of O/N rates on trades executed in a
given day and, as such, it reflects real trading in the money market among Czech banks.
Moreover, the O/N segment is the most liquid part of money market trading (CNB,
2010). We could also employ the PRIBOR rate. However, PRIBOR rates are solely ref-
erence rates and do not reflect real trading. In order to properly capture the effect of the
monetary conditions on credit risk both on the date of loan origination and during the life
of individual loans, we have to control for potential reverse causality and endogeneity of
the monetary conditions represented by CZEONIA. CZEONIA, mirroring the official 2W
repo rate of the CNB, may itself strongly depend on the level of credit risk in the banking
system, as the central bank would react to worsening economic conditions and an increase
in bad loans in banks’ portfolios by decreasing the official CNB repo rates. Furthermore,
if we happen to ignore controls correlated with both the Czech monetary stance and
Czech banks’ risk-taking, our analysis would suffer from omitted variable inconsistency.
Thus, we use EONIA as an instrument, or alternatively a proxy, for CZEONIA. The tests
applied confirmed that EONIA is a valid instrument for CZEONIA, reflecting strong cor-
relation between these two rates as discussed above. Therefore, throughout our analysis
we rely upon the monthly average of euro area money market overnight rates to capture
the existing monetary policy conditions in the Czech Republic.
Apart from interest rates, each duration or probit model contains a set of macroe-
conomic variables to control for major economic developments in the Czech Republic.
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The set includes Czech inflation6 (CPIt) and the spread7 between Czech and European
Monetary Union 10-year maturity government bond yields (Country riskt) dated at loan
origination. We also add a time trend and time trend squared, which are functions of
calendar time. In the duration models we also incorporate two GDP growth rates, one
dated prior to loan origination and the other prior to loan default or maturity. The probit
analysis, which lacks the dynamic loan-life perspective, contains solely the GDP growth
rate prior to loan origination. GDP growth is the seasonally adjusted quarterly rate of
change of gross domestic product in the Czech Republic.
Banks tend to differ in their lending strategies and thus also in their credit risk
behaviour. In order to account for differences in credit risk profiles across banks, and
for the reasons discussed in the methodology section, we introduce bank characteristics
stemming from the CCR as well as the banks’ financial statements reported to the CNB.
We include bank size, bank type and risk appetite as well as the liquidity and own funds
to total assets ratios. Typically, bank size is given as the logarithm of total assets. Bank
type is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is granted by a foreign-owned bank.
Liquidity ratiot−1 and Own funds/total assetst−1 are, respectively, the bank’s liquid assets
over its total assets and its equity over total assets. The difference between the bank’s
and other banks’ non-performing loan ratios, Bank NPLb - NPLt−1, depicted in Figure
2.1, measures the credit risk already on the books.
Figure 2.1: The Average NPL in the Czech Banking Sector
The methodology section contains a discussion of the identification challenges faced
in our econometric investigation. It points out that the second-best empirical strategy for
6Inflation is measured by monthly consumer price indices (CPI).
7Monthly averages.
41
the troublesome separation of the loan supply and demand sides is to control for changes
in the quality of borrowers and loan characteristics. As the borrower-related controls we
employ the firm’s turnover and employment categories as well as the firm’s regional and
industry dummies. In addition, we construct measures of the firm’s age and its number
of bank relations. The turnover and number of employees categories are obtained based
on the classes recorded in the CCR. The regional and industry dummies are also derived
from CCR data. Following Jiménez and Saurina (2007) we proxy the firm’s age by
its age as a borrower, that is the time since the origination of the first loan taken by
the firm. Bank relationst−1 is the logarithm of the number of bank relationships of the
borrower plus one measured prior to loan origination. By the same token, Bank debtt−1
is the logarithm of the borrower’s total amount of bank debt augmented by one. We
account for the changing pool of loans by controlling for their size, purpose, maturity
and currency and the way they are collateralized. The methodology section outlines the
rationale for the inclusion of loan size, collateral and maturity. What is left to describe
is the construction of the variables. As typically done in the literature, we calculate the
loan size as the logarithm of the amount granted. The effect of loan maturity is captured
by three dummy variables accounting for terms of up to three, six and twelve months.
Dummy variables are also employed to allow for difference in the riskiness of loans with
collateral and granted8 in euros, dollars or pounds as opposed to other currencies. The
CCR dataset contains ten possible variables accounting for the type of collateral and
fifteen possible types. We coarsely classify each type based on its riskiness and pool
those with a similar likelihood of default. As a result we obtain ten collateral dummy
variables displayed together with their statistical characteristics in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Collateral Type: Data Descriptive Statistics
Variable Unit Mean Std Dev Max Min
No collateral 0|1 0.34 0.47 1.00 0.00
Pledge on own real estate 0|1 0.15 0.36 1.00 0.00
Pledge on third party’s real estate 0|1 0.02 0.14 1.00 0.00
Pledge on movable property without transfer 0|1 0.02 0.15 1.00 0.00
Ensuring note 0|1 0.25 0.43 1.00 0.00
Guarantee deposit 0|1 0.02 0.14 1.00 0.00
Guarantee 0|1 0.05 0.21 1.00 0.00
Pledged assets 0|1 0.07 0.26 1.00 0.00
Blockage of premium 0|1 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.00
Other collateral 0|1 0.05 0.22 1.00 0.00
While investigating banks’ risk-taking behaviour in the Czech banking system, we
8Loan currencyt = 1 if the loan is granted in euros, dollars or pounds.
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also examine whether or not it depends on the type of bank lending strategy – focused
or diversified. We measure the banks’ loan portfolio diversification using the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index. The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted mea-
sure of concentration, which we employ to measure each bank’s relative credit exposure
to a particular industry prior to new loan origination. The index is the sum of the squares
of banks’ relative credit exposures to each industry. Figure 2.2 depicts the evolution of
the Hirschman-Herfindahl index for the Czech banking sector. On average, Czech banks
moderately increased their loan portfolio diversification until mid-2008, when a slight
decline can be observed.









































2.4.1 Ex-ante Riskier Borrowers
In this section we explore Czech banks’ appetite for ex-ante riskier borrowers at times of
monetary easing. In particular, we examine whether lower interest rates promote more
lending to corporate clients with overdue loans prior to new loan origination. This ques-
tion is addressed by estimating the probability that a new loan is granted to a borrower
with a recent bad credit history. Those recently “bad” borrowers, or – more accurately –
borrowers with overdue loans six months prior to new loan origination, are considered to
be “ex-ante riskier”. We estimate a probit model using the bank, firm, loan and macroe-
conomic variables described in the data section, and primarily focus on the impact of
the interest rate present in the money market one month prior to loan origination. The
estimation results are given in Table 2.2.
Due to the presence of the endogeneity problem, we instrument the Czech money
market interest rate (CZEONIA) by the EONIA rate reported by the ECB. The instru-
mental variable probit regression shows that expansive monetary policy encourages Czech
banks to grant fewer loans to borrowers who exhibited a recent bad credit history prior
to loan origination. This means that lower interest rates imply less credit risk incurred
by Czech banks. Consequently, our data do not support hypothesis H.1.1 and contradict
the findings of Ioannidou and Peydró-Alcalde (2007) and Jiménez and Saurina (2008).
However, the probit results of our study and the other two are not completely comparable
due to differences in defining the dependent variables. In Ioannidou and Peydró-Alcalde
(2007), bad credit history refers to borrower past default and not to non-performance.
Prudential regulations prevent Czech banks from financing previously defaulted firms.
Jiménez and Saurina (2008) classifies a borrower as ex-ante riskier when it is overdue on
another loan, as in our study, but contrary to us checks any time before the new loan
is granted. As the CCR was launched in 2002 and our analysis spans to the year 2010,
we consider solely the six-month period preceding new loan origination.9 The other co-
efficients are mostly as expected. Larger banks, ceteris paribus, are less prone to lend to
firms with a recent bad credit history (-0.025∗∗∗). By the same token, banks holding more
liquid assets are likely to accept fewer risky borrowers (-1.910∗∗∗). Moreover, banks with
9We also experiment with one year prior to new loan origination and obtain the same positive depen-
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higher than average non-performing loan ratios are less inclined to tolerate additional risk
and finance companies with overdue loans in the previous six months (-0.721∗∗∗). Surpris-
ingly, the estimation output suggests that less leveraged banks are likely to grant loans
to borrowers with a risky past (0.190∗∗), while more indebted borrowers are less likely to
have a recent bad credit history (-0.016∗∗∗). Table 2.3 presents the riskiness of industries
obtained within the instrumental probit framework. We note that lower interest rates
imply, ceteris paribus, a lower likelihood of default on loans granted to manufacturers
(0.120∗∗∗), and higher defaults on loans provided to construction companies (-1.185∗∗∗).
Finally, we observe recent default or bad history less frequently in the case of younger
firms (0.166∗∗∗) with fewer bank relationships (0.757∗∗∗).
Table 2.2: Estimation Results: Instrumental Probit
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
Interest ratet−1 0.152∗∗∗ 0.012
Bank sizet−1 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.005
Liquidity ratiot−1 -1.910∗∗∗ 0.036
Bank NPLb - NPLt−1 -0.721∗∗∗ 0.070
Own funds/total assetst−1 0.190∗∗ 0.083
Bank typet−1 0.139∗∗∗ 0.015
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 0.166∗∗∗ 0.004
Bank relationst−1 0.757∗∗∗ 0.015
Bank debtt−1 -0.016∗∗∗ 0.001
Loan sizet 0.020∗∗∗ 0.002
Loan currencyt 0.235∗∗∗ 0.015
Maturity 0–3 monthst 0.345∗∗∗ 0.017
Maturity 3–6 monthst 0.251∗∗∗ 0.018
Maturity 6–12 monthst 0.252∗∗∗ 0.012
Loan purposet -0.085∗∗∗ 0.008
GDPCRt−1 -0.018∗∗∗ 0.002
CPIt -0.009∗∗ 0.004
Country riskt 0.048∗∗∗ 0.015
Time trend 0.015∗∗∗ 0.001
Time trend sq. 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
Intercept -1.632∗∗∗ 0.072
Collateral dummies yes
Firm turnover categories yes
Firm employment categories yes
Firm regional dummies yes




The endogeneity problem is detected both by the Wald statistic, reported in Table
2.2, and the tests robust to weak instruments. The test outcome obtained in the presence
dence.
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of potentially weak instruments, an approach due to Finlay and Magnusson (2009), is
provided in Table B1.3. We rely on IV probit estimates rather than on the coefficients
of the regular probit regression, but the two approaches yield similar results with respect
to the monetary policy impact. To be precise, we refer to the probit model as the
one estimated on the loan-level clusters. We also perform probit analysis on clusters of
borrowers. Since the outcome corrected for firm-level clustering remains almost unaltered,
we refrain from reporting it. The probit estimates corrected for loan clustering and the
corresponding robust standard errors are reported in Table B1.4 in Appendix B.1. One
final remark concerning endogeneity is that its presence strengthens the main points and
concerns underlying our previous discussion of the potential reverse causality issue.
Table 2.3: Estimation Results: Instrumental Probit by Industries
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
Manufacturing 0.120∗∗∗ 0.014
Other -0.091∗∗∗ 0.018
Repair & related -0.586∗∗∗ 0.082
Electricity, gas & heat 0.079 0.057
Water distribution & related 0.137∗∗∗ 0.028
Construction -1.185∗∗∗ 0.117




Information activities 0.115∗∗∗ 0.034
Financial intermediation 0.044 0.044
R&D, advertising & market research -0.155∗∗∗ 0.030
Scientific & technical activities -0.068∗∗∗ 0.019
Security & investigation -0.578∗∗∗ 0.098
Education -0.222∗∗∗ 0.042
Artistic & entertainment activities -0.579∗∗∗ 0.074
Gambling 0.385∗∗∗ 0.042
Sport & recreation -1.416∗∗∗ 0.172
N 204,757
χ2(65) 22,304.536
We fit the probit model to assess the influence of the monetary policy stance on banks’
willingness to accept ex-ante riskier borrowers. If Czech banks were more prone to grant
loans to ex-ante riskier firms at times of monetary expansion, we could claim that banks
believed economic fundamentals were strong enough to reduce the default probability.
One reason for that could have been higher net worth of borrowers in periods of lower
interest rates. However, our data do not confirm that. One possible explanation of the
link between low interest rates and lower probability of granting loans to borrowers with
a riskier past might be the specific time period for which the analysis is done, which
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was marked by several structural changes. As banks were privatized before 2002, the
banking sector experienced no state interventions and was relatively competitive in the
period 2002–2010. Nevertheless, the rises and falls of money market rates (mirroring the
CNB repo rate) between 2002 and 2009 happened under different conditions. There were
two pronounced sub-periods of monetary policy expansion (2002–2004 and 2007–2009)
and one pronounced sub-period of monetary policy tightening (2005–2007). In the first
expansionary period of 2002–2004, the major domestic banks had just been cleared of
nonperforming assets dating from the 1990s, as a part of a balance sheet consolidation
process before privatization, and started to refocus their business on household loans. In
this sub-period, referred to in the literature as a “credit crunch” in the corporate seg-
ment Geršl and Hlaváček (2007), corporate loans were declining and banks were not keen
on providing new loans to corporations with a bad credit history despite the monetary
expansion, effectively decreasing their risk-taking. The second monetary expansion, in
2007–2009, was a reaction to the global economic crisis and the economic recession in the
euro area, again a period when banks were not keen on financing risky borrowers. On the
contrary, anecdotal evidence shows that in this period, banks decreased their risk-taking,
got rid of risky borrowers and maintained their loan relationships with rather less risky
ones. In the period of monetary tightening, 2005–2007, which was itself a reaction to
accumulating inflation pressures due to the strong economic and credit boom in those
years, the banks strengthened their risk-taking owing to both competitive pressures and
overall optimism in the economy, relaxed their lending standards and fuelled the credit
boom even further, despite increases in money market rates. These structural factors
are likely to have produced the puzzling positive relation between interest rate levels and
banks’ appetite for risk.
We conducted several robustness checks on the probit estimations. We test our hy-
potheses on models developed according to the guidelines of Hosmer & Lemeshow (1999,
pp. 158–180) and Hosmer & Lemeshow (2000, pp. 92–116) for the probit regressions.
Both suggest an approach to building a model with covariates chosen optimally. Gen-
erally, our choice of covariates is grounded in economic reasoning, supported, to some
extent, by the findings of the previous studies. When constructing the specifications for
the robustness checks, we greatly emphasize another important variable selection crite-
rion, namely statistical significance. We employ the fractional polynomials methodology
as a tool to validate the significance of the variables. The methodology of fractional
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polynomials is presented in Appendix B.2. When necessary, we also use fractional poly-
nomials to suggest transformations of the continuous variables. All the steps involved in
building the statistically desirable probit models for our data are also discussed in Ap-
pendix B.2. There are cases where the methodology suggested the inclusion of additional
predictors, some transformation of continuous covariates or different grouping of selected
categorical variables. Therefore, Table B2.1 contains the definitions of the optimally
chosen covariates which differ from those employed in the main part of our analysis. The
reasoning provided above also applies to the survival analysis (see next section). The
descriptive statistics of the alternative predictors are summarized in Tables B2.2–B2.4.
We begin with our first measure of risk-taking, namely the likelihood of financing
an ex-ante riskier borrower. Similarly to our regular analysis, the estimates obtained
for the robust probit suggest that a relaxed monetary policy encourages Czech banks to
finance fewer borrowers with a recent bad credit history (0.471∗∗∗). Therefore, the model
with optimally selected covariates also does not support hypothesis H.1.1, which says
that lower interest rates lead to more lending to borrowers with a riskier past. As in the
case of our main probit regressions, we reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity and
rely on IV probit estimates. Still, the two approaches produce comparable outcomes,
which for the probit model with observations clustered on the loan level are displayed in
Tables B2.5–B2.9 in Appendix B.2. Additionally, we perform the analysis on borrower
clusters and obtain almost unaltered coefficients.
Following the optimal variable selection strategy for the probit regressions results in
the inclusion of an additional bank characteristic (Deposit ratiot−1), a different bank type
measure (Bank unitt−1) and an altered grouping of loan maturity, purpose and collateral.
Bank unit is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the loan is granted by a branch
in the Czech Republic (as opposed to a headquarters in the Czech Republic or a branch
abroad). Additionally, Bank debtt−1 and loan size are excluded from the alternative probit
specification. Thus, we solely compare the other estimated parameters for bank and firm
covariates. We observe a reverse sign of the bank capital measure. Contrary to our main
analysis findings, here banks holding more own funds are likely to accept fewer risky
borrowers (-0.466∗∗∗). The other coefficients in the robust and regular probit analysis
are alike. Larger and more liquid banks are less prone to lend to firms with a recent bad
credit history (-0.028∗∗∗ and -1.123∗∗∗). Moreover, banks with higher than average non-
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results: Robust Instrumental Probit
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
Interest ratet−1 0.471∗∗∗ 0.020
Bank sizet−1 -0.028∗∗∗ 0.007
Liquidity ratiot−1 -1.123∗∗∗ 0.058
Bank NPLb - NPLt−1 -1.402∗∗∗ 0.173
Own funds/total assetst−1 -0.466∗∗∗ 0.152
Deposit ratiot−1 1.228∗∗∗ 0.069
Bank unitt−1 -0.224∗∗∗ 0.014
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 0.411∗∗∗ 0.006
Bank relationst−1 1.412∗∗∗ 0.016
Loan currencyt -0.159∗∗∗ 0.022
Maturity 2–3.5 yearst -0.074∗∗∗ 0.015
Maturity 4–8 yearst -0.311∗∗∗ 0.014
Maturity 5.5 yearst 0.342∗∗∗ 0.032
Maturity 8.5–10 yearst -0.181∗∗∗ 0.026
GDPCRt−1 0.021∗∗∗ 0.003
CPIt -0.138∗∗∗ 0.006
Country riskt 0.195∗∗∗ 0.025
Time trend 0.015∗∗∗ 0.001
Time trend sq. 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
Intercept -4.067∗∗∗ 0.102
Loan collateral: 1st - 3rd yes
Loan purpose: [1]-[5] yes
Firm turnover categories yes
Firm employment categories yes
Firm regional dummies yes





performing loan ratios are less likely to tolerate additional risk and finance companies
that were late with loan payments in the previous six months (-1.402∗∗∗). Finally, we
observe recent default or bad history less frequently in the case of younger firms (0.411∗∗∗)
with fewer bank relationships (1.412∗∗∗).
2.4.2 Dynamic Riskiness of Loans
Duration models of loan default consider not only the default itself, but also its timing.
As in the probit regression, we still account for observed and unobserved loan quality
by origination date. However, in addition, survival analysis enables us to capture the
changing conditions over the loan life. Thus, we may investigate bank risk-taking in a
broader, dynamic, context. This richer approach also allows for a richer set of covariates.
Duration analysis enables us to examine the impact of the monetary policy stance on the
riskiness of new loans as well as its effect on the existing loan portfolio. Therefore, our
hazard rate models comprise not only the interest rate measured prior to loan origination,
but also the interest rate prior to loan default or maturity. The latter allows us to test
how monetary policy affects the performance of loans already on the books. We also
incorporate two GDP growth rates, one dated prior to loan origination and the other
prior to loan default or maturity.
We fit four duration models and contrast their outcomes. The rationale for each
specification is laid out in the empirical strategy section. The survival models differ in
line with the shifting focus of our analysis. Nevertheless, each formulation contains the
core covariates, namely a set of macroeconomic variables to control for major economic
developments in the Czech Republic. The first two models, Model I and Model II, con-
trol for diverse lending strategies across banks. The former is the estimated shared frailty
survival model, with frailties common to loans of the same bank. The latter analyses a
duration model with bank characteristics incorporated in an explicit manner. Model III
accounts for the changes over time in the pool of borrowers and loans, and includes the
firm and loan covariates. Model IV further enriches our analysis with the loan portfolio
concentration measure (HHI).
The coefficient on the short interest rate preceding loan origination is negative and
significant in all the estimated formulations. The models with bank unobserved hetero-
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geneity (Model I) and loan portfolio diversification (Model IV) yield coefficients significant
solely at the 10 per cent level and equal respectively to -0.214∗ and -0.289∗. The two
other models render even more significant negative results. The estimated impact of
the interest rate prior to loan origination in the model with bank characteristics (Model
II) amounts to -0.312∗∗ and that in the model with bank, loan and borrower covariates
equals -0.298∗∗ (Model III). Therefore, all cases indicate that at times of lower inter-
est rates banks tend to grant loans with higher hazard rates. In other words, a more
relaxed monetary conditions policy encourages banks to take on more credit risk. This
finding gives support to hypothesis H.1.2 and corroborates the outcomes of Ioannidou
and Peydró-Alcalde (2007) and Jiménez and Saurina (2008).
All four formulations produce highly significant and positive estimated coefficients
on the interest rate prevailing during the loan life. The impact of the interest rate prior
to loan maturity ranges from 0.278∗∗∗ to 0.296∗∗∗ for the model with bank characteris-
tics (Model II). The lowest impact is obtained for the case of bank, loan and borrower
characteristics (Model II). The formulation with bank unobserved heterogeneity yields
an only slightly higher estimate (0.279∗∗∗, Model I). The outcome for the case with the
incorporated measure of loan portfolio diversification is also not much different (0.282∗∗∗,
Model IV). The positive dependence in all four cases implies that the higher the interest
rate prior to loan maturity, the greater the probability of loan default per time period.
This result is as expected and can be attributed to lower refinancing costs or a reduced
loan repayment burden at times of low interest rates. Thus, relaxed monetary conditions
give rise to fewer loan defaults or lower riskiness of the outstanding portfolio.
The results for the GDP growth rate offer limited scope for interpretation. Out
of the two rates, solely the GDP growth rate during the loan life proves to be statistically
significant. Moreover, it is significant only when borrower characteristics are accounted
for. We obtain a significant and negative coefficient on the GDP growth rate during the
loan life for the specification with bank, loan and borrower covariates without and with
the measure of loan portfolio diversification – -0.066∗∗ and -0.067∗∗ respectively for Model
III and Model IV. The direction of the effect of GDP on the riskiness of the outstanding
portfolio is as expected. At times of higher economic growth, loan defaults are less fre-
quent.
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The parameters for inflation remain positive and highly significant for all four models
(0.215∗∗∗, 0.210∗∗∗, 0.194∗∗∗ and 0.191∗∗∗). They indicate that higher inflation at origina-
tion increases the loan hazard rate. Finally, the negative and highly significant estimated
coefficients on the time trend indicate an overall decrease in new credit volume observed
over (calendar) time in the Czech banking sector. Indeed, since 2002 Czech banks have
substantially changed their lending strategies and credit risk assessment. This observed
general improvement is revealed on top of the effects captured by bank characteristics
and the change in the pool of loans and borrowers.
Next, we focus on the results for bank characteristics. The sole bank covariates
that prove to be statistically significant in all three model specifications10 are bank liq-
uidity and type. We find that more liquid banks, ceteris paribus, are likely to grant loans
with lower hazard rates. The estimated parameters amount to -3.083∗∗∗, -3.437∗∗∗ and
-3.758∗∗∗ for the model with bank characteristics (Model II), the model with bank, loan
and borrower covariates (Model III) and the model with loan portfolio diversification
(Model IV) respectively. The inverse influence of the bank’s liquidity on its loan hazard
rate supports hypothesis H.2.1 and suggests that banks accumulating liquid assets tend
to grant less risky loans, thus confirming one of the implications of Diamond and Rajan
(2006). The bank size effect proves to be positive in the specification with bank covari-
ates. Such an outcome indicates that larger banks are willing to accept more credit risk
(0.181∗∗). One might argue that in a banking sector dominated by few banks, as in the
Czech Republic, the positive bank size could be attributable to a “too big to fail” effect.
In doing so, we would employ the same line of argument as Boyd and Runkle (1993)
and Ioannidou and Peydró-Alcalde (2007), who obtained similarly puzzling estimates for
their data. In our study, Model II is the only case where the size effect is significant. Fi-
nally, we obtain that foreign banks tend to extend more hazardous loans (0.470∗, 0.840∗∗∗
and 0.831∗∗∗). The impact of all other bank characteristics is statistically insignificant.
Therefore, we find no support for hypothesis H.2.2, which relates bank leverage and bank
credit risk appetite.
10In Model I differences between banks are captured by the “frailty effect”. Given the standard error
of θ and the likelihood-ratio test statistic (χ̄2(01) = 47.25), we find a significant frailty effect, meaning
that the correlation across loans grouped by banks cannot be ignored.
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In the Czech Republic, the association between high liquidity and low risk appetite
(low hazard rates) may be explained by a preference of most large banks to attract and
keep depositors. Domestic banks apply a very conservative banking model, hardly en-
gage in risky investments and focus on collecting deposits and granting loans. Moreover,
compared to their European counterparts, Czech banks are very prudent in their lending
activities and prefer to maintain low credit risk profiles. At the same time, they prefer
to hold large liquidity buffers, mainly for two reasons: first, when relying on a large pool
of (mainly sight) deposits, the banks need liquid assets to be able to saturate poten-
tial demand for liquidity should deposit withdrawals increase in stress times; second, a
large liquidity buffer is an important signal – together with low credit risk indicators –
to existing and potential depositors. Moreover, given their conservative banking model
and overhang of deposits, most domestic banks invest in Czech government bonds, which
constitute an important part of their liquid assets CNB (2011).
Furthermore, we examine the estimated impact of loan and borrower covariates. Not
surprisingly, we obtain that hazardous borrowers are more likely to default in the future
(1.129∗∗∗). To measure the firm’s riskiness we look for previous overdue loans in its re-
cent credit history. As in the probit analysis, younger firms are safer. In other words,
loans to younger firms tend to survive longer (0.241∗∗∗). Table 2.6 presents the hazard
rates for firm industries. Interestingly, all significant industry effects are solely positive.
Such results indicate that lower interest rates imply, ceteris paribus, a lower likelihood
of default or no significant effect of loans granted to all but agricultural producers. By
introducing credit size, purpose, currency and maturity we wish to control for modifica-
tions in the loan pool over the time span of our study. We find that modest-sized loans
tend to be more risky (-0.202∗∗∗). The estimated effect of loan purpose, captured by a
dummy for overdrafts, suggests that overdrafts and current account debits exhibit a lower
hazard rate (-0.553∗∗∗). Additionally, loans granted in euros, dollars or pounds are more
hazardous than the others, which are mostly granted in Czech korunas (0.997∗∗∗). The
influence of each loan maturity dummy is highly significant and positive. All the same,
the magnitude of the estimated maturity parameters decreases with the loan maturity
and amounts to 1.889∗∗∗, 1.132∗∗∗ and 0.729∗∗∗ respectively. In other words, the shorter
the loan term, the greater the probability of default.
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Adding the diversification measure of banks’ corporate loan portfolio only slightly
modifies the magnitude of the effect of bank, firm and loan covariates on the hazard rate.
In all but one case we note no change of sign or significance level. The sole exception is
the bank capital coefficient, which remains insignificant, but changes sign. Finally, we
obtain that in the analysed period the type of lending strategy, diversified or focal, has
no explanatory power for Czech banks’ risk appetite. We present solely the results for the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. However, we find that using neither the Gini coefficient nor
the Shannon entropy as a concentration measure speaks in support of hypothesis H2.3.
The results of our analysis offer important policy lessons for the macroprudential pol-
icy of central banks, which – ideally – need to take into account the consequences of
the monetary policy stance regarding bank risk-taking. The estimated parameters for
interest rates, both prior to loan origination and during the life of the loan, enable us
to quantify the potential effect of different interest rate paths on credit risk. The coef-
ficient on the interest rate prior to loan origination varies between -0.2 and -0.3, with a
standard error of around 0.15. For macroprudential purposes, it is recommended to be
rather conservative. Assuming the highest (in absolute terms) coefficient plus two stan-
dard deviations implies that an interest rate decline of one percentage point increases
the hazard rate by 0.6 percentage points. Thus, a substantial easing of monetary policy
which would bring interest rates down from 5% (as in 2001–2002) quickly to 2% (as in
2004) could increase the hazard rates by almost 2 percentage points. The increase in the
hazard rate would, however, happen under two conditions: (a) a worsening of the eco-
nomic environment, such as an economic decline and an increase in retail interest rates,
which would make it more difficult for borrowers to repay loans, (b) a worsening of the
economic environment happening after a time of, say, at least one or two years, in order
to “enable” new borrowers who took out loans in the period of rapid monetary easing
to default on their obligations. Assuming that the hazard rates were in line with the
default rates, which remained between 2% and 3% in 2007, just the risk-taking behaviour
could increase the default rates by some 2 percentage points11 in addition to the effect
of the economic decline and a possible increase in interest rates (i.e. debt servicing costs).
As to the robustness checks, we used the same approach as in the probit analysis.
11To be precise, the figure would be 1.8 percentage points given a 3 percentage point drop in interest
rates and a conservative change in the hazard rate of 0.6 percentage points.
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results: Duration Models
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Interest ratet−1 -0.214∗ -0.312∗∗ -0.298∗∗ -0.289∗
(0.129) (0.131) (0.149) (0.151)
Interest rateT−t−1 0.279∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.066) (0.077) (0.077)
GDPCRt−1 -0.018 0.006 -0.018 -0.013
(0.037) (0.038) ( 0.042) (0.042)
GDPCRT−t−1 -0.019 -0.024 -0.066∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032)
Bank sizet−1 0.181∗∗ 0.155 0.056
(0.085) (0.105) (0.142)
Liquidity ratiot−1 -3.083∗∗∗ -3.437∗∗∗ -3.758∗∗∗
(0.676) (0.836) (0.900)
Own funds/total assetst−1 -1.942 0.037 -0.061
( 1.494) (2.074) (2.119)
Bank NPLb - NPLt−1 0.048 -0.624 -1.616
(0.429) (2.100) (2.786)
Bank typet−1 0.470∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.312) (0.316)
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 0.241∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.086)
Bad historyt−1 1.129∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.151)
Bank relationst−1 -0.151 -0.170
(0.227) (0.228)
Loan sizet -0.202∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021)
Loan currencyt 0.997∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗
( 0.228) (0.229)
Maturity 0–3 monthst 1.889∗∗∗ 1.915∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.454)
Maturity 3–6 monthst 1.132∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗
(0.411) (0.413)
Maturity 6–12 monthst 0.729∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.230)




CPIt 0.215∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.064) (0.064)
Country riskt -0.410 -0.429 -0.563 -0.542
(0.290) (0.297) (0.343) (0.344)
Time trend -0.097∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Time trend sq. 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) ( 0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Collateral dummies no no yes yes
Firm regional/industry dummies no no yes yes
N 154,372 154,368 152,316 152,316
Log-likelihood -2,092.978 -2,103.071 -1,564.971 -1,564.218
χ2 108.63(8) 169.781(13) 563.224(40) 570.244(40)
We proceed with modelling the time to loan default, our other measure of risk-taking.
We consider the statistically robust survival model with bank characteristics. The choice
of bank-level controls used here is described in Appendix B.2. In the duration model we
include bank size, risk appetite and profitability, bank unit, and the ratios of liquidity
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results by Industries
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
Manufacturing 1.539∗∗ 0.719
Other 1.630∗∗ 0.735
Repair & related -41.827 0.000
Electricity, gas & heat -43.143 0.000
Water distribution & related 2.323∗∗∗ 0.779
Construction -41.215 0.000




Information activities 0.274 1.246
Financial intermediation -42.773 0.000
R&D, advertising & market research 0.606 0.916
Scientific & technical activities 1.191 0.760
Security & investigation 2.404∗∗ 1.226
Education -43.602 0.000
Artistic & entertainment activities -42.248 0.000
Gambling -42.981 0.000




and own funds to total assets. Bank size and the liquidity and leverage ratios are defined
as in the regular survival analysis. The bank unit is designed as in the robust probit
model and equals one if the loan is granted by a bank branch in the Czech Republic.
As a measure of the credit risk already on the books the fractional polynomials method
suggested the inverse of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR−1t−1). Finally, we add to the
model bank profits scaled down by millions of Czech korunas. We also use another mea-
sure of bank profitability, namely the return on equity (ROE). Since the outcome with
ROE instead of scaled profits leaves the main results almost unaltered, we refrain from
reporting it here. The estimation output is displayed in Table 2.7.
Consistently with our core analysis, the coefficient on the interest rate prior to loan
origination is negative and significant (-0.463∗∗∗). This negative relationship indicates
that an expansionary monetary policy encourages more credit risk-taking among banks.
Moreover, the alternative specification with bank characteristics produces a positive and
highly significant coefficient on the interest rate during the loan life (0.290∗∗∗). This
positive dependence indicates that a higher interest rate prior to loan maturity raises the
probability of loan default per time period and confirms our previous results. Thus, once
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again we find evidence to support hypothesis H.1.2.
Table 2.7: Estimation Results: Robust Model with Bank Characteristics
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
Interest ratet−1 -0.463∗∗∗ 0.141
Interest rateT−t−1 0.290∗∗∗ 0.068
GDPCRt−1 0.074∗ 0.043
GDPCRT−t−1 -0.021 0.027
Bank sizet−1 0.347∗∗∗ 0.105
Liquidity ratiot−1 -3.559∗∗∗ 0.913
Own funds/total assetst−1 -11.994∗∗∗ 2.721
CAR−1t−1 -23.354∗∗∗ 5.471
Bank unitt−1 -0.523∗∗∗ 0.162
Bank profitt−1 -0.406∗∗∗ 0.076
CPIt 0.247∗∗∗ 0.061
Country riskt -0.540∗ 0.307
Time trend -0.092∗∗∗ 0.021




As previously, higher inflation at origination tends to augment the loan hazard rate
(0.247∗∗∗). In addition, the optimally derived bank-level specification confirms that banks
with higher liquidity ratios are likely to grant loans with lower hazard rates (-3.559∗∗∗).
Not surprisingly, emphasizing statistical significance in variable selection produces a
model with numerous significant characteristics. Therefore, in contrast to our main model
with bank characteristics, here the impact of all bank characteristics matters. More cap-
italized and profitable banks are likely to grant loans with lower hazard rates (-0.406∗∗∗
and -11.994∗∗∗ respectively). The negative coefficient on own funds to total assets corrob-
orates the theoretical findings of Keeley (1990), where banks with more capital exhibit a
lower default risk. The negative coefficient on the inverse of the capital adequacy ratio
suggests that banks persist in their hazardous lending (-23.354∗∗∗).
Finally, we compare the two survival models with bank, loan and borrower char-
acteristics. The estimation output for the survival model with robust borrower and loan
covariates is provided in Table 2.8. Consistently with our core analysis, we observe that
adding the firm and loan variables does not alter our key findings. A lower interest rate
prior to loan origination increases the hazard rate of new loans (-0.383∗∗). Once again, we
find evidence in support of hypothesis H.1.2, which relates increases in bank riskiness to
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expansionary monetary conditions. At the same time, a lower short rate during the loan
life decreases non-payment of outstanding loans (0.349∗∗∗). Contrary to the main model,
the robust specification also produces a significant and negative coefficient on the GDP
growth rate during the loan life (-0.080∗∗∗). Therefore, the robust model suggests that
more dynamic economic growth reduces the riskiness of the outstanding loan portfolio.
The parameter for inflation remains positive and highly significant, which indicates that
higher inflation at origination increases the loan hazard rate (0.186∗∗∗).
The bank, firm and loan covariates employed in the optimally built survival model
are defined as in the corresponding main specification. However, the core survival anal-
ysis contains more bank, loan and borrower characteristics. Implementing the optimal
variable selection strategy results in the exclusion of bank type, loan currency and the
measure of bank relations maintained by the borrowers prior to new loan origination. In
addition, the fractional polynomials method suggested capturing the credit risk already
on the books by the capital adequacy ratio (CARt−1) instead of the non-performing loan
ratio (Bank NPLb - NPLt−1).
All characteristics included in both the main and robust model yield similar results.
As in the core part of our survival study, more modest loans tend to be more risky
(-0.246∗∗∗). In both regression outputs, overdrafts have a lower hazard rate (-0.662∗∗∗
in the robust model versus -0.553∗∗∗ in the main model). Moreover, we obtain the same
effect of loan maturity as in the main model, namely each coefficient on the maturity
dummy is highly significant and positive. In addition, we observe that the shorter the
loan term, the greater the probability of default (2.341∗∗∗, 1.319∗∗∗ and 0.979∗∗∗ respec-
tively).
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Table 2.8: Estimation Results: Robust Model with Bank, Loan and Borrower Charac-
teristics
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
Interest ratet−1 -0.383∗∗ 0.152
Interest rateT−t−1 0.349∗∗∗ 0.077
GDPCRt−1 0.011 0.043
GDPCRT−t−1 -0.080∗∗∗ 0.031
Bank sizet−1 0.193∗∗ 0.085
Liquidity ratiot−1 -4.978∗∗∗ 0.770
Own funds/total assetst−1 -4.202∗∗ 2.126
CARt−1 0.035∗∗∗ 0.008
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 0.180∗∗ 0.070
Bad historyt−1 0.939∗∗∗ 0.195
Loan sizet -0.246∗∗∗ 0.020
Maturity 0–3 monthst 2.341∗∗∗ 0.447
Maturity 3–6 monthst 1.319∗∗∗ 0.348
Maturity 6–12 monthst 0.979∗∗∗ 0.239
Loan purposet -0.662∗∗∗ 0.158
CPIt 0.186∗∗∗ 0.064
Country riskt -0.570 0.347
Time trend -0.097∗∗∗ 0.020
Time trend sq. 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
Firm regional dummies yes






This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of monetary conditions on banks’
appetite for risk by investigating the case of the Czech Republic. The mechanism of bank
risk-taking coined by Borio and Zhu (2012) can be identified in studies on the credit
channel, for instance Diamond and Rajan (2006) and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003).
Generally speaking, higher tolerance to risk implies that at times of low interest rates
banks will seek to finance riskier borrowers. We focus on two aspects of the discussion,
namely whether a monetary easing leads to more lending to borrowers with a riskier
past and whether it encourages banks to extend new loans that default sooner. The two
questions are vital both for macroprudential authorities and for academics due to their
contradictory theoretical implications and their consequences for monetary policy design.
We use Czech National Bank Credit Register data to model the probability of accepting
borrowers with a bad credit history and the time to loan failure in association with a
set of macroeconomic, firm, loan and bank characteristics. We ask two distinct research
questions, employ two different measures of risk, and thus use two different econometric
methodologies – a probit model and a duration model. Therefore, our results are not
directly comparable.
The outcome of our probit analysis suggests that at times of monetary expansion
Czech banks do not necessarily believe that the economic fundamentals are strong enough
to reduce the default probability of borrowers with a recent bad credit history and are
less likely to finance them. We provide a possible explanation for this – at first glance
– puzzling result. The estimated influence of bank characteristics shows that larger and
more liquid banks tend to extend fewer loans to firms with a recent bad credit history.
Additionally, banks with a worse relative credit risk track record tend to finance fewer
companies with a riskier past. Interestingly, we find that less leveraged banks are less
likely to incur credit risk.
The result of our survival analysis indicates that relaxed monetary conditions pro-
mote risk-taking among banks. This outcome is confirmed irrespective of the way we
address differences in bank profiles. Specifically, we obtain a positive association between
low interest rates prior to loan origination and the loan hazard rate both when bank co-
variates are explicitly accounted for and when the effect of unobserved bank heterogeneity
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is estimated. Controlling for loan and borrower characteristics confirms that banks tend
to extend loans with a higher hazard rate at times of monetary easing. We separate de-
mand and supply for hazardous loans by using a set of borrower and loan characteristics,
and proxy the Czech money market rate by the euro area overnight rate. Estimation of
the hazard model, which in its essence works with the failure rate normalized per time
period, enables us to disentangle credit risk from the effect of the overnight rate on loan
maturity and, thus, liquidity risk. The survival model allows us to examine the effect of
the monetary policy stance on the outstanding loan portfolio. Conditional on the loan
being extended, a lower interest rate during the loan life reduces its hazard rate. This
result can be attributed to lower refinancing costs or, simply, a reduced loan repayment
burden.
At the same time, we find hardly any support for an impact of the real cycle in
determining the risk of new loans and the outstanding portfolio. The specification with
bank, borrower and loan covariates yields a negative impact of the GDP growth rate
on existing loans. Other estimated effects of the real cycle turn out to be statistically
insignificant in the survival data for Czech loans. The impact of monetary policy on
risk-taking varies with bank characteristics. More liquid banks tend to grant loans with
lower hazard rates. The negative association between loan riskiness and bank liquidity
shows that banks accumulating liquid assets tend to grant less risky loans and confirms
one of the implications of Diamond and Rajan (2006). Finally, we find that foreign-owned




Evaluation of Swap Contracts Using Various
Term Structure Models in the Polish Market
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A growing role of derivatives reinforces a need for their consistent valuation and thus
for reliable term structure models. In this paper I analyze five term structure models
in order to compare their ability to capture the interest rate dynamics and value the
interest rate swaps in the Polish market. A choice of the plain interest rate derivative
allows for a wider selection of interest rate models, which includes the frameworks of
Nelson and Siegel (1987), Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), Heath et al.
(1992) and the cubic spline curves. The performance and predictive accuracy of the term
structure models are assessed based on the realized contract values. The Nelson-Siegel,
cubic interpolation and CIR models generate adequate fit and transaction values similar
to the realized contract values. A special case of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton model with
the volatility corroborated by the observable market data produces mostly unreliable
fitted curves, while Vasicek’s approach gives contract values statistically different from
the actually swapped amounts. The ample performance of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model
suggests the rate-reliant nature of the interest rate volatility. The underperformance of
the Vasicek model emphasizes the role of the cross section of interest rates, and thus the
importance of a no-arbitrage argument. Finally, the ex-post accuracy of the Nelson-Siegel
and the cubic spline models indicates that a current cross-section of the yield curve is
highly informative for the future.
JEL Classification: G13, C53, C52
Key Words: term structure, interest rate models, calibration, interest rate derivatives,
swap pricing
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3.1 Introduction
The financial turmoil, which took its first toll in 2007, but seemed to unveil its truly
disastrous nature only in 2008, has fueled a discussion about the complexity of contem-
porary financial instruments’ valuation. Following the crisis, practitioners and regulators
have raised concerns regarding opaque financial products and their pricing. This study
poses a more basic question, namely it discusses the usefulness of advanced term struc-
ture models in the valuation of plain vanilla interest rate sensitive derivatives. As it
investigates the value added of theoretically-grounded term structure models in valua-
tion of real life swap contracts, this chapter also refers to model risk. Model risk "occurs
when the investment strategy relies on valuation or risk models that are flawed" (Jorion
(2009), p. 419). Although model risk is typically associated with complex derivatives,
the choice of a plain interest rate derivative allows for examination of model risk in the
case of a dynamically growing OTC market, such as the Polish one, and a wider selection
of interest rate models.
However, the motivation of my investigation does not stem solely from the recent
developments. The relationship of yields on risk-free assets to maturity and its deter-
minants has already gained a great deal of attention in the economic literature over
previous decades. Economists have attempted to derive, model and understand the term
structure for reasons ranging from extracting expectations to valuing future contingent
claims. With the growing role of derivatives a quest for pricing, hedging and, in general,
managing risk associated with their portfolios has become one of the priorities in finance.
Since valuing instruments contingent on future developments calls for deriving a yield
curve, a need for a commonly accepted term structure model has followed. While for
stock options Black and Scholes (1973) have successfully established the major model,
interest contingent claims and term structure modeling continue to be addressed by a
vast number of methods used among scholars and practitioners.
The lack of a universally employed term structure model could be attributed to the
complex stochastic behavior exhibited by interest rates and their non-tradability. Unques-
tionably, the efforts to explain the behavior of the yield curve, which depicts the relation
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between maturities and interest rates, have been intensified since the introduction of op-
tion trading on bonds and interest rate swaps (IRS). Roughly speaking, under an interest
rate swap agreement, a fixed and agreed upon rate is exchanged for a floating interest
rate. Thus, in the case of interest rate swaps as well as other interest contingent deriva-
tives the term structure affects not only the discounting future but, more importantly, it
drives the underlying ’asset’ value. Despite all the effort undertaken, understanding and
modeling the term structure remains one of the challenging topics in financial research.
This study empirically examines whether the five models of the yield curve differ sig-
nificantly in terms of the implications for valuing interest rate swaps. Selecting a plain
interest rate derivative allows me to investigate interest rate models that are applicable
in a broader context and may be used to extract expectations about the economy, con-
duct monetary policy, assess and manage financial risk1. Consequently, this investigation
centers on the valuation for a longer horizon. Translated to a real-life setting, the choice
of the term structure model is considered from the perspective of financial institutions,
such as banks, and their portfolio of the interest sensitive claims with a longer holding
period. Thus, the performance of the term structure models is essentially assessed by the
predictive accuracy of the fitted yield curves and fitted swap contract values. I estimate
the term structure models of Nelson and Siegel (1987), Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll,
and Ross (1985), Heath et al.(1992) and construct the cubic spline curves. By comparing
the outcomes of these techniques, I also investigate the value added of a complex and
computationally expensive versus simplistic approach to interest rate modeling. Pricing
of interest rate derivatives depends vitally on the term structure and it is of great interest
to verify the extent to which the discrepancies in modeling the term structure impact the
valuation of these contingent claims.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the term structure models,
while Section 3 focuses on the interest rate swaps and their valuation. Section 4 discusses
the data and the estimation methodology. Section 5 summarizes the findings, and Section
6 concludes.
1This argument is discussed in more detail in Section 3.
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3.2 Term Structure Models
The term structure of interest rates describes the relationship between the yield on
a default free debt instrument and its time to maturity. Strictly speaking, this term is
reserved for more formal descriptions of the yield-to-maturity relation, while the graph-
ical relationship is often called the yield curve. Nonetheless, both constructs tend to be
employed interchangeably. Term structure modeling refers to two related, but separate,
questions in finance. The first question focuses merely on curve construction, whereas
the second - and much broader problem - involves a specification of factors driving the
term structure dynamics over time. Within the latter approach two distinct research
strands have evolved. Simply put, researchers either develop empirical models and esti-
mation methods for the yield curve or propose theories about the nature of the stochastic
process that governs interest rates. Loosely speaking, the empirical methods seek to de-
sign mathematical functions that reproduce the typical yield curve shapes. Thus, clearly
they lack any theoretical underpinnings. On the contrary, the theoretical studies derive
interest rate models from the theory of asset pricing and economic fundamentals. The
model building blocks are state variables, which constitute the source of uncertainty in
the economy, and processes characterizing their intertemporal dynamics. These dynam-
ics successively determine the stochastic behavior of interest rates. Many term structure
frameworks assume that the instantaneous interest rate itself is a source of uncertainty
in the economy.
Essentially, two approaches to the theoretical modeling of interest rates dominate
in the finance literature2. Earlier works focus on the evolution of the short rate, while
studies following Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) start directly with the movement of
the entire term structure. From the economic perspective the two classes of stochastic
interest rate models are arbitrage-free or equilibrium models. Strictly speaking, the vast
majority of equilibrium frameworks are built under the partial equilibrium condition.
Even in their case, however, the no-arbitrage argument is crucial for obtaining a bond
pricing formula3. Such an approach has been pioneered by the celebrated paper of Va-
2For a detailed discussion of various classifications of interest rate models and the models’ exposition
refer to Brigo and Mercurio (2006), Cairns (2004), James and Webber (2009) or Wu (2009) to name just
a few.
3Therefore, even the seminal Vasicek (1977) paper can be classified as the no-arbitrage model (see a
critical evaluation of Vasicek (1977) provided in Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992), pp. 77-78).
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sicek (1977), which is discussed in the following section. The general equilibrium models
achieve the specification of the term structure within a representative agent endowment
economy from a set of steady-state conditions. Their prominent example, due to Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), is also presented below. Finally, the arbitrage pricing models
impose an exogenous stochastic process on spot or forward rates in a way that excludes
unexploited price differences in the market of interest rate contingent claims. The far
reaching paper of Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) with its unifying framework is an
excellent illustration of the arbitrage-free studies.
3.2.1 The Vasicek Model
In his seminal paper, Vasicek starts with a certain stochastic behavior of interest rates
and the market price for risk and then derives the price of all contingent claims assuming
the absence of arbitrage opportunities. He models the instantaneous interest rate as an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process of the following form:
dr(t) = κ(θ − r(t))dt+ σdW (t), (3.1)
where κ, θ and σ are positive constants and W (t) denotes a standard Wiener process. The
reasoning is similar to that of Black and Scholes (1973). The solution to the stochastic
differential equation (3.1) is given by:




The interest rate r(t) implied by this structure is a Gaussian random variable with the
following conditional moments:







where F0 is the filtration for W (0) and, more generally, Ft is the filtration for the Wiener
process W (t). The derivation of equation (3.2) and the conditional variance of r(t) are
provided in the Appendix. It is easy to see that lim
t→∞
E (r(t)) = θ. Therefore, the pa-
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rameter θ represents the average long-run interest rate. Parameter σ is the volatility of
the short rate. Moreover, whenever r(t) exceeds its long-run mean (θ), the drift term
becomes negative, which pushes r(t) down towards θ. Clearly, the speed of this adjust-
ment is captured by the parameter κ. Likewise, when the interest rate is lower than its
long-run mean (r(t) < θ), the positive drift term pushes r(t) up towards θ. Thus, the
Vasicek model exhibits mean reversion, an appealing feature from the economic point of
view. Roughly speaking, in times of an economic downturn and rising interest rates the
demand for loans decreases, which eventually pulls the rates down. By the same token,
the opposite can be argued. The mean reversion process prevents the expected value and
variance of the instantaneous rate from exploding, which in turn limits the occurrence
of unreasonably high and low rates. However, negative yields for distant maturities may
still appear.
Generally, the term structure of interest rates is characterized by yields to maturity.
The continuously compounded yield at time t of bond maturing at T is defined by:
R(t, T ) = − ln P (t, T )
T − t
(3.3)
where P (t, T ) is the price in period t of a discount bond maturing at T , for all 0 ≤
t ≤ T ≤ T ∗. We fix a time horizon, T ∗, before which all bonds will mature. To ensure
that the bond prices satisfy the no-arbitrage condition one needs to apply the Girsanov
theorem and redefine the diffusion process for the instantaneous interest rate under the
risk neutral probability measure4. The Appendix features a detailed presentation of the
risk neutral determination of bond prices and yields within the Vasicek framework. The







dt+ σ dW̃ (t) (3.4)
In a nutshell, the above given equation reformulates the short rate equation (3.1) using
the following equivalence:
dW (t) = dW̃ (t)− λ dt (3.5)
where W (t) is the original Wiener process and W̃ (t) is the Wiener process under a risk-
4Rigorously speaking, it is required that the diffusion process for the bond prices has the martingale
property. For the full treatment of risk-neutral pricing refer to Shreve (2004).
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adjusted measure Q. The parameter λ denotes a market price of risk and is assumed to
be constant in the Vasicek model. Finally, given the character of the spot rate process,
r(t), Vasicek (1977) derives prices for discount bonds (P (t, T )) under the risk neutral
probability measure Q and conditional on the information available at time t. The price
of a discount bond at time t with maturity T ≤ T ∗ is defined as:











In the Vasicek model the time-t price of the discount bond maturing at T for any 0 ≤
t ≤ T ≤ T ∗ is described by:
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4e−κ(T−t) − e−2κ(T−t) + 2κ(T − t)− 3
)]
Once inverted, the bond prices serve to determine the term structure of interest rates,
which Vasicek (1977) expresses as:





































where κ, θ and σ are the same positive constants as in equation (3.1), the parameter
λ is the risk premium introduced by the risk-neutral pricing and r(t) is the current
period instantaneous interest rate driven by the stochastic differential equation (3.1). The





infinite maturity interest rate R(t,∞). Depending on the relation between r(t), R(t,∞)
and σ2
4κ2
Vasicek (1977) generates upward sloping, downward sloping and humped yield
curves. All three types of shapes corroborate the stylized facts about yields curves.
3.2.2 The Cox, Ingersoll and Ross Model
Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) adapt an equilibrium approach to interest rate model-
ing. The paper develops a single-good continuous time homogeneous economy in which
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interest rates are derived from the supply and demand of investors with a constant rel-
ative risk aversion. In each period a representative agent faces production opportunities
determined by the state of technology, which evolves according to a first-order stochastic
differential equation. The equilibrium risk-free rate and the expected return on contingent
claims are such that "all wealth is invested in the physical production"5. Therefore, the
endogenized interest rate depends on the production opportunities and the rate dynam-
ics moves in line with the evolution of the stochastic state of the production technology.
Using the assumption about the production dynamics, Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985)
arrive at the following diffusion process for the risk-free rate of interest:
dr(t) = κ (θ − r(t)) dt+ σ
√
r(t)dW (t) (3.9)
where κ, θ and σ are positive constants and W (t) denotes a standard Wiener process
associated with filtration Ft. Generally, a closed-form solution cannot be derived, however
a unique positive solution takes the form of:






Additionally, in order to preserve a positive short rate the condition 2κθ > σ2
is imposed. Derivations are provided in the Appendix. The endogenously determined
process characterized by equation (3.10) is similar to the stochastic process for the inter-
est rate in Vasicek (1977). However, the volatility of the CIR process for the short rate
increases with the rate level. Feller (1951) shows that processes as described by equation
(3.10) have a noncentral chi-squared distribution. Specifically, conditioned on filtration
Fs for s < t the short rate r(t) follows a noncentral chi-squared distribution6:
r(t)|Fs ∼ χ2 [2cr(t); 2q + 2, 2u]





5Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), p. 387.





The interest rate r(t) implied by the square-root diffusion process has the following con-
ditional moments:
E(r(t)|Fs) = θ + (r(s)− θ)e−κ(t−s)












The Appendix presents derivations of the conditional moments in the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
framework. As in the case of the instantaneous short-rate process proposed by Vasicek
(1977), in the CIR model the parameter θ represents the average long-run interest rate
and the parameter κ captures the speed of mean-reverting dynamics. Whenever r(t)
moves away from its long-run mean, the drift term pulls it back towards θ. However, the
two models differ with respect to the volatility function of the short rate, which for the
CIR process becomes σ
√
r(t) and moves with the spot rate level.
Similar to Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) use the market efficiency
to derive the price of discount bonds and the yield-to-maturity. The no-arbitrage price
of discount bonds is implied by the existence of a risk-neutral measure Q. Changing the
probability measure from the actual to the risk-neutral modifies the drift term exactly











At the Cox-Ingresoll-Ross equilibrium the risk premium, λ(t), assumes the form of
λ
√
r(t) and corresponds to the constant λ in Vasicek’s equation (3.5). In both cases
the market price for risk preserves the same structure under the actual and the risk-
neutral probability measure. The Appendix outlines steps involved in the derivation of
bond prices in the Cox-Ingresoll-Ross framework. Given the character of the square-root
process for the spot rate, r(t), the price of a discount bond at time t with maturity
T ≤ T ∗ is given as:
P (t, T ) = A(t, T )e−B(t,T )r(t) (3.12)
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where
A(t, T ) =
[
2γe(κ+γ+λ)(T−t)/2
(γ + κ+ λ)(eγ(T−t) − 1) + 2γ
]2κθ/σ2
B(t, T ) =
2(eγ(T−t) − 1)
(γ + κ+ λ)(eγ(T−t) − 1) + 2γ
γ =
√
(κ+ λ)2 + 2σ2
where κ, θ and σ are the same positive constants as in equation (3.9), the parameter
λ is introduced by the risk-neutral pricing and r(t) is the current period instantaneous
interest rate driven by the stochastic differential equation (3.11). Using equation (3.3) the
continuously compounded yield for discount bonds in the CIR model can be expressed
as:
R(t, T ) =
−lnA(t, T ) + B(t, T )r(t)
T − t
where A(t, T ) and B(t, T ) are defined as in formula (3.12). It can be shown that the
infinite maturity yield in the Cox-Ingresoll-Ross model amounts to:
R(t,∞) = 2κθ
γ + κ+ λ
As in Vasicek (1977), all three types of yield curves shapes are admissible. The CIR term
structure becomes upward sloping for instantaneous rates lower than the long-term yield,
downward sloping for rates exceeding κθ
κ+λ
and exhibits humps for intermediate values of
the short interest rate.
The great appeal of both interest rate models is their analytical tractability. On
the other hand, one of the drawbacks of the Vasicek and the Cox- Ingersoll-Ross model
stems from the fact that they do not take the whole yield curve as an input in the price
structure. Instead, the yield curve is what those models produce. In particular, Heath,
Jarrow, and Morton (1992) criticizes the models of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) and
Vasicek (1977) for introducing arbitrary specification of the market price for risk. Both
models derive the term structure from the prices for risk-free claims, which originate
from the value of the discount bond bearing some risk. Such reverse pricing may lead
to inconsistencies and arbitrage opportunities. To exclude arbitrage, the price structure
should take into account the entire curve observed in the market. This consideration has
fueled the evolution of the arbitrage pricing models.
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3.2.3 The Heath-Jarrow-Morton Model
Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) propose a unifying framework for all arbitrage
pricing models. Any specific arbitrage-free model can be expressed as a special case of
their model. Amongst others, their work is a generalized formulation of such classical
cases as Vasicek (1977), Hull and White (1987) (Extended Vasicek) or Ho and Lee (1986),
which is the first arbitrage-free term structure model calibrated to the term structure
data. As already mentioned, a basic feature of arbitrage models is taking the entire curve
as state variables. Heath-Jarrow-Morton’s methodology imposes stochastic structure on
the forward rates and its state variable is the forward rate curve. The evolution of the
term structure of the forward rates is described by7:
df(t, T ) = α(t, T )dt+ σ(t, T )dW (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≤ T ∗ (3.13)
or in an integral form:






σ(u, T )dW (u) (3.14)
where σ(u, T ) denotes a family of volatilities of the forward rate for maturity T and W (u)
is a standard Wiener process. For any maturity T , the volatilities σ(u, T ) and the drifts







is almost surely finite. In general, the volatilities σ(u, T ) and the drifts α(u, T ) depend
on the history of the Wiener process and on the rates up to time t. For any time t,
0 ≤ t ≤ T ≤ T ∗, the model assumes that the initial forward rate curve f(0, T ) is known.
Thus, by construction, the model fits the initial observed term structure.
A major contribution of Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) is that it recognizes the
implication of the arbitrage-free assumption for the relationship between the drift and
the volatility of the forward rate. In the no-arbitrage setting, the drifts of the forward
7For the simplicity of the exposition I present a one factor specification
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rates, α(u, ·) are uniquely determined by the volatilities, σ(u, ·), and the market price for
risk. Formally, the condition reads:




 ,∀t ∈ [0, T ], T ∈ [0, T ∗] (3.15)
The Appendix features derivation of equation (3.15). Using the no-arbitrage drift re-
striction, the forward-rate process in (3.13) can be formulated under the risk-neutral
probability measure Q as:
df (t, T ) =
σ (t, T ) T∫
t
σ (t, u) du
 dt+ σ (t, T ) dW̃ (t) (3.16)
where W̃ (t) is the Wiener process under the martingale measure Q, while λ(t) denotes a
market price of risk and 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≤ T ∗. The Heath-Jarrow-Morton methodology offers
a broad range of models, each characterized by specific functional forms of the drifts and
the volatilities of the forward rates. Due to the drift condition (3.15), the choice of any
particular model reduces to the choice of a functional form of the volatility.
A simple way to postulate the dynamics for the short rate under the Heath-Jarrow-














σ(u, t)dW̃ (u) (3.17)
In general, the HJM forward rate framework results in a path-dependant evolution (3.17)
for the spot rates. Since the Markovian models are numerically easier to handle, a
condition additionally imposed on the Heath-Jarrow-Morton specification is that the
short rate needs to be Markovian. Equation (3.17) implies the following differential form
for the spot interest rate process:
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dt+ σ(t, t)dW̃ (t) (3.18)
Given the regularity conditions and under the risk-neutral probability, the yields on
contingent claims are determined by the initial term structure and the volatility function
of the forward rates in the following way:






















σ(u, s)ds dW̃ (u)
T − t
(3.19)
The Appendix outlines the derivations of equations (3.16) and (3.19). It is worth
noting that Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) obtain the value of the discount bonds
directly from a finite number of state variables under the assumption of the absence of
arbitrage. Thus, by construct, their model consistently prices all contingent claims on
the term structure. Given the generality of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton methodology and
its flexibility regarding the functional forms of σ(t, ·), there have been numerous attempts
to extend and validate the HJM model by assuming and testing a certain functional form
for the forward-rate volatility.
3.2.4 Empirical Yield Curve Models
Early attempts within the empirical approach focused on advancing the polynomial
splines models. This methodology was introduced by McCulloch (1971) and extended by
McCulloch (1975) and Langetieg and Smoot (1981). Polynomials, however, fail to con-
form to the variety of yield curve shapes observed in reality and tend to produce unstable
forward rates with unacceptable asymptotic properties. A pioneering work in the expo-
nential approximation of the yield curve is due to Vasicek and Fong (1982). The paper
suggests an exponential spline formulation, well-fitting the term structures observed in
reality. Vasicek and Fong (1982) avoid a tedious nonlinear estimation of the discount
factor coefficients due to a logarithmic transform of the discount function’s arguments.
As a result, an ordinary least squares estimation can be employed. When tested on the
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US Treasury bills, the methodology generates stable forward rates that are a continuous
function of time, exhibit desirable asymptotic characteristics for long maturities and con-
form to a wide range of shapes.
Building on Vasicek and Fong’s results, Nelson and Siegel (1987) proposed an expo-
nential model which is simple, parsimonious and at the same time flexible enough to
generate monotonic, humped and S-shaped curves. Their model is capable of replicating
important stylized facts of the yield curve. Nelson and Siegel (1987) develop the term
structure model starting with a function for the instantaneous forward rate. The frame-
work includes three specifications of the instantaneous forward rate functions, namely
a second-order exponential equation with unequal roots, with equal roots and, finally,
a simple exponential specification. Given that the simple specification performs unsat-
isfactorily, whereas the case of unequal roots tends to cause overparametrization, they
are both excluded from my investigation. Nelson and Siegel (1987) report that the for-
mulation with equal roots failed to accurately approximate solely the extreme cases. In
particular, the model with equal roots overestimated the long-term discount rates and
underestimated their short term counterparts in their in- and out-of-sample estimations
for the U.S. Treasury bills. The second-order exponential equation with equal roots
characterizing the instantaneous forward rate r(m) for maturity m has the form8:











where τ is a time constant that determines the rate at which the regressors decay to zero
and β0, β1, β2 are the coefficients to be estimated. The determinant of the speed of decay
needs to be calibrated to the data. Small τ conforms to low maturities, whereas high
values of τ generate slow decay and thus fit long maturities best. Using equation (3.20),
the evolution for the yield to maturity m can be expressed as:













where R(m) is the yield for maturity m and β∗1 = β1 + β2. Parameters τ , β0, β1 and β2
are defined as in expression (3.20). By construct, β0 is the limiting value of the yield
for very large maturities. It can be also shown that for maturities close to 0 the yield
8I follow the notation of Nelson and Siegel (1987).
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approaches (β0 + β1). The derivations are provided in the Appendix. The factors of
the Nelson-Siegel model have appealing interpretations, namely they can be regarded as
the yield curve level, slope and curvature. The long-term factor β0 governs the level of
the term structure of interest rates, while β1 and β2 are responsible for monotonic and
humped shapes of the curves.
The Nelson-Siegel methodology has become very popular and gave rise to an entire
class of models. The approach is extensively used by practitioners, in particular central
banks (ECB (2008) and BIS (2005)). The most recognized extensions of the Nelson-Siegel
approach are by Diebold and Li (2006) and Dahlquis and Svensson (1996). The Svensson
model adds even more flexibility to the Nelson-Siegel framework by including a second
hump factor, which produces a much broader range of term structure shapes. The real
value added of Diebold and Li (2006) stems from modeling the coefficients dynamically
with the use of the autoregressive process of order one. By doing so, the study enriches
the Nelson-Siegel model with a time-series dimension. An out-of-sample forecasting based
on Diebold and Li estimates for US Treasury bonds exhibits an improvement in precision
of prediction as time horizon lengthens. This result could be attributed to the dynamics
imposed in the estimated parameters. The Diebold and Li variation of the Nelson-Siegel
model proves the robustness of the latter one to modifications and restrictions. It also
supports the choice for this study of the second-order exponential model with equal roots.
Finally, a frequently employed algorithm for the curve construction is a cubic spline
interpolation. Hagan and West (2006) features a comprehensive survey of the yield curve
construction. The interpolation methods use the set of available observations to recover
the in-between "missing" yields. A cubic spline9 is a spline constructed of piecewise third-
order polynomials, which pass through a set of control points. The second derivative of
each polynomial is commonly set to zero at the endpoints, which provides a boundary




3.3 Interest Rate Swaps
A plain-vanilla interest-rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange
fixed for floating payments in the future10. The interest rate swaps are an appropriate
choice to empirically compare the performance of the term structure models for several
reasons. Since their introduction in the early 1980s, swaps have dominated the over-the-
counter derivative market. Additionally, the interest rate swap market is liquid, deep
and practically hardly regulated. What’s more, selecting a plain interest rate derivative
allows the investigation of interest rate models applicable in a broader context. If in-
stead the interest-rate options were selected, the choice of models would be naturally
confined to the interest-rate market models. As noticed by Brigo and Mercurio (2006),
the unquestionable popularity of the market models stems from the fact that they have
been tailored to a specific interest rate option’s type and its market segment11. Unlike
options, the interest rate swap is equivalent to a portfolio of bonds or a series of forward
rate agreements. As shown below in this section, the swap can be valued as a portfolio
of either of the two instruments. The term structure models that characterize evolution
of bond prices, the same that serve to extract expectations about the economy, conduct
monetary policy, assess and manage financial risk, may also be used to price plain inter-
est rate derivatives such as swaps. In his acknowledged text on term structure modeling,
Rebonato (1998) emphasizes that "any yield curve model capable of pricing discount
bonds exactly must recover the market swap rates correctly for any choice of the model
volatility"12. Contrary to this traditionally established approach, Duffie and Singleton
(1997) develop a new framework for pricing caps, floors swaptions and swaps using a
default and liquidity-adjusted instantaneous short rate. Their risk-adjusted model is a
natural consequence of the empirical studies of the default spreads in the swap market (
Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang (1993) and Malhotra (1997)). To mitigate the problem of
default risk premia, I analyze the contracts between banks of similar credit quality. None
10Rebonato (1998), p. 8
11Brigo and Mercurio (2006), p. 195. In particular, the Brace-Gatarek-Musiela (BGM) model is
compatible with Black’s pricing formula for caps, floors or caplets, while the lognormal forward-swap
model (LSM) is compatible with pricing swaptions. Their calibration to each specific instrument’s market
in developed countries is relatively straightforward. A calibration to the markets in transition economies
is examined in Vojtek (2004). An overview of the market models can be found in Brigo and Mercurio
(2006) or Cairns (2004).
12Rebonato (1998), p. 12
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of the examined deals incorporates a spread over the money market reference rate13. The
symmetric nature of the interest rate swaps implies no default risk premium (Sorensen
and Bollier (1994)) and Duffie and Huang (1996)). Therefore, the swap pricing theory
and common yield curve models may be applied.
The series of swap fixed payments are often referred to as the fixed legs, and the
floating payments as the floating legs of a swap. Both legs are calculated on the same
principal and for the same period. The fixed rate and the future dates of exchanges are
know at the outset of the swap. The floating rate is reset at each payment time. The
widely known reference rate of interest employed in standardized quotations and financial
derivatives valuation is the London Interbank Offered Rate. LIBOR is the reference in the
Eurocurrency market which, though centered in London, is the global money market for
wholesale deposits and loans in all easily convertible currencies. More precisely, LIBOR
is the rate of interest offered by banks on deposits from other banks in the Eurocurrency
market. However, the use of interbank interest rates is not confined to London. Natu-
rally, most financial centers quote their own interbank offered rates. These rates include,
among many others, the Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate (FIBOR), the Paris Inter-
bank Offered Rate (PIBOR) or the Warsaw Interbank Offered Rate (WIBOR), which is
charged on bank deposits in the Warsaw money market. As previously mentioned, the
reference rates are key to derivatives valuation. In this study I examine the interest rate
swap agreements signed in the Polish market, in the Polish zloty, and where fixed interest
payments were exchanged for the WIBOR-linked payments. Therefore, the reference rate
for the sake of this investigation is the Warsaw Interbank Offered Rate (WIBOR).
The value of the interest rate swap is by default zero or close to zero at the contract
outset. Under IRS, the principal amount is not exchanged and thus it is solely a notional
principal. The swap fixed rate is determined by equalizing the net present value of both
fixed- and floating-rate cash flows. Throughout the swap’s life the contract gains or
loses in value. The swap pricing theory suggests two approaches to interest rate swap
valuation. One approach determines the swap value in terms of bond prices, the other by
treating an IRS as a portfolio of forward rate agreements (FRAs). Valuing the interest
13Unlike in many other studies, my dataset contains very detailed information on the interest rate
swaps including all contractual provisions.
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rate swap as bonds reduces to finding a difference between the prices of a floating- and
a fixed-rate bond. From the point of view of the fixed-rate payer, an interest rate swap
is a long position in a floating-rate bond combined with a short position in a fixed-rate
bond. Thus, the fixed-rate payer calculates the value of the IRS by subtracting the price
of the fixed-rate bond from the price of the floating-rate bond. The opposite is true for
the floating-rate payer. At any time of the IRS’s life its value to the fixed-rate payer is
equal to14:




ke−riti + Le−rntn (3.23)
Bfl = (L+ k
∗) e−r
∗t∗ (3.24)
where ti is a time interval until the i-th payments are exchanged, ri is the WIBOR15 zero
rate corresponding to maturity ti and k is a fixed payment made on each payment date.
Expression (3.24) presumes that the next exchange date is t∗. Then, r∗ is the correspond-
ing WIBOR zero rate and k∗ is the floating-rate payment. To understand formula (3.24)
one needs to recall that immediately after each exchange, the floating-rate bond is worth
just the notional amount (L). Therefore, in the period between the payment date t∗ and
a preceding payment date, the bond’s value equals the notional principal augmented by
the corresponding discounted floating payment.
Alternatively, any IRS could be valued in terms of FRAs. A FRA or a forward rate
agreement is a contract that determines the rate of interest to be paid or received on
an obligation beginning at some future date16. In order to price an interest rate swap
as a portfolio of FRAs one needs to determine the implied forward rate for each future
floating payment specified under the contract. The forward interest rate rFi,i+1 for the





14Hull (2002), pp. 136-137.
15More generally, the LIBOR zero rate corresponding to maturity ti. In what follows, I will refrain from
recalling that for the Eurocurrency market the appropriate LIBOR rate would be used instead of WIBOR.
16Based on Hull (2008), p. 85.
17Hull (2008), p. 83.
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where ri and ri+1 are the WIBOR zero rates for maturities ti+1 and ti respectively.
Clearly, further steps assume that the forward rates are realized. Under this assumption,
the future swap floating rates equal the implied forward rates. As a result, the swap cash
flows can be calculated for each exchange date ti+1 as the net present value18 of the swap
payments:
NPV CFi+1 = (ti+1 − ti)L(rfix − rFi,i+1)e−ri+1
i+1
12 (3.26)
where ti+1 and ti is a time interval until respectively the i+ 1 and i-th payments are
exchanged, ri+1 is the WIBOR zero rate corresponding to maturity ti+1 and rfix is the
fixed interest rate. Finally, rFi,i+1 is the implied forward interest rate for the period
between dates ti and ti+1. Eventually, the IRS value is simply equal to the present value





It can be seen from the valuation of interest rate swaps to what extent IRS are
sensitive to changes in interest rates. This sensitivity makes IRS a good candidate to test
the impact of differences in modeling term structure on derivatives valuation. The choice
of the interest rate swap contracts is further motivated by the fact, that the swap market
is liquid, deep and practically hardly regulated. Not all interest rate contingent claims
are traded in the markets, which share these characteristics. The swap market liquidity
follows from the amount of deals concluded. The size of the IRS market constitutes a
most significant portion of the over-the-counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives both in
terms of outstanding notional amounts and gross market values of the contracts. The
IRS dominance in the OTC interest rate market is reflected in market data surveys,
a good example of which are the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) quarterly
reviews listing outstanding total derivatives notional amounts and market values in the
G10 countries. The statistics are provided in Tables 3.1 – 3.4. BIS regularly gathers
data from national regulators and extracts from it the worldwide consolidated derivatives
exposure of major banks and dealers in the developed countries to assess the OTC market
size. Table 3.1 shows the IRS constitutes the most significant position out of all OTC
interest rate derivatives for the reported periods.
18The NPV of a contract under which the fixed-rate interest is received and the interest linked to the
floating rate is paid (Hull (2002), p. 138).
19Source: www.bis.org/statistics/dt21a21b.pdf
82
Table 3.1: Notional Amounts of OTC Interest Rate Derivatives by Instruments
Notional Amounts (billions of US dollars)
Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007 Dec 2008 Dec 2009 Dec 2010 Dec 2011 Dec 2012 Dec 2013
Total 211,970 291,582 393,138 432,657 449,875 465,260 504,117 489,706 584,364
FRA 14,269 18,668 26,599 41,561 51,779 51,587 50,596 71,353 73,819
IRS 169,106 229,693 309,588 341,128 349,288 364,378 402,611 370,002 461,281
Options 28,596 43,221 56,951 49,968 48,808 49,295 50,911 48,351 49,396
Source: BIS statistics. The data are available at the BIS website (for details consult the references). IRS: interest rate
swaps, FRA: forward rate agreements. The figures have been adjusted for double- counting. Under the interest rate
category BIS reveals solely the single currency swaps, no currency interest rate swaps (CIRs) enter this position. 19
IRS dominance is even more visible in Table 3.2, which presents the shares of each
type of derivatives. In all analyzed periods the interest rate derivatives amount to at
least 76% of the OTC interest rate market in terms of outstanding notional amounts.
Table 3.2: Share in Notionals of Outstanding OTC Interest Rate Derivatives
Share in Notional Amounts
Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007 Dec 2008 Dec 2009 Dec 2010 Dec 2011 Dec 2012 Dec 2013
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
FRA 7% 6% 7% 10% 12% 11% 10% 14% 13%
IRS 80% 79% 79% 79% 78% 78% 80% 76% 79%
Options 13% 15% 14% 11% 10% 11% 10% 10% 8%
Source: Own calculations based on BIS statistics available at the BIS website (for details consult the references). IRS:
interest rate swaps, FRA: forward rate agreements. The figures have been adjusted for double-counting. Under the
interest rate category BIS reveals solely the single currency swaps, no currency interest rate swaps (CIRs) enter this
position.
In addition, BIS International Financial Statistics contain data on gross market value
of the OTC derivatives. Gross market value represents the cost of replacing all open
contracts at the prevailing market prices. Also in this category interest rate swaps outclass
other OTC interest rate derivatives, which is reflected both in the absolute and percentage
values shown respectively in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
The presented statistics confirm the interest rate swaps’ primacy among the OTC
interest rate derivatives which together with the lack of regulations makes IRS a suitable
candidate to test the impact on interest rate contingent claims of the difference in the
modeling the term structure.
20Source: www.bis.org/statistics/dt21a21b.pdf.
Definition cited from: www.bis.org/statistics/rqa1406notes.pdf
21Source: www.bis.org/statistics/dt21a21b.pdf.
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Table 3.3: Gross Market Value of OTC Interest Rate Derivatives by Instruments
Gross Market Value
Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007 Dec 2008 Dec 2009 Dec 2010 Dec 2011 Dec 2012 Dec 2013
Total 5,397 4,826 7,177 20,087 14,020 14,608 20,001 18,833 14,039
FRA 22 32 41 165 80 206 67 47 108
IRS 4,778 4,163 6,183 18,158 12,576 13,001 18,046 17,080 12,758
Options 597 631 953 1,764 1,364 1,401 1,888 1,706 1,174
Source: BIS statistics available at the BIS website (see the references). IRS: interest rate swaps, FRA: forward rate
agreements. Gross market value represents the cost of replacing all open contracts at the prevailing market prices and is
defined as "the sum [. . . ] of the positive market value of all reporters’ contracts and the negative market value of their
contracts with non-reporting counterparties"20
Table 3.4: Share in Gross Market Value of Outstanding OTC Interest Rate Derivatives
Share in Gross Market Values
Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007 Dec 2008 Dec 2009 Dec 2010 Dec 2011 Dec 2012 Dec 2013
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
FRA 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1%
IRS 89% 86% 86% 90% 90% 89% 90% 91% 91%
Options 11% 13% 13% 9% 9% 10% 10% 9% 8%
Source: Own calculations based on BIS statistics available at the BIS website (see the references). IRS: interest rate
swaps, FRA: forward rate agreements. Gross market value represents the cost of replacing all open contracts at the
prevailing market prices and is defined as "the sum [. . . ] of the positive market value of all reporters’ contracts and the
negative market value of their contracts with non-reporting counterparties"21
3.4 Estimation and Valuation Methodology
3.4.1 Data Description
This study uses a dataset consisting of yields quoted by Reuters and parameters for
369 interest rate swap agreements (IRS) signed in Polish zlotys. The contracts are real
life transactions concluded in the Polish interbank market between the 1st August 2001
and the 27th June 2007 by banks of similar credit quality. None of the examined deals
incorporates a spread over the money market reference rate. None of the parties involved
were dependent in terms of capital or any other relation. The IRS parameters include
trade date, beginning of contract’s life date, its maturity, principal, currency, floating
and corresponding fix rate. Tables 3.5 – 3.7 and Figures 3.2 – 3.7 present an overview
of the contracts’ characteristics. Figure 3.2 displays the distribution of grouped notional
amounts with the intervals of 5 million euros. Clearly the majority of the notional values
amount to 25 million euros22 and most of them do not exceed 50 million euros. It also
Definition cited from: www.bis.org/statistics/rqa1406notes.pdf
22The exchange rate PLN/EUR is 3.3460 (the average exchange rate quoted by the National Bank of
Poland on the 29th August 2008)
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proves that contracts with principal values oscillating around 15 and 30 million euros
dominate the sample, which is also reflected in the basic descriptive statistics of the
contracts’ notional values shown in Table 3.5.








Figure 3.1: Box Plots of Observed Yields from August 2000 to November 2007























Table 3.6 contains descriptive statistics for sample maturities and indicates that the
examined interest rate swaps were most frequently concluded for a year, but on average
lasted 2 years. The longest contracts in the sample span over 6 years, while the shortest
were signed for 3 months. OTC agreements for 3 and 6 moths as well as 1 and 2 years
are standard in the Polish interbank market.
The frequent occurrence of one-year deals and mean maturity of 2 years are also visible
on Figure 3.3, which depicts the distribution of principals by contracts’ lengths. The chart
shows that one-year contracts span over all range of notional values, but generally amount
to 100 million euros. Shorter deals as well as those over 2 years never surpass 25 million
euros, while two-year agreements come to 100 million euros.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Notional Amounts








Issuance date matters as much as maturity for valuation of claims. The investigated
transactions were signed between years 2001 and 2007 and expired in years 2007 – 2008.
Such a time structure results from the sampling procedure. Contracts that entered the
sample had to be alive at the data collection time that is in the middle of 2007 year and
be due by mid 2008, which allowed for ex post actual value calculation. The overview of
issuance and due dates indicates that the deals commonly originated in 2005, 2006 and
2007, which corroborate with the most frequent one-year and average two-year maturities.
The payments to be exchanged under interest rate swap agreements are denominated
in Polish zlotys and are calculated based on Warsaw Interbank Offer Rates (WIBOR).
Roughly speaking, the WIBOR rate is a Polish equivalent of the LIBOR rate (for more
details on the reference rates employed in interest rate swaps refer to Section 3). In the
examined sample, the WIBOR rate for 6 months determines payments of 59% of the
sample contracts. It is clear from Figure 3.4 that the next most commonly employed rate
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Figure 3.3: Notional Amounts by Contract Maturities
Table 3.7: Sample Interest Rate Swap Contracts: Issuance and Expiration Dates










(40% of deals) is the 3-month WIBOR. Together the two rates cover 99% of the sample
transactions.
Knowing the sample composition with respect to the transaction dates and reference
rates, it is illustrative to verify the ex post evolution of the two base rates for the period
when the sample contracts were originated. Figures 3.6 and 3.5 depict the development
of 3-month and 6-month WIBOR rates for the contracts’ inception times. Figure 3.5
indicates that the 6-month rate experienced a plunge of 1.500 bps in years 2001-2003 and
thereafter remained within the brackets of 5 to 7 percent. Given that over 88 percent
of the 6-month contracts were signed from 2004 to 2006, the vast majority of them orig-
inated in a relatively stable period. Figure 3.6 shows a stable performance of 3-month
rate except from the last three months, when it slightly rose by around 35 basis points.
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Figure 3.4: Sample Data: Composition of Interest Rates
Figure 3.5: 6-month WIBOR Rates from August 2001 to June 2007
Finally, the presentation of the ex-post evolution of the IRS reference rates is com-
pleted with the development of the term structures prevailing in the market at each
transaction date. Figure 3.7 depicts the average input rates for each maturity together
with their standard deviation bands. The daily frequency of observations makes the short
end of the term structure much more volatile than the long end, and thus the bands are
wider for the shorter rates. Figure 3.8 presents the full scope of rate variation for the
entire examined period and all maturities. In the case of the 3- and 6-month WIBOR, the
period 2001 – 2003 of higher rate levels is followed by times of relative rate stabilization.
The augmented rate levels in the initial years should not create a concern, given that
each contract is valued based on the cross-sectional set of rates for available maturities
prevailing in the market at the swap transaction dates.
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Figure 3.6: 3-month WIBOR Rates from May 2006 to June 2007
Figure 3.7: Evolution of Average Input Rates from August 2000 to November 2007
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of Input Rates from August 2000 to November 2007
3.4.2 Methodology and Models Specification
This study empirically examines whether the five models of the yield curve differ sig-
nificantly in terms of the implications for valuing plain interest rate contingent claims.
Roughly speaking, the idea is to express the model accuracy in terms of how much one
could have gained or lose on average on the set of real life interest rate swaps. The
research strategy can be summarized by the following steps: (1) estimation of the term
structure model, (2) valuation of the set of interest rate swaps using the fitted yields, and
(3) comparison of the performance and predictive accuracy of the fitted yield curves and
"fitted" contract values. The term structure estimations are performed for every trans-
action date in order to generate the fitted curves to value each contract in the sample.
The key measures to assess the ex post forecasts of the term structure models herein are
based on contrasting the ’fitted’ and realized contract values. The realized deal values
are computed based on the interest rate that are quoted by the market at the date of
payment exchange. Those realized rates determine the amounts to be swapped and thus
the effective contract value. The IRS valuation involves calculating the implied forward
rates, swap cash flows, and finally, the swap total values as shown in formulas (3.25) to
(3.27). All computations are done in MATLAB. The Kalman filter algorithm is imple-
mented using Dynare23 for MATLAB.
23Dynare is a user oriented general program for the simulation of deterministic or stochastic models
that translates into a GAUSS or a MATLAB program. Barillas et al. (2007) provide a good overview of
Dynare implementations.
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The parameters for the Nelson-Siegel framework are determined by running the Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS) with the fixed decay parameter, τ = 50, on a slightly altered
version of equation (3.21). The equation to be estimated is:














The interpolated curve is fitted using the cubic spline function. The parameters for the
interest rate dynamics proposed by Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985)
are obtained using the Kalman filter. The algorithm of the Kalman filter and the esti-
mated state-space formulation for the models are discussed in the following section. In
this study there are as many datasets to be filtered by the Kalman algorithm as contracts
to be evaluated. Each dataset consists of time series of yields with daily frequency and 21
maturities ranging from overnight to 10 years. The maturities create the cross-sectional
dimension of each dataset. A standard approach in the literature is to employ a win-
dow of 100 to 200 daily observations to determine the coefficients. Initially, sets with
100, 150 and 200 observations preceding each transaction date were used. Given that all
three cases yield similar output, only the results for the window of 100 observations are
reported. The initial starting values chosen for the parameters of the Vasicek and the
CIR models are κ = 0.15, σ = 0.05, λ = −0.1 and θ = 0.05.
Given the generality of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton model, its implementation requires
a specification of the volatility, σ(t, T ), for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≤ T ∗. As the same diffusion process
appears in the rate dynamics under the actual and the risk-neutral probability measures,
the historical data may be utilized to determine the volatilities. Next, σ(t, T ) serves to
calculate integral σ∗(t, T ), and to parametrize formula (3.16). The adopted construction
of the HJM model with parametric components follows Wu (2009) and Avellaneda &
Laurence (1999) (see Wu (2009) pp. 94-106, and Avellaneda & Laurence (1999) pp. 239-
247). The HJM model is built using the distributional properties of the time series of
forward rates obtained from the spot yields. When the covariance among the rates is
estimated, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is carried out to detect the random
factors that drive the evolution of the rates. Essentially, PCA reduces the number of
factors to the most informative ones. The empirical covariance24 between ∆fn,i and
24The method’s presentation and the notations refer to (Wu 2009) p. 100. For more details, refer to
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where ∆fk,i is a daily change of the forward rates for each maturity Ti, K is the number







With the help of eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance matrix, Ĉ, the change of the









where λp are the covariance matrix eigenvalues, v
(p)
k are the covariance matrix eigenvec-
tors, ξp,k are independently distributed with mean 0 and variance equal to 1. The most
informative factors are those associated with eigenvalues that - when ranked - explain
together about 99% of the empirical covariance. The uncovered key factors and their
fitted functional forms are used to express the volatility of the forward rates. The next
steps involve estimating the HJM curves with the Kalman procedure and valuation of
the interest rate swap contracts.
3.4.3 The Kalman Filter
The Kalman filter is an algorithm that makes inferences about the values of unob-
served state variables based on the observed data. As such, it necessitates a state-space
representation of the dynamic system describing the model in question. State-space is
a minimal space of states, which fully describes the system at any point in time. In a
nutshell, the state-space formulation is characterized by the measurement and transition
equations. The transition equation specifies how the state changes over time, while the
measurement equation relates the observable output, possibly a control input at time t,
and the unobservable state. Both equations include error terms. Generally speaking, the
the whole section ((Wu 2009), pp. 94-106).
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state or transition equation takes the form25:
Xt+1 = F Xt +M Wt + ϵt (3.29)
where Xt+1 is a k × 1 vector of the next period state, Xt is the current period state, F
is a k × k transition matrix, Wt is a r × 1 vector of exogenous variables, M is a k × r
coefficient matrix and ϵt+1 is a k × 1 vector of the transition noise. The measurement or
observation equation can be written as:
Yt = H Xt +N Wt + νt (3.30)
where Yt is a n × 1 vector of the observed variables, H is the n × k system matrix, Wt
is a r × 1 vector of exogenous variables, N is a n × r coefficient matrix, νt is a n × 1
vector of the measurement noise, and Xt is the unobserved state from equation (3.29).
The residuals ϵt and νt have mean zero and covariance matrix Q and R respectively.
Cov(ϵt, ϵt) = Q , Cov(νt, νt) = R and Cov(ϵt, νt) = 0
A comprehensive description of the Kalman filter can be found in Harvey (1989). This
section features solely the gist of how the the Kalman filter recursion works. In the
Kalman methodology each observation adds to the information set at each run of the
algorithm. While iterating for each observation data, three steps are performed: predic-
tion, innovation and updating. The prediction stage involves obtaining the estimate for
the next period state, Xt|t−1, based on the current period state value. First, the time
0 value of underlying state process, X0|0, and the covariance matrix of the state vector,
P0|0, are guessed. Using the predicted state value, the predicted output value, Y1|0, is
computed and it serves to calculate the prediction error or innovation. In period t this
stage produces:
Xt|t−1 = F Xt−1|t−1 +M Wt−1
Pt|t−1 = F Pt−1|t−1 F
′ +Q
Yt|t−1 = H Xt|t−1 +N Wt|t−1
25The presentation draws upon Wang (2009), pp. 151-154. The application of the Kalman filter to
the affine term structure models relies on Geyer and Pichler (1999).
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where Pt|t−1 ≡ V ar(Xt|Ft−1), while Pt|t ≡ V ar(Xt|Ft). Thus, the time 1 state value X1
and output value Y1 are predicted with the help of state and observation equations re-
spectively. The difference between the observation Y1 and its prediction, Y1|0, determines
the so-called one-step prediction error. The goal is to minimize this prediction error based
on the previous observations. The next step consists of updating the prediction for X1 in
the light of the observation Y1. The update phase yields adjusted-predicted state value
(Xt|t) and Kalman gain (Kt). Kalman gain is determined by taking the partial derivative
of the adjusted predicted state variance with respect to the gain so as to minimize the




Xt|t = Xt|t−1 +Kt(Yt − Yt|t−1)
Pt|t = (I −KtH)Pt|t−1
The adjusted predicted state value, X1|1, serves as an input in the transition equation
in the iteration for the periods from 2 to T . The Kalman filter propagates throughout
the time. A joint likelihood function for all observations can be computed assuming that
observable variables are serially independent and normally distributed. The parameters
to be estimated are chosen such that they maximize the value of the score function. Maxi-
mum likelihood estimation of parameters is performed for each iteration. The parameters
for the next period (iteration) are updated based on the parameters in the previous period.
Following the work of Duan & Simonato (1995), Geyer and Pichler (1999) and Babbs
& Nowman (1999), the technique of (Kalman 1960) gained popularity in the affine term-
structure literature. Geyer and Pichler (1999) obtains a quasi-optimal filter for the non-
Gaussian state-space models. As discussed in Section 2, the building blocks of the theo-
retical interest rate models are state variables, which constitute the source of uncertainty
in the economy, and processes characterizing their evolution. Thus, the state equation
(3.29) corresponds to a discrete time version of the stochastic differential equations cap-
turing the instantaneous interest rate dynamics. For the Vasicek framework the transition
equation is a discretized equation (3.2), while for the CIR methodology a discretized equa-
tion (3.10). In the affine term structure models bond prices are of the affine form. The
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frameworks of Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) belong to the affine
term structure models. Furthermore, the yields for this class of model can be expressed
as:
R(t, T ) =
− lnA(t, T ) +B(t, T )r(t)
T − t
where A(t, T ) and B(t, T ) depend on the interest rate dynamics postulated by each model.
Using this affine relationship, the term structure model can be recast in the state-space
form. After the addition of a measurement error, the yield-to-maturity is characterized
by:
Rt(Xt;ψ, T ) = −
1
T − t
ln(A(ψ, t, T )) +
1
T − t
B(ψ, t, T )Xt + νt
where Xt is for both models the instantaneous interest rate, ψ denotes the model param-
eters and νt is an error term with 0 mean and standard deviation σνt . This is equation
(3.30) formulated in the context of the affine term structure models and their notation.
Given that claims with N maturities are traded in the market, the N corresponding yields





Rt(Xt, ψ, TN )
 =

− ln(A(ψ, t, T1))/(T1 − t)
− ln(A(ψ, t, T2))/(T2 − t)
...
− ln(A(ψ, t, TN ))/(TN − t)
+

B(ψ, t, T1)/(T1 − t)
B(ψ, t, T2)/(T2 − t)
...








In terms of the Vasicek model, the functional forms for A(ψ, t, T ) and B(ψ, t, T ) follow
from equation (3.9) and are given by:









(B(ψ, t, T )− (T − t))− σ
2B2(ψ, t, T )
4κ
)






For the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model, A(ψ, t, T ) and B(ψ, t, T ) are stipulated directly in the
equation (C.2.3) as:
A(ψ, t, T ) =
[
2γe(κ+γ+λ)(T−t)/2
(γ + κ+ λ)(eγ(T−t) − 1) + 2γ
]2κθ/σ2
B(ψ, t, T ) =
2(eγ(T−t) − 1)




(κ+ λ)2 + 2σ2
Given that both models propose the same form for the interest rate drift, for both cases
F and M in the equation (3.29) can be represented as:
M(ψ,∆t) = θ(1− e−κ∆t)
F (ψ,∆t) = e−κ∆t
where ∆t is the length of the discrete time interval. With daily observations and 20
maturities traded, the time interval equals 1 and N is 20. The variance of the transi-
tion residuals is given by the discretized conditional variance of the instantaneous rate.
Therefore, the variance takes the following forms:




CIR : Q(Xt, ψ,∆t) = Xt
σ2
κ




Derivations of the conditional moments in the Vasicek and the Cox-Ingersoll- Ross frame-
work are provided in the Appendix. As discussed in Section 2, Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross
(1985) propose a non-Gaussian model. Geyer and Pichler (1999) show how to apply
the Kalman filter to the non-Gaussian statespace representation and obtains the quasi-
maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters.
3.5 Empirical Results
The estimated term structures are depicted in Figure 3.9 to Figure 3.12. A visual
inspection of the fitted curves suggests a resemblance of the Nelson- Siegel and cubic
spline interpolation outcomes. At the same time, the term structures modeled by the
Vasicek and the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross methodologies differ significantly from the others and
assume a greater variety of shapes through time.
The variation in the level, the slope and the curvature of the examined term structures,
visible in Figure 3.8, is reflected in the descriptive statistics in Table 3.8 for the estimated
level, slope and curvature parameters. The long-term interest rate implied by the Nelson-
Siegel model is always positive and on average equals 7.13%. However, the median and
mode indicate a lower level of the long end of the term structure, 5.73% and 4.92%
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Figure 3.9: Nelson-Siegel Model: Fitted Yield Curves from August 2000 to November
2007
Figure 3.10: Cubic Interpolation: Fitted Yield Curves from August 2000 to November
2007
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Figure 3.11: Vasicek Model: Fitted Yield Curves from August 2000 to November 2007
Figure 3.12: Cox-Ingersoll-Ross Model: Fitted Yield Curves from August 2000 to
November 2007
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics for the Nelson-Siegel Estimated Parameters
Measure β0 β1 β2 βshort
Mean 0.0713 0.0036 0.0137 0.0749
Median 0.0573 -0.0012 -0.0021 0.0547
Mode 0.0492 -0.0240 -0.0321 0.0369
Standard deviation 0.0286 0.0198 0.0493 0.0447
Minimum 0.0427 -0.0440 -0.0438 0.0319
Maximum 0.1581 0.0738 0.3288 0.2082
Note: Summary of the Nelson-Siegel model parameters estimated for each working date from August 29, 2000 to
November, 1 2007. Measures computed across all estimations. βshort determined based on β0 and β1 results.
respectively. The average yield curve, that is the curve corresponding to the mean values
of β0, β1 and β2, is increasing (positive β1), but inverted (positive β2). Still, the typical
upward sloping yield curve is implied by the median and mode values of the estimated
parameters. The development of the curvature parameter in Figure 3.13 shows that the
concave curve persisted in the second half of the sample interval. Another stylized fact
about the term structure of interest rates, a higher volatility of the short end than the
long end of the curve, is obtained within the Nelson-Siegel framework by construct. As
shown in the Appendix, the long-term interest rate is captured by β0, while the short
rate by (β0 + β1). Greater short-term volatility follows. What is more, for the examined
sample the estimates of (β0 + β1) are always positive, and so is the short rate. Finally,
Figure 3.13 demonstrates that the estimated curves assume a variety of shapes through
time. The discussion of the models’ goodness of fit is deliberately postponed to the end
of this section.
Table 3.9: Summary of the Vasicek & CIR Estimated Parameters
Model θ κ σ λ
Average Estimated Parameters
Vasicek 0.053 0.005 0.086 -0.133
CIR 0.056 0.006 0.016 -0.009
Share % of Significant Parameters
Vasicek 99.73 100.00 100.00 100.00
CIR 98.92 90.24 85.91 93.50
Note: Summary of the Vasicek & CIR model parameters estimated for each IRS deal time. The average of estimated
parameters and the percent of cases the parameters are significant. The average across transactions.
The parameter estimates obtained with the Vasicek methodology are significant in all
but one case for θ. The Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model also yields mostly significant estimated
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Figure 3.13: Evolution of the Nelson-Siegel Model Parameters
parameters (in over 85% of the cases). The estimation results are summarized in Table
3.9. The average long-term interest rate implied by the Vasicek and the Cox-Ingersoll-
Ross frameworks equal 5.3% and 5.6% respectively. Given that both models propose
the same form for the drift of the interest rate process, those close results for θ are as
expected. By the same token, the average estimates for κ should be and are similar (0.005
and 0.006 respectively). Those results are not encouraging and imply a very slow mean
reversion process. The Vasicek and the CIR methods assume different volatility functions
of the interest rate dynamics, σ versus σ
√
r. The obtained volatility parametric values are
necessarily different (0.086 versus 0.016). Both estimates for volatilities are comparable
in magnitude with the empirical evidence (see, for example, Duan & Simonato (1995)
or Gibbons and Ramaswamy (1993)). Finally, (Vasicek 1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and
Ross (1985) deviate in the formulation of the market price of risk. The estimated λ
parameters for the Vasicek and the CIR models are −0.133 and −0.009, which implies
positive risk premia. Figures 3.14 and 3.15 display the evolution of the model parameters
across transactions for the Vasicek and the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross method respectively.
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Figure 3.14: Evolution of the Estimated Vasicek Model Parameters Across Transactions
Figure 3.15: Evolution of the Estimated CIR Model Parameters Across Transactions





















































The Principal Component Analysis produced the following volatility components for
the Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework:
σ1(t, T ) = α1
(
1− exp −(T − t)
β1
)







Their fit is presented in Figure 3.16 and 3.17, respectively. The estimated volatility
parameters equal α1 = −0.33, β1 = 1.36, α2 = −0.33, γ2 = −0.47, δ2 = 0.47 and
β1 = 1.36. The fitted values serve as the initial starting values in the estimation of the
HJM model with the Kalman filter.
Figures 3.18 and 3.19 present the evolution of the model parameters across trans-
actions. The application of the Kalman filter to the two-factor Heath- Jarrow-Morton
model produces statistically insignificant estimates in as many as 98% of the cases. Es-
timating the HJM framework with solely the first principal component driving the rate
volatility yields insignificant parameters in 80% of the cases. The multi-factor model,
which requires more parameter input and adds complexities, generates more noise and
imprecision. Next, I experiment with the GARCH-family of models for the forward rates
selected in Zhou (2002). The results are equally discouraging. Most probably the problem
lies in the numerous approximations necessary to build and calibrate the HJM model.
Other possible explanations and solutions will be considered in the extension of this work.
At this stage, I refrain from calculating and presenting the contract values obtained for
the model of Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992).
Table 3.10: Test for the Mean Contract Values Equality
Pairs of means t-statistic Decision
Cubic vs. N-S -7.633 reject H0
Cubic vs. Vasicek 8.627 reject H0
Cubic vs. CIR 1.483 accept H0
N-S vs. Vasicek 9.765 reject H0
N-S vs. CIR 1.761 accept H0
CIR vs. Vasicek -0.088 accept H0
Note: The null hypothesis: equal means of IRS contract value for the two respective yield curve models (paired
samples). The test statistics is distributed with 368 degrees of freedom. The reported decision considers a 5% significance
level.
The fitted curves for the Nelson-Siegel, the Vasicek, the Cox-Ingersoll- Ross and the
cubic spline models are used to compute the values of IRS. The ultimate aim of this
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Figure 3.16: Heath-Jarrow-Morton: Forward Rate Volatility Component






















y(x) = a (1 − exp( − x / b))
a = −0.33429
b = 494.76
R = 0.91713  (lin)
Figure 3.17: Heath-Jarrow-Morton: Forward Rate Volatility Component



























R = 0.97953  (lin)
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Figure 3.18: Evolution of the Estimated HJM Model Parameters Across Transactions





















Figure 3.19: Evolution of the Estimated HJM Model Parameters Across Transactions













































study is to evaluate the performance and predictive accuracy of the four interest rate
models, when applied to the interest rate swap agreements. The ex post forecasts of
the term structure models are assessed by contrasting the ’fitted’ and realized contract
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values. First, I determine whether the four term structure methodologies deliver similar
IRS evaluations. The t-test for the equality of mean contract values under the four
different approaches indicates that the mean deal values do not statistically differ for the
pairs of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross and cubic interpolation, the Nelson-Siegel and the Vasicek
fitted curves respectively. Thus, the CIR approach produces IRS values relatively close
to all other methodologies. At the same time, the term structures generated by the
Vasicek model, cubic interpolation and the Nelson-Siegel methodology yield on average
net present values of swaps statistically different from each other. The corresponding
t-statistics for the test are presented in Table 3.10. The null hypothesis assumes no
difference in the means of IRS values for paired samples. The reported decision considers
a 5% significance level.
Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics for the Ex-post Accuracy of the Fitted Curves in
Relative Terms
Measure Cubic N-S Vasicek CIR
Mean -0.014 -0.07 0.365 0.127
Median 0.046 0.036 0.100 0.115
Mode 0.047 0.079 -0.242 0.064
Minimum -11.618 -11.254 -13.698 -51.335
Maximum 2.238 2.095 5.738 14.552
Standard deviation 0.877 0.822 1.214 5.138
MAE 0.325 0.299 0.59 2.178
RMSE 0.876 0.824 1.266 5.132
Note: The measures calculated for the differences between the realized contract values and fitted contract values
expressed as % of the contract notionals. The fitted contract values are determined based on the yields from the fitted
term structures.
The remaining question is which of the fitted curves performs better when applied to
the valuation of real-life contracts and whether a more elegant and precise solution for
interest rate modeling proposed by Vasicek (1977) or Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985)
is worth the cost of considerably higher mathematical sophistication. To address this
matter one needs to contrast the evaluation of the sample deals under the four method-
ologies with the realized transaction values. The realized values are computed based on
the interest rate that are quoted by the market at the date of payment exchange. Those
realized rates determine the amounts to be swapped and thus the effective contract value.
By examining the differences between the realized IRS exchanges and the deal amounts
computed under the four approaches, I establish the ex post predictive accuracy of the
four interest rate models. Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show the descriptive statistics for the
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differences in the fitted and realized contract values expressed as a percent of notional
amounts and in thousand of euros respectively.
Table 3.12: Descriptive Statistics for the Ex-post Accuracy of the Fitted Curves in
Absolute Terms
Measure Cubic N-S Vasicek CIR
Mean 10.87 -0.39 72.38 68.96
Median 14.05 9.44 36.86 41.73
Mode 123.76 116.83 -42.03 -118.98
Standard deviation 384.93 350.72 182.01 810.07
Minimum -1,783.15 -1,681.74 -2,046.87 -7,671.16
Maximum 384.93 350.72 994.83 3118.03
RMSE 124.07 116.67 195.65 811.90
Note: The measures calculated for the differences between the realized contract values and fitted contract values in ’000
EUR. The fitted contract values are determined based on the yields from the fitted term structures.
The discrepancies in the fitted and realized contract values amount on average to
less than 0.1 percent of the notional amounts for the cubic spline, Nelson-Siegel and
CIR methodologies. The first two methods generate negative differences between the
realized and fitted deal values and thus they tend to overestimate the fitted values. In
the case of the Vasicek model the mean deal difference is almost 3 times higher than for
the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross case. Both models result in the underestimated fitted contract
values. On the other hand, the mean absolute error (MAE) indicates that, irrespective
of the direction being positive or negative, the CIR model yields the most different IRS
values from the effective deal values. Here the discrepancies do not cancel out and on
average amount to over 2 percent of the notional amounts. This tendency is confirmed
by the most pronounced root mean squared error (5.13%), standard deviation (5.13%),
minimum (−51.33%) and maximum (14.55%) values obtained for the case of CIR versus
realized contract valuation. The Vasicek fitted curves generate more significant minimum
(−13.70%) and maximum (5.74%) differences in contract values than the cubic spline and
the Nelson-Siegel methodology. The Vasicek model also produces more volatile differences
in contract values. The higher volatility corroborates with the unstable evolution of the
Vasicek fitted curves presented on Figure 3.14. Finally, all measures in Tables 3.11 and
3.12, but the mode, indicate that the deal values closest to the realized ones are obtained
under the cubic spline and the Nelson-Siegel model. Tables 3.11 and 3.12 characterize
the performance of the four term structure models for the set of interest rate swaps at
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hand. The true question is whether the sample mean differences between the realized
and fitted interest rate swap values are statistically significant.
Table 3.13: Test for the Mean Equality: Realized vs. Fitted Contract Values
Pairs of sample means t-statistic Decision
Relative to
Notional
Realized vs. cubic -0.307 accept H0
Realized vs. N-S -1.628 accept H0
Realized vs. Vasicek 5.770 reject H0
Realized vs. CIR 0.476 accept H0
Absolute
Terms
Realized vs. cubic 1.687 accept H0
Realized vs. N-S -0.063 accept H0
Realized vs. Vasicek 7.639 reject H0
Realized vs. CIR 1.635 accept H0
Note: The null hypothesis considers equal means of realized and fitted IRS contract values for the paired samples. The
test statistics in the upper module refer to the deal values per notional amounts. The lower module simply presents the
results for the paired mean contract values realized and fitted. The test statistics are distributed with 368 degrees of
freedom. The reported decision relates to a 5% significance level.
Table 3.13 presents the results of the t-test for the equal means of the realized and
fitted IRS contract values. The realized transaction values are calculated based on the
interest rates that are quoted by the market at the date of payment exchange. Those
realized rates determine the amounts to be swapped. The fitted IRS deal values are
computed using the yields generated by each model. The t-statistics indicate that the
fitted mean transaction values do not statistically differ from the mean realized values
under three out of the four methodologies: the cubic interpolation, the Nelson-Siegel and
the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross approach. The term structures generated by the Vasicek model
yield the net present values of interest rate swaps statistically different from the realized
deal amounts. The null hypothesis assumes no difference in the sample means of IRS
fitted and realized deal values. The test statistics in the upper module refer to the deal
values per notional amounts. The relative means show to what extent the values differ
per 1 euro of notional and the t-statistics refer to such notional-weighted means. The
lower module simply presents the results for the realized and fitted mean contract values.
The reported decisions relate to a 5% significance level.
The poor results of the Vasicek model raise a question as to whether the outcome is not
driven by a different number of estimated parameters. To check whether this might be
the case, I compute the Akaike information criterion (AIC) for the curves obtained with
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the Nelson-Siegel, the Vasicek and Cox-Ingersoll- Ross models. Additionally, I provide
the root mean square error (RMSE) for the estimated yields. The measures are presented
in Table 3.14. Both measures suggests that the Nelson-Siegel outperforms the Vasicek
model, and AIC suggests that the number of parameters is not the reason for the the
Vasicek underperformance. Contrasting the low and high performance of the Vasicek
and the Nelson-Siegel methodologies can be put in a broader perspective. Within the
Nelson-Siegel exponential framework the entire yield curve is estimated for every time
the interest rate swap contract is initiated. Such an approach centers on accurately
fitting the cross section of interest rates at any given time. In the Vasicek model the
yield curve is estimated at every contract initial time using a window of observation prior
to the contract beginning. The model works with a structure of four parameters fixed
for a window of observations. Therefore, Vasicek’s framework focuses on a time-series
dynamics and imposes a structure across time, which the Nelson- Siegel does not. As the
Vasicek approach is more restrictive and focused on a time-series dynamics, one might
hope that it will deliver better forecasts. However, the test results for the realized versus
fitted contract values indicate the opposite. In this case a current yield curve is more
informative than the historical time series of yields.
Table 3.14: Measures of Fitted Curves Accuracy
Measure N-S Vasicek CIR
AIC -25,145 -11,485 -14,807
RMSE 0.90 2.97 1.35
Note: The measures calculated for the yields observed in the market corresponding to the maturities of claims traded in
the interbank market. By construct, the cubic spline interpolation perfectly fits the traded yields.
Finally, the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model exhibits a significantly greater ability to capture
the dynamics of the interest rate than the Vasicek framework. This outcome is consistent,
among others, with (Chan et al. 1992), who document that the interest rate volatility is
an increasing function of r(t), as postulated by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985).
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter determines the usefulness of advanced term structure models in the valu-
ation of plain vanilla interest rate sensitive derivatives. In particular, examines five term
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structure models in order to compare their ability to capture the interest rate dynam-
ics and value the interest rate swaps in the Polish market. I analyze the methodologies
proposed by Nelson and Siegel (1987), Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985)
and Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) as well as the cubic spline curves. A special case
of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton model with the volatility corroborated by the observable
market data produces mostly unreliable fitted curves that are not used for the valuation.
The tentative explanations link the HJM insignificant outcome to the technical issues.
The tests for the equality of mean contract values under the four other approaches in-
dicate that the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross approach produces IRS values relatively close to all
other methodologies. More importantly, the Nelson-Siegel, the cubic interpolation and
the CIR models return fitted transaction values that on average do not differ from the
realized contract values. The ex-post accuracy of the Nelson-Siegel and the cubic spline
values suggests that a current yield curve is highly informative for the future yields.
Furthermore, the Vasicek yield curves generate very different net present values of inter-
est rate swaps which statistically differ from the actually swapped amounts. The solid
performance of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross methodology, especially as opposed to Vasicek’s
approach, supports the conjecture of the rate-reliant nature of the interest rate volatility.
The Vasicek model’s underperformance emphasizes the role of the cross section of interest
rates, and thus the importance of no-arbitrage argument.
As this study investigates the value added of theoretically-grounded term structure
models in valuation of real life swap contracts, it refers to model risk. Model risk is
typically associated with complex derivatives, however, the choice of a plain interest rate
derivative allows for examination of model risk in the case of a dynamically growing OTC
market, such as the Polish one. In this context, I obtain that the less computationally
demanding approaches to the term structure modeling perform at least as well the more
advanced solutions. Thus, in practice the latter may not always be worth the cost of a
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A Appendices to Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix A.I to Chapter 1
Table A1.1: Variables Definition
Variabls Definition
RISK the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets, RWATA, reported
under the Basel Capital Accord
CAP the ratio of the bank’ total capital to total assets
LIQ the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, liquid assets defined as a
sum of the bank’s cash, reverse repos, bills and commercial papers
SEC a ratio of the sum of securitization deal values in current year to
the total assets at the end of previous year; deals included asset
backed securities and mortgage backed securities issued based on
the loans granted by the bank
SIZE the logarithm of the bank’s total assets
ROA the bank’s return on assets
LLOSS a ratio of loan loss provisions to the sum of bank’s loans net loan
loans reserves
↑ LOAN a ratio of new loans granted in the current year to the amount
of loans on the bank’s balance sheet at the end of the previous
year; the new lending volume expressed as a difference between
the gross loans at the end of the current and previous year
LTA a ratio of net loans to total assets
Table A1.2: Correlations Between Variables in Levels
Variables RISK CAP LIQ SEC SIZE ROA LLOSS ↑ LOAN
RISK 1.00
CAP 0.67 1.00
LIQ −0.21 −0.01 1.00
SEC −0.04 −0.06 −0.07 1.00
SIZE −0.53 −0.62 −0.19 0.11 1.00
ROA 0.40 0.48 −0.03 −0.04 −0.29 1.00
LLOSS 0.06 0.03 −0.11 −0.00 −0.03 −0.10 1.00
↑ LOAN 0.05 0.05 −0.06 0.03 −0.02 0.13 0.08 1.00
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Table A1.3: Cross-Correlations Between First-Differenced Endogenous Variables
Variables ∆RISK ∆CAP ∆LIQ SEC SIZE ROA LLOSS ↑ LOAN
∆RISK 1.00
∆CAP 0.42 1.00
∆LIQ −0.21 −0.06 1.00
SEC 0.01 −0.01 0.03 1.00
SIZE −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 0.11 1.00
ROA 0.08 0.17 −0.05 −0.04 −0.29 1.00
LLOSS 0.01 −0.08 −0.03 −0.00 −0.03 −0.10 1.00
↑ LOAN −0.05 −0.13 −0.21 0.03 −0.02 0.13 0.08 1.00
Table A1.4: Distribution of Banks Across Years











A.2 Appendix A.II to Chapter 1
Repullo (2005) models the behavior of a bank facing random withdrawal of deposits
and supervised by the lender of last resort (LLR) that, if needed, decides about providing
the support based on the information on the quality of banks assets. Both agents are
risk neutral. The bank chooses the liquidity buffer that it wants to hold against deposit
withdrawals (λ), a parameter p ∈ [0, 1] linked to the risk of its loan portfolio (1 − p)
and level of capital (k) subject to capital requirements (κ). The bank’s total assets are
normalized to 1. The economy lasts from period 0 to 2. At t = 0 the bank attracts (1−k)
insured deposits and raises (k) equity capital. At the same time, it invests in a safe and
perfectly liquid assets (λ) as well as illiquid and risky assets (1 − λ). It is important
to emphasize that the risk of the illiquid assets (i.e. loan portfolio), denoted above by
1−p, is chosen by the bank. The cost of deposits, the interest rate, is normalized to zero.
Still, the bank’s equity providers demand a return of δ ≥ 0. Since the bank is subject to
capital requirements it must hold that:
k ≥ κ(1− λ) (A.2.1)
As mentioned above, the return on the illiquid asset depends on the level of its risk chosen
by the bank. Specifically, the illiquid asset yields:
R =
{
R1 = R(p), with probability p
R0 = 0, with probability 1− p
(A.2.2)
It is assumed that R′(p) < 0 and R”(p) ≤ 0. In addition, R(1) ≥ 1 and R(1)+R′(1) < 0.
At time t = 1 a fraction ν ∈ [0, 1] of deposits is withdrawn. From the perspective of the
initial date, at time t = 0, ν is a continuous random variable assuming values between 0
and 1 with the cumulative distribution function F (ν). Since the bank has (1−k) deposits,
ν(1− k) is withdrawn at date 1. If ν(1− k) ≤ λ, the bank can repay the deposits using
its liquidity buffer λ. In such a case the bank keeps λ− ν(1− k) in the safe asset and its
payoff in the high-return is given by:
λ− ν · (1− k) + (1− λ) ·R(p)− (1− ν) · (1− k) = (1− λ) · [R(p)− 1] + k (A.2.3)
When the opposite situation happens and ν · (1− k) > λ, the supervisory intervention is
necessary. If the bank obtains the missing part of the funding, that is ν · (1− k)− λ, its
payoff in the high-return state equals:
(1− λ) ·R(p)− (1− ν) · (1− k)− [ν · (1− k)− λ] = (1− λ) · [R(p)− 1] + k (A.2.4)
By limited liability, the bank’s payoff in both low-return states is zero. The LLR de-
cides about providing assistance based on the signal on the bank’s asset quality s. The
information is solely about the high or low return on asset and not about a particular
realization of R(p). Let s1 stand for the good and s0 for the bad supervisory signal.
It is further assumed that the quality of the supervisory information is described by a






. Using the fact that P (R1|s) = 1−P (R0|s)
and the Bayes’ rule, the probabilities of high return given the two types of supervisory
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signal can be expressed as:
P (R1|s0) =
p · (1− q)




p · q + (1− q) · (1− p)
(A.2.6)
If the LLR decides to provide emergency lending based on the signal s observed at time
1, then at date 2 the supported bank can prove solvent with probability P (R1|s1) or
insolvent with probability P (R0|s1). When solvent, the bank repays ν · (1− k)−λ to the
LLR. Its failure, on the other hand, causes the LLR to incur a social cost c and the loss
of the rented amount, ν · (1 − k) − λ. The lack of funding assistance causes the bank’s
liquidation at time 1, which generates the cost c to the LLR. Therefore, the LLR provides
the assistance as long as:
−[ν · (1− k)− λ+ c]P (R0|s) ≥ −c (A.2.7)
The LLR will support the bank if the liquidity shock, ν, meets:
ν ≤ c · P (R1|s) + λ · P (R0|s)
P (R0|s) · (1− k)
(A.2.8)
Repullo (2005) obtains critical values for the liquidity shocks in the model without the
liquidity buffer and bank equity. Under such conditions, the relations (A.2.7) and (A.2.8)
simplify to:
−[ν + c] · P (R0|s) ≥ −c (A.2.9)
ν ≤ c · P (R1|s)
P (R0|s)
(A.2.10)
Substituting (A.2.5) into (A.2.10) yields the critical value for the liquidity shocks under
a bad signal:
ν ≤ c · P (R1|s0)
P (R0|s0)
=
c · p · (1− q)
(1− p) · q
≡ ν0 (A.2.11)
Under a good signal, combining (A.2.6) and (A.2.10) produces:
ν ≤ c · P (R1|s1)
P (R0|s1)
=
c · p · q
(1− p) · (1− q)
≡ ν1 (A.2.12)
Further, the critical values ν0 and ν1 serve to simplify the expression for the liquidity
shortage triggering the financial assistance in the model with liquidity buffers and bank’s
equity. As a result, formula (A.2.10) in case of a bad signal becomes:




While under a good signal expression (A.2.10) translates into:
ν ≤ ν1 + λ
1− k
(A.2.14)
Finally, the bank’s objective is to maximize the expected shareholder value. Clearly,
the bank’s shareholders obtain zero payoff if the bank does not succeed. The only positive
return is generated by the successful bank under the liquidity shortfall which satisfies
condition (A.2.13) for the bad and (A.2.14) for the good supervisory signal. The bank’s
success yields the payoff derived in equations (A.2.3) and (A.2.4), that is (1−λ) · [R(p)−
1] + k. That happens with either of the following probabilities:
P
(



































[(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k]− (1 + δ)k (A.2.17)
The game between the bank and the LLR has a Nash equilibrium characterized by
(λ∗, k∗, p∗), which maximizes UB given in (A.2.17) subject to the critical values for the
liquidity shortage triggering the financial assistance under the bad and good signals re-
spectively:
ν∗0 =
c · p∗ · (1− q)
(1− p∗) · q
and ν∗1 =
c · p∗ · q
(1− p∗) · (1− q)
,
as well as the capital requirements:
k ≥ κ(1− λ).
Using the equilibrium choice p∗ of parameter p in the expression for the critical values for
the liquidity shortage, ν∗, reflects the fact that the bank’s choice of risk is unobservable
for the LLR. What follows, these critical values only depend on the equilibrium risk. It
further simplifies the bank’s problem to a maximization of:
p · [(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k] (A.2.18)
The first-order condition of this problem with respect to p is given by:
[(1− λ∗)(R(p∗)− 1) + k∗ + p∗ · (1− λ∗) ·R′(p∗)] = 0 (A.2.19)
That yields:





Given that R(p∗) + p∗R′(p∗) is a decreasing function of p, higher capital and liquidity
buffers imply lower risk. The first-order condition with respect to k can be obtained solely
when a parametrization of the liquidity shock distribution is introduced. Repullo (2005)
employs a simple type of a beta distribution, namely F (ν) = νη with η ∈ (0, 1). Such a
specification of the distribution function yields the objective function (A.2.17) convex in
k. Consequently, the optimal level of equity can be either 1 or κ(1− λ∗). For k∗ = 1 the






















Substituting (A.2.21) into (A.2.17) reduces the bank’s objective function to:
p[(1− λ)(R(p)− 1) + k]− (1 + δ)k (A.2.22)
Differentiating A.2.22 with respect to k gives p− (1 + δ), which is less than zero. Thus,
the optimal level of equity can be only k∗ = κ(1− λ∗). Substituting this corner solution
into A.2.20 yields:
R(p∗) + p∗ ·R′(p∗) = 1− κ (A.2.23)
Following Repullo (2005), we refrain from deriving the analytical results for the optimal
liquidity level.
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B Appendices to Chapter 2
B.1 Appendix B.I to Chapter 2
Table B1.1: Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
Interest ratet−1 Monthly average of euro overnight interest rate for month prior
to loan origination
GDPCRt−1 Rate of change of gross domestic product, chain-linked working
day and seasonally adjusted, quarterly frequency
CPIt Monthly indices of consumer prices
Country riskt Long-term interest rate spread between Czech 10-year maturity
government bond yield and EMU 10-year maturity T-bond yield,
both yields expressed as monthly averages and in per cent
Bank sizet−1 Natural logarithm of bank total assets measured 1 month prior to
loan origination
Liquidity ratiot−1 Amount of bank liquid assets over total assets measured 1 month
prior to loan origination
Bank NPLb - NPLt−1 Difference between bank and other banks’ level of NPLs measured
1 month prior to loan origination
Own funds/total assetst−1 Bank’s equity amount over bank’s total assets measured 1 month
prior to loan origination
Bank typet−1 = 1 if bank is foreign owned
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 Natural logarithm of number of years (augmented by 2 and mea-
sured 1 month prior to loan origination) that have elapsed since
first time firm borrowed from bank
Bank relationst−1 Natural logarithm of number of bank relationships of borrower
plus 1 measured prior to loan origination
Bank debtt−1 Natural logarithm of borrower bank debt plus 1 measured prior
to loan origination
Loan sizet Natural logarithm of loan amount
Maturity 0-6 monthst = 1 if loan maturity is less than or equal to 6 months
Maturity 6-12 monthst = 1 if loan maturity is between 6 and 12 months
Maturity 12-18 monthst = 1 if loan maturity is between 1 and 1.5 year
Loan currencyt = 1 if loan is granted in euros, dollars or pounds
Loan purposet = 1 if overdrafts or current account debit
Firm turnover categories Dummy variables created for CNB categories of firm turnover in
CZK million
Firm employment categories Dummy variables created for CNB categories of number of firm
employees
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Table B1.2: Correlations Between Variables







GDPCRt−1 0.25 0.35 1.00
GDPCRT−t−1 -0.24 0.64 0.23 1.00
CPIt 0.52 -0.11 0.06 -0.34 1.00
Bank
sizet−1
0.10 -0.06 0.02 -0.10 0.14 1.00
Liquidity
ratiot−1
-0.24 0.06 0.11 0.18 -0.26 0.44 1.00
Bank NPLb
- NPLt−1
-0.05 -0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 1.00
Own
fundst−1
-0.12 -0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.09 -0.19 0.13 0.16 1.00
ln(2+ age as
borrower)t−1
0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
Bad
historyt−1
0.10 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.18 -0.05 -0.03 0.21 1.00
Bank
relationst−1
-0.09 0.01 -0.04 0.10 -0.12 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.55 0.20 1.00
Bank
debtt−1
-0.10 -0.02 -0.09 0.09 -0.14 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.48 0.16 0.84 1.00
Loan sizet -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.27 0.08 0.22 0.26 1.00
Table B1.3: Weak Instrument Robust Tests for IV Probit
Test Statistic p-value
AR χ2(1) = 165.66 Prob > χ
2
(1) = 0.0000




Table B1.4: Estimation Results for Probit Model with Clustered Loans
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
Interest ratet−1 0.079∗∗∗ 0.030
Bank sizet−1 -0.032 0.027
Liquidity ratiot−1 -1.862∗∗∗ 0.199
Bank NPLb - NPLt−1 -0.713∗ 0.377
Own funds/total assetst−1 0.143 0.429
Bank typet−1 0.150∗ 0.081
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 0.163∗∗∗ 0.021
Bank relationst−1 0.759∗∗∗ 0.076
Bank debtt−1 -0.015∗∗∗ 0.004
Loan sizet 0.019∗∗ 0.009
Loan currencyt 0.236∗∗∗ 0.064
Maturity 0–3 monthst 0.331∗∗∗ 0.037
Maturity 3–6 monthst 0.241∗∗∗ 0.042
Maturity 6–12 monthst 0.246∗∗∗ 0.037
Loan purposet -0.082∗∗ 0.038
GDPCRt−1 -0.031∗∗∗ 0.008
CPIt 0.006 0.013
Country riskt 0.037 0.072
Time trend 0.014∗∗∗ 0.002
Time trend sq. 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
Intercept -1.342∗∗∗ 0.334
Collateral dummies yes
Firm turnover categories yes
Firm employment categories yes
Firm regional dummies yes





B.2 Appendix B.II to Chapter 2
This section describes the steps involved in building the optimal survival and probit
models developed as a robustness check for our probit and loan survival analysis. In the
probit analysis we first evaluate the significance of each potential measure by considering
its univariate probit fit. All covariates with p-values less than 25% along with all those of
known economic importance are initially included in the multivariable model. Following
the fit of the initial model we verify the significance of each variable in the model to iden-
tify those which can be removed. In order to nominate covariates that might be deleted
from the model we use the p-values from the Wald tests of the individual coefficients, and
then examine the p-value of the partial likelihood ratio test to confirm that the deleted
covariate is indeed not significant. Having eliminated all insignificant measures at this
stage, we coarsely classify the discrete characteristics overly rich in their categories, such
as the 72 firm regional affiliations. We fit a hazard model for each category and group the
characteristics with similar parameter estimates and significance levels. Thereafter, we
employ the method of fractional polynomials to suggest transformations of the continu-
ous variables. To ensure the economic validity of the transformed continuous covariates,
we limit our search for proper functional forms to the natural logarithm and powers of
plus and minus one. Moreover, we use the fractional polynomials procedure as a tool for
validating the variables’ significance once the optimal transformations have been incorpo-
rated. Finally, we determine whether our model necessitates interaction terms. We test
the significance at the 5% level of all economically plausible interaction terms formed
from the main effects in our model. As previously, we examine the p-values from the
Wald test and the partial likelihood ratio test.
To select the covariates for the survival analysis we employ essentially the same meth-
ods as those used in the probit regression. We begin with the bivariate analysis of the
association between all plausible variables and the loan survival time. For all potential
predictors we compute the first, fifth, tenth, fifteenth and twentieth percentiles of the
survival times. No estimates of higher survival quantiles are needed, as the loan data are
typically characterized by low default occurrence. In our dataset the default ratio does
not exceed 20% in specific sub-groups and is approximately 2% on average. For descrip-
tive purposes, we break continuous variables into ten and twenty quantiles and compare
the survivorship experience across the groups so defined. We examine the equality of
the survivor functions using a set of available non-parametric tests, but we mostly rely
on the log-rank test. Additionally, we consider the partial likelihood ratio test obtained
in the estimation of each covariate’s group-specific impact on the time to loan failure.
Evidently, the same type of bivariate analysis is performed for categorical predictors. All
variables with log-rank and partial likelihood ratio test p-values less than 20% along with
all those that are economically vital are initially included in the multivariable model.
Thereafter, we repeat all the steps already described for the probit variable selection. We
fit the initial model, remove insignificant covariates, coarsely classify the discrete charac-
teristics and apply the method of fractional polynomials to the multivariable proportional
hazards regression model. Next, we determine whether any economically plausible inter-
action terms need to be added. Finally, we check the model’s validity and its adherence
to the proportionality assumption.
The methodology of fractional polynomials due to Royston and Altman (1994) of-
fers an analytical way of determining the scale of the continuous predictors. Royston
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and Altman (1994) introduce a family of curves called fractional polynomials with power
terms limited to a small predefined set of values and show how to find the best powers
yielding the best-fitting and parsimonious model. In a single covariate case, a fractional
polynomial of degree m is defined as:





where m is a positive integer, p = (p1,...,pm) is a vector of powers with p1 <...<pm, ξ =
(ξ0, ξ1,..,ξm) are coefficients and Xpj signifies:
Xpj =
{
Xpj if pj ̸=0
ln(X) if pj=0
(B.2.2)
Expressions B.2.1 and B.2.2 combined and generalized can be rewritten into:






Xpj if pj ̸=pj−1
Hj−1(X) ln(X) if pj=pj−1
(B.2.4)
Royston and Altman (1994) advocate that p={−2, −1, −0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 3} is a
set of powers sufficiently rich to handle many practical cases. The best model is the
one with the largest log likelihood. We use the fractional polynomials routine extended
for multivariable specifications and implemented in STATA. An iterative search of scale
within multivariable models involves checking for the scale of each covariate. To briefly
illustrate the process, let’s consider m = 2. For each variable the routine tests the best
J = 2 model versus the linear model, the best J = 2 versus the best J = 1 fractional
polynomial model and the linear model versus the model excluding the tested covariate.
Having checked each predictor, the procedure repeats for each variable using the outcome
of the first cycle for all covariates other than the one currently being tested in the second
cycle. The reiteration aims to ascertain whether changing the functional form of one
covariate alters the transformation of the other covariates. The routine runs until no
further transformation is suggested. Table B2.1 contains the definitions of the optimally
chosen covariates, while tables B2.2–B2.4 present their descriptive statistics.
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Table B2.1: Robust Specification: Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
Deposit ratiot−1 Amount of bank’s deposits over bank’s total assets measured 1
month prior to loan origination
Bank typet−1 = 1 if bank is branch in CZ (as opposed to headquarters in CZ or
branch abroad)
Probit: Maturity 2–3.5 year = 1 if loan maturity is between 2 and 3.5 years
Probit: Maturity 4–8 years = 1 if loan maturity is between 4 and 8 years but not 5.5 years
Probit: Maturity 5.5 year = 1 if loan maturity is 5.5 years
Probit: Maturity 8.5–10 years = 1 if loan maturity is between 8.5 and 10 years
1st collateral: [1] = 1 if none or 3rd party real estate
1st collateral: [2] = 1 if guarantee deposits or real estate
1st collateral: [3] = 1 if movable property with ownership transfer
1st collateral: [4] = 1 if pledged securities
2nd collateral: [1] = 1 if real estate or movable property without ownership transfer
2nd collateral: [2] = 1 if movable property with ownership transfer
2nd collateral: [3] = 1 if pledged securities
2nd collateral: [4] = 1 if state guarantee
2nd collateral: [5] = 1 if other collateral
3rd collateral: [1] = 1 if real estate or movable property without ownership or guar-
antee deposit
3rd collateral: [2] = 1 if pledged assets or ensuring notes or other
3rd collateral: [3] = 1 if guarantee (incl. bank guarantee) or blockage of premium
Loan purpose: [1] = 1 if temporary shortage of resources or residential property
Loan purpose: [2] = 1 if residential property for business purposes, overdrafts or
debit, other investment loans
Loan purpose: [3] = 1 if residential property without state aid
Loan purpose: [4] = 1 if purchase of securities
Loan purpose: [5] = 1 if seasonal costs or subordinated loans
Loan currency = 1 if loan granted in Czech or Slovak koruna or Japanese yen
Table B2.2: Robust Probit Model: Data Descriptive Statistics
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Interest ratet−1 % 2.74 0.88 4.30 0.35
GDPCRt−1 % 4.77 2.58 7.70 -4.70
CPIt % 2.59 1.85 7.50 -0.40
Country riskt % 0.13 0.34 1.26 -0.38
Bank relationst−1 # 0.32 0.41 1.80 0.00
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 # 2.17 1.06 4.00 1.00
Bad historyt−1 0|1 0.08 0.27 1.00 0.00
Bank sizet−1 CZK 12.45 1.16 13.59 5.33
Liquidity ratiot−1 % 0.32 0.13 0.71 0.00
Bank NPLb - NPLt−1 % 0.02 0.07 6.40 -0.12
Own funds/total assetst−1 % 0.09 0.05 0.61 -0.08
Deposit ratiot−1 % 0.66 0.11 0.98 0.00
Bank typet−1 0|1 0.67 0.47 1.00 0.00
Loan sizet CZK 14.55 2.00 22.69 0.00
Maturity 2–3.5 year 0|1 0.17 0.38 1.00 0.00
Maturity 4–8 years 0|1 0.25 0.43 1.00 0.00
Maturity 5.5 year 0|1 0.02 0.13 1.00 0.00
Maturity 8.5–10 years 0|1 0.04 0.20 1.00 0.00
Loan currencyt 0|1 0.95 0.22 1.00 0.00
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Table B2.3: Robust Survival Model: Data Descriptive Statistics
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Interest ratet−1 % 2.74 0.88 4.30 0.35
Interest rateT−t−1 % 2.39 1.34 4.30 0.34
GDPCRt−1 % 4.77 2.58 7.70 -4.70
GDPCRT−t−1 % 2.55 3.86 7.70 -4.70
CPIt % 2.59 1.85 7.50 -0.40
Country riskt % 0.13 0.34 1.26 -0.38
Bank sizet−1 CZK 12.45 1.16 13.59 5.33
Liquidity ratiot−1 % 0.32 0.13 0.71 0.00
Own funds to total assetst−1 % 0.09 0.05 0.61 -0.08
CARt−1 % 12.36 7.56 147.14 0.00
CAR−1t−1 % 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.01
Bank profitt−1 CZK 0.48 0.55 12.22 -4.68
Bank typet−1 0|1 0.67 0.47 1.00 0.00
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 # 2.17 1.06 4.00 1.00
Bad historyt−1 0|1 0.08 0.27 1.00 0.00
Loan sizet CZK 14.55 2.00 22.69 0.00
Maturity 0–6 monthst 0|1 0.04 0.19 1.00 0.00
Maturity 6–12 monthst 0|1 0.06 0.23 1.00 0.00
Maturity 12–18 monthst 0|1 0.22 0.41 1.00 0.00
Loan purposet 0|1 0.30 0.46 1.00 0.00
Herfindahl-Hirschman indext # 0.48 1.07 6.40 0.00
Table B2.4: Robust Models: Correlations Between Variables







GDPt−1 0.23 0.36 1.00
GDPT−t−1 -0.27 0.64 0.23 1.00
CPIt 0.52 -0.13 0.05 -0.37 1.00
Country
riskt
-0.42 -0.20 -0.44 -0.09 0.28 1.00
Bank
sizet−1
0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.15 0.17 0.01 1.00
Liquidity
ratiot−1
-0.29 0.05 0.09 0.19 -0.29 -0.02 0.37 1.00
Own
fundst−1
-0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.46 0.05 1.00
CARt−1 -0.15 -0.02 -0.14 0.08 -0.18 0.04 -0.47 0.21 0.78 1.00
Loan sizet -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 1.00
Bad
historyt−1
0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.10 1.00
Borrower
aget−1
0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.10 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 0.28 0.29 1.00
Bank
profitt−1
0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.11 0.04 0.46 0.24 -0.07 -0.10 -0.00 -0.00 0.09 1.00
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Table B2.5: Estimation Results for Robust Probit Model with Clustered Loans
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
Interest ratet−1 0.237∗∗∗ 0.048
ln(2+ age as borrower)t−1 0.402∗∗∗ 0.032
Bank relationst−1 1.438∗∗∗ 0.089
Bank sizet−1 -0.042 0.041
Liquidity ratiot−1 -0.981∗∗∗ 0.291
Bank NPLb - NPLt−1 -1.424 0.935
Own funds/total assetst−1 -0.550 0.727
Deposit ratiot−1 1.285∗∗∗ 0.387
Bank typet−1 -0.237∗∗∗ 0.068
Maturity 2–3.5 yearst -0.072 0.060
Maturity 4–8 yearst -0.296∗∗∗ 0.074
Maturity 5.5 yearst 0.355∗ 0.200
Maturity 8.5–10 yearst -0.166 0.154
Loan currencyt -0.159∗ 0.093
GDPCRt−1 -0.019 0.012
CPIt -0.089∗∗∗ 0.021
Country riskt 0.161 0.116
Time trend 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004




Firm turnover categories yes
Firm employment categories yes
Firm regional dummies yes




Table B2.6: Robust Probit Results for Firm Turnover Controls
Firm turnover in CZK millions Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
<0.2 or ≥1500 -0.911∗∗∗ 0.126
⟨0.2, 0.5),⟨10, 30),⟨200, 300) -0.595∗∗∗ 0.098
⟨0.5, 1), ⟨30, 60) -0.657∗∗∗ 0.121
⟨500, 1000) -0.114 0.074
⟨100, 200), ⟨1000, 1500) -0.074 0.077
Table B2.7: Robust Probit Results for Firm Employment Controls
Firm employment Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
⟨1500, 1999) -1.186∗∗∗ 0.271
⟨6, 9), ⟨50, 99), ⟨250, 499) -0.379∗∗∗ 0.093
⟨1, 5), ⟨10, 19), ⟨25, 49) -0.260∗∗∗ 0.086
⟨20, 24), ⟨100, 199) -0.354∗∗∗ 0.103
⟨500, 999) 0.284∗∗ 0.125
⟨1000, 499) 1.008∗∗ 0.507
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Table B2.8: Robust Probit Estimation Results for Loan Collateral Types
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
1st collateral
None or 3rd party real estate -0.153∗∗∗ 0.057
Guarantee deposits or real estate -0.412∗∗∗ 0.081
Movable property with ownership transfer -0.960∗∗∗ 0.326
Securities 1.074∗∗ 0.493
2nd collateral
Real estate or movable property w/o ownership transfer -0.255∗∗∗ 0.093
Movable property with ownership transfer 0.769∗∗ 0.312
Securities -0.159∗∗ 0.062
State guarantee -1.117∗∗∗ 0.405
Other collateral -0.479∗∗∗ 0.141
3rd collateral
Real estate or movable property w/o ownership or deposit 0.495∗∗∗ 0.169
Assets or ensuring notes or other 0.197 0.133
Guarantee (incl. bank guarantee) or blockage of premium 0.226 0.199
Table B2.9: Robust Probit Estimation Results for Loan Purpose
Loan purpose Coefficient Robust Std. Err.
Temporary shortage of resources or residential
property
-0.591∗∗∗ 0.201
Residential property for business purposes,
overdrafts or debit, other investment loans
-0.104∗ 0.057
Residential property w/o state aid 0.331∗ 0.198
Purchase of securities 1.031∗∗ 0.434
Seasonal costs or subordinated loans 0.960∗∗∗ 0.285
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C Appendices to Chapter 3
C.1 The Vasicek Model
Recall that Vasicek (1977) defines the short-term rate process as:
dr(t) = κ (θ − r(t)) dt+ σdW (t) (C.1.1)
where κ, θ and σ are positive constants and W (t) denotes a standard Wiener process
associated with filtration Ft. The solution to the stochastic differential equation (C.1.1)
is given by:





































 · σ dW (t)















Rearranging and using the fact that r(0) = r0 gives:




The solution for s = 0 can be generalized for any s < t, which yields equation (C.1.2).
Thus, the process r(t) defined by equation (C.1.2) solves the stochastic differential equa-
26I follow the proof of Proposition 3.7 in Nielsen (1999) (Nielsen (1999), pp. 103-104).
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tion given by (C.1.1). It follows that r(t) is a Gaussian random variable with conditional
moments equal to:
E (r(t)|F0) = θ + (r0 − θ) e−κt












The term structure of interest rates is characterized by the yields to maturity. Generally,
the continuously compounded yield at time s of bond maturing at t is defined by:
R(s, t) = − ln P (s, t)
t− s
(C.1.3)
Vasicek (1977) determines the yields from the prices of discount bonds. To ensure that
the bond prices satisfy the no-arbitrage condition one needs to redefine the diffusion
process for the instantaneous interest rate under the risk neutral probability measure27.
It follows from Girsanov’s theorem that a new Brownian motion under a risk-adjusted
measure Q is defined as:
W̃ (t) = W (t) +
t∫
0
λ ds = W (t) + λt
In Vasicek’s model λ denotes a market price of risk and is assumed to be constant.
Equation (C.1.1) can be restated using process W̃ (t) in the following manner:
dr(t) = κ (θ − r(t)) dt+ σ
[













dt+ σ dW̃ (t)






dt+ σ dW̃ (t) (C.1.4)
where θ̃ = θ − λσ
κ
. The solution to the above stochastic differential equation is given by:








Given the character of the spot rate process r(t) under the market efficiency assumption,
Vasicek (1977) derives prices for discount bonds. Under the risk-neutral probability
27Rigorously speaking, it is required that the diffusion process for the bond prices has the martingale
property. For the full treatment of risk-neutral pricing refer for example to Karatzas and Shreve (1998).
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measure Q the price at time 0 of a discount bond maturing at time t is given by:







By the property of the log-normal random variable equation (C.1.6) can expressed as:





























σ · e−κ·(u−s)dW̃ (s) du
The order of integration can be changed by Fubnini’s theorem, which yields:
t∫
0














 dW̃ (s) =






















 = (θ̃ − r0) · 1− e−κ·t
κ


















4 · e−κ·t − e−2·κ·t + 2 · κ · t− 3
)
Plugging the expressions for both moments into equation (C.1.6) produces:











4 · e−κ·t − e−2·κ·t + 2 · κ · t− 3
)]
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More generally, for any 0 ≤ s ≤ t the Vasicek model postulates the following bond prices
and yields:









4e−κ(t−s) − e−2κ(t−s) + 2κ(t− s)− 3
)]
Finally, the yield is given by:



















4e−κ(t−s) − e−2κ(t−s) + 2κ(t− s)− 3
) ]
Rearranging results in:




































where κ, θ and σ are the same positive constants as in equation (C.1.1), the parameter
λ is the risk premium introduced by the risk-neutral pricing and r(s) is the current
period instantaneous interest rate driven by the stochastic differential equation (C.1.1).




represents the infinite maturity interest rate:
R(s,∞) ≡ lim
t→∞





C.2 The Cox-Ingresoll-Ross Model
Using the assumption about the factor and production dynamics Cox, Ingersoll, and
Ross (1985) arrive at the following diffusion process for the risk-free rate of interest:
dr(t) = κ (θ − r(t)) dt+ σ
√
r(t)dW (t) (C.2.1)
where κ, θ and σ are positive constants and W (t) denotes a standard Wiener process. A
unique positive solution to equation (C.2.1) is given by:






Let us also denote by r̄(t) the solution of (C.2.1) starting at r̄. To derive28 equation





= κeκtr(t)dt+ eκtdr(t) = eκt
[













Next, we integrate both sides:
















The solution for s = 0 can be generalized for any s < t, which gives equation (C.2.2).
Since the expectation of an Itô integral is 0, the conditional mean of r(t) has the same
form as in the Vasicek model.








= θ + (r0 − θ)e−κt
To compute the conditional variance of r(t), the expression E (r2(t)e2κt|F0) can be used


















= e2κt(2κθ + σ2)r(t)dt+ 2σe2κtr
3
2 (t)dW (t)
Integrating both sides and taking expectations yields:



























r(0)eκu + θ(e2κu − eκu)
)
du =










e2κt − 2eκt + 1
)
Rearranging gives:











1− 2e−κt + e−2κt
)
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And finally, the conditional variance of r(t) equals:











1− 2e−κt + e−2κt
)
Key to any pricing within the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model is the characterization of the law







. Their joint law is characterized by
the following theorem. Recall that by r̄(t) we denote the solution of (C.2.1) starting at
r̄.





















λ(γ + κ) + eγt(γ − κ) + 2µ(eγt − 1)




κ2 + 2σ2µ .
Applying the theorem with µ = 0, Lamberton and Lapeyre (2007) show how to obtain
the price of a zero-coupon bond in the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross framework. The price of the
bond with maturity T at time 0 is characterized by:
P (0, T ) = E∗
e− T∫0 r(s)ds
 = e−κθϕ(T )−r(0)ψ(T )
where the functions ϕ and ψ are given by:
















γ∗ − κ∗ + eγ∗t(γ∗ + κ∗)
with κ∗ = κ+ λ and γ∗ =
√
(κ∗)2 + 2σ2. The price at time t becomes:
P (t, T ) = exp (−κθϕ(T − t)− r(t)ψ(T − t))
29This is Theorem 9.6.4 in Elliott & Kopp (1998) or Proposition 6.2.4 in Lamberton and Lapeyre
(2007). Its proof and the derivations of the bond prices under the Cox-Ingersoll- Ross model are provided
in Elliott & Kopp (1998), pp. 273-276, and in Lamberton and Lapeyre (2007) pp. 162-164.
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or equivalently
P (t, T ) = A(t, T )e−B(t,T )r(t) (C.2.3)
where
A(t, T ) =
[
2γe(κ+γ+λ)(T−t)/2
(γ + κ+ λ)(eγ(T−t) − 1) + 2γ
]2κθ/σ2





(γ + κ+ λ)(eγ(T−t) − 1) + 2γ
γ =
√
(κ+ λ)2 + 2σ2
where κ, θ and σ are the same positive constants as in equation (C.2.1), the parameter
λ is introduced by the risk-neutral pricing and r(t) is the current period instantaneous
interest rate driven by the stochastic differential equation (3.11). Using the equation
(3.3), the continuously compounded yield for discount bonds in the CIR model can be
expressed as:
R(t, T ) =
− lnA(T, t) +B(t, T )r(t)
T − t
where A(t, T ) and B(t, T ) are defined as in formula (C.2.3). Alternatively, the CIR
bond price and yield may be obtained by solving the partial differential equation for
P (t, T ) = f(t, r(t)). Shreve (2004) propose a way to find the PDE for the function
f(t, r(t)) that characterizes the bond prices30. First, they suggest a martingale





and differentiate it to get:
d(D(t)f(t, r(t))) = f(t, r(t))dD(t) +D(t)df(t, r(t)) =
= D(t)
[








ft(t, r) + (κθ − κr)fr(t, r) +
1
2





The partial differential equation for the function f(t, r(t)) is then obtained by setting the
dt term equal to zero.
ft(t, r) + (κθ − κr)fr(t, r) +
1
2
σ2rfrr(t, r) = rf(t, r) (C.2.4)
The terminal condition reads:
f(T, r) = 1 for all r
30See Shreve (2004), pp. 273-276.
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At this stage, the solution to the above PDE can be guessed to have a form typical for
the affine term structure models, namely:
P (t, T ) = A(t, T )e−B(t,T )r(t) = e−A
∗(t,T )−B(t,T )r(t)
In such a case, partial differential equation (C.2.4) becomes:
f(t, r)
[(
−B′(t, T ) + κB(t, T ) + 1
2
σ2B2(t, T )− 1
)
r − A∗′(t, T )− κθB(t, T )
]
= 0
Since the term: (
−B′(t, T ) + κB(t, T ) + 1
2
σ2B2(t, T )− 1
)
must be 0, the remaining term must also equal 0, which in turn implies the following
ODEs:
B′(t, T ) = κB(t, T ) +
1
2
σ2B2(t, T )− 1
A∗′(t, T ) = −κθB(t, T )
Under the terminal conditions A∗(T, T ) = B(T, T ) = 0 the solutions are given by:
B(t, T ) =
sinh(γ(T − t))
γ cosh(γ(T − t)) + 1
2
κ sinh(γ(T − t))
,






γ cosh(γ(T − t)) + 1
2















Rearranging and using relation (3.3) gives the expression for the yield in the CIR model:
R(t, T ) =
− lnA(t, T ) +B(t, T )r(t)
T − t
where A(t, T ) and B(t, T ) are defined as in formula (C.2.3).
C.3 The Heath-Jarrow-Morton Model
To exclude arbitrage from bond trading, the existence of a martingale measure for all
maturities needs to be established. Shreve (2004) present a fairly short way to find such a
martingale measure31. They examine the discounted bond price for T ∈ [0, T ∗] and seek
the risk-adjusted probability measure, under which the discounted price is a martingale.
31See Shreve (2004), pp. 425-428
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The differential of the discounted bond price is given by:
d
(













Given the character of the instantaneous and continuously compounded forward rate,
f(t, T ), the price of a discount bond at time t with maturity T ≤ T ∗ is given as:





Applying the Itô lemma to the bond price dynamics implies:


















 = f(t, t)dt− T∫
t
df(t, u)du
Plugging the dynamics for the forward rate, f(t, T ), recalling that f(t, t) = r(t), and then





 = r(t)dt− T∫
t







σ(t, u)dW (t)du =
= r(t)dt− α∗(t, T )dt− σ∗(t, T )dW (t)
where
α∗(t, T )dt =
T∫
t





Inserting the obtained expression for the differential of the discounting term into equation
(C.3.1) produces:













dt− σ∗(t, T )dW (t)
]
For the discounted bond price to be a martingale relation (C.3.5) needs to be rewritten
using a new Brownian motion under a risk-adjusted measure Q defined as:
W̃ (t) = W (t) +
t∫
0
λ(s)ds =W (t) + λ(t)t
What follows, it must hold that:[(




dt− σ∗(t, T )dW (t)
]
= −σ∗(t, T )λ(t)dt− σ∗(t, T )dW (t)
Clearly, it implies:
−α∗(t, T ) + 1
2
(α∗(t, T ))2 = −σ∗(t, T )λ(t)
Differentiating both sides with respect to T gives:




α∗(t, T ) = α(t, T ) and
∂
∂T
σ∗(t, T ) = σ(t, T )
Substituting for σ∗(t, T ) yields the no-arbitrage drift condition (3.15):




 , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], T ∈ [0, T ∗]
Using the no-arbitrage drift restriction, the forward-rate process in (3.13) can be formu-
lated under the risk-neutral probability measure Q as:
df(t, T ) = α(t, T )dt+ σ(t, T )dW (t) =




+σ(t, T )(λ(t) + dW (t)) =
σ(t, T ) T∫
t
σ(t, u)du
 dt+ σ(t, T )dW̃ (t) (C.3.5)
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where W̃ (t) is the Wiener process under the martingale measure Q, λ(t) denotes a market
price of risk and 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≤ T ∗. In an integral form, the dynamics for the instantaneous
forward rate (C.3.5) is given as:
f(t, T ) = f(0, T ) +
t∫
0
σ(v, T )σ∗(v, T )dv +
t∫
0
σ(v, T )dW̃v (C.3.6)
From equation (C.3.6), the yields on contingent claims for every fixed maturity T ≤ T ∗
can be written as:






Combining equations (C.3.6) and (C.3.7) gives formula (3.19) for the yield in the Heath-
Jarrow-Morton framework32. To simplify, term R̄(t, T ) = (T−t)R(t, T ) is first considered.
From equations (C.3.6) and (C.3.7), it follows that R̄(t, T ) must satisfy:














Applying Fubini’s theorem and rearranging gives:




























The instantaneous interest rate can be expresses as:
ru = f(u, u) = f(0, u) +
u∫
0




From the above it follows that:



























32The derivations are loosely based on Musiela and Rutkowski (2005), pp. 420-421
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Consequently, the yields on the contingent claims are charaterized by relation (3.19):






















σ(u, s)ds dW̃ (u)
T − t
C.4 The Nelson-Siegel Model
One of the specifications postulated in (Nelson and Siegel 1987) describes the instan-
taneous forward rate for maturity m by the following exponential equation with equal
roots33:












where τ is a time constant that determines the rate at which the regressors decay to zero















β0 + β1 · e−
x

















































































τ dx = −m · e−
m
τ + I1 =
= −m · e−
m






Substituting for I1 and I2 gives:
m∫
0






− β2 ·m · e−
m
τ
33I follow the notation of (Nelson and Siegel 1987)
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− β2 · e−
m
τ
Finally, rearranging yields the expression for the yield34:







where parameters τ , β0, β1 and β2 are defined as in expression (C.4.1). By construct, β0
















It can be also shown that for maturities close to 0 the yield approaches (β0 + β1).
lim
m→0



















= β0 + β1
34It is a slightly altered formulation of the one presented in formula (2) in Nelson and Siegel (1987),
p. 475.
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